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vAbstract
Web Based Social Networks (WBSNs) are well-known applications which are used
by thousands of people worldwide. However, privacy issues, and access control in
particular, cannot be disregarded. WBSNs consist of users who upload data to
be shared with other users and the management of who is able to access to the
uploaded data is a subject to study. In this respect, this thesis focuses on four
aspects. First, WBSN users have to specify their privacy preferences in a fine-
grained way. Second, WBSN data is not usually related to a single user, who
uploads it and who is considered the owner, but to multiple users who are referred
to as co-owners. Then, access control has to be managed preserving the privacy
of both, owners and co-owners, such that all their privacy preferences are satisfied
without restrictions. Thirdly, the great quantity of WBSNs forces users upon being
enrolled in many of them, though being access control management a cumbersome
task. Lastly, users upload data to WBSNs and providers store it and may use it for
unnoticed or unauthorized purposes.
The widespread development of WBSNs has contributed to the enhancement
of these applications. The demanding necessity of providing users with tools to
control accesses to their data, has boosted the development of proposals in this
regard. Nonetheless, a general lack of fine-grained management is detected.
The goal of this thesis is to facilitate fine-grained access control management
along the whole usage process within and among different WBSNs in a privacy pre-
serving way. Firstly, an expressive usage control model, together with its admin-
istrative model, is proposed to achieve the definition of fine-grained access control
preferences.
Based on previous models, a mechanism to manage co-ownership corresponds
to the second contribution of this thesis. Data is decomposed in parts and each
of them is assigned to the owner or to a co-owner who establishes access control
preferences. Then, these preferences are jointly evaluated and the privacy of all
vi
users is completely preserved.
Having the right tools to manage access control in a fine-grained way, the third
and last contribution of this thesis is a pair of protocols, one being based on an
extension of the other, to attain interoperability, reusability and unauthorized data
exposures among different WBSNs. Also taking the proposed usage control model
as the underlying base to manage access control, these protocols reduce the burden
of managing access control in different applications and thus, they help to increase
users’ control over their data.
As a result, this thesis aims to be a challenging step towards the enhancement
of access control management procedures in the social networking field.
Keywords: Web Based Social Network (WBSN), Fine-grained access control,
Access control model expressive-power, Interoperability, Reusability, Data exposure
minimization.
vii
Resumen
Las Redes Sociales (RSs) son aplicaciones conocidas y utilizadas a lo largo y ancho
del mundo. Sin embargo, los problemas de privacidad, y de control de acceso en
particular, no pueden menospreciarse. Las RSs se basan en usuarios que comparten
datos entre s´ı, siendo la gestio´n de quie´n puede acceder a dichos datos un tema al
que hay que prestar especial intere´s. En base a esto, la presente Tesis estudia cuatro
cuestiones. Primero, los usuarios de las RSs tienen que especificar sus preferencias
con alta granularidad. Segundo, los datos de las RSs no se asocian a un u´nico
usuario, considerado el propietario y quien sube los datos a las RSs, sino que pueden
estar asociados a mu´ltiples usuarios, los cuales reciben el nombre de copropietarios.
Por ello, el control de acceso tiene que preservar la privacidad de todos los usuarios,
tanto de los propietarios como de los copropietarios, consiguiendo satisfacer las
preferencias de control de acceso de todos ellos. Tercero, la gran cantidad de RSs
existentes obliga a los usuarios a crear cuentas en cada una de ellas en las que
quieran participar, siendo la gestio´n del control de acceso una tarea tediosa. En
u´ltimo lugar, los usuarios suben sus datos a las RSs y los proveedores de servicio
los almacenan, pudie´ndolos utilizar para su propio beneficio.
La necesidad de proporcionar a los usuarios las herramientas adecuadas para
que puedan controlar sus datos ha acelerado el desarrollo de propuestas para la
mejora de las RSs. Sin embargo, se detecta una falta de granularidad en la gestio´n
del control de acceso.
El objetivo de esta Tesis es facilitar la gestio´n del control de acceso con alta
granularidad entre distintas RSs a lo largo de todo el proceso de uso y preservando
la privacidad. En primer lugar se propone un modelo de uso expresivo, junto con el
modelo administrativo complementario, para conseguir la definicio´n de preferencias
de control de acceso con alta granularidad.
Basado en los modelos anteriores, la segunda de las contribuciones se corres-
ponde con el desarrollo de un mecanismo para la gestio´n de la copropiedad. Los
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datos son descompuestos en partes y cada parte asignada al propietario o a un
copropietario para que e´ste establezca las preferencias de privacidad deseadas. Pos-
teriormente, en cada solicitud de acceso a un dato se evalu´an todas las preferencias,
preserva´ndose as´ı la privacidad de todos los usuarios.
Disponiendo de las herramientas adecuadas para gestionar el control de acceso
con alta granularidad, la tercera y u´ltima de las contribuciones de esta tesis consiste
en el desarrollo de un par de protocolos, uno extendiendo el otro. Estos protocolos
facilitan la interoperabilidad, la reusabilidad y la minimizacio´n del acceso a los
datos de forma no autorizada entre distintas RSs. Igualmente, aplicando el modelo
de uso propuesto para la gestio´n del control de acceso, estos protocolos reducen
las tareas a realizar para gestionar el acceso en distintas aplicaciones y por tanto,
ayudan a incrementar el control que los usuarios tienen sobre sus datos.
En resumen, esta tesis pretende dar un paso en la mejora del control de acceso
en las RSs.
Palabras clave: Red Sociale (RS), Control de acceso granular, Expresividad
en modelo de control de acceso, Interoperabilidad, Reusabilidad, Minimizacio´n de
datos expuestos.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This Chapter introduces the context of the thesis, the statement of the problem,
the main objectives of the thesis, the achieved contributions and the document
organization.
1.1 Context
Currently, we are in the era of techno-dependecy and hyper-connectivity [2] and
Web Based Social Networks (WBSNs) are remarkable developments in this regard.
WBSNs are growing tremendously [3, 4] and since the release of Friendster in 2002
until recent times, many WBSNs, like Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, etc., with
different purposes but under the same bases, have emerged. Despite the unques-
tionable benefits of these applications, e.g. the communication of people worldwide,
security and specially privacy issues are tough challenges to face up to.
Privacy is defined as “the condition of not having undocumented personal knowl-
edge about one possessed by other (1983)” [5]. WBSNs store large amounts of data,
some of them is personal and they must be carefully protected and managed, even
if it is an issue not thoroughly taken into account by users [6] and, sometimes,
confusing [7]. Assorted studies have analysed security and privacy concerns in WB-
SNs. Specifically, two different perspectives have been considered, from the users
and from the researchers point of view. Although users do not consider privacy
a primary requirement, researchers promote the creation of systems that look not
only after users expectations but after users security as well.
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Regarding users perspective, many authors have contributed to the analysis.
Becker et al. concluded that the total of Facebook users have never used any of
the privacy mechanisms provided [8]. Likewise, Acquisti et al. analyzed that even
Facebook users who are aware of privacy problems continue using it [6]. This matter
can be related to the enormous appearance of perceived benefits, as well as to the
fact that people may be conscious about internet security but not aware of its
threats [9]. By contrast, more recently, some studies reveal that users are becoming
much more private [10, 7].
Despite interests and motivations of WBSN users, studied by researchers and
highlighted by authorities, privacy is extremely relevant in everybody’s life. For
instance, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 12 sets up the right
to not have interferences with our privacy1. Likewise, according to the Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995, article
8 points out “Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data revealing
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-
union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life” [11].
Besides, the United Nations General Assembly has recently adopted “The right to
privacy in the digital age”, such that “... human rights should prevail irrespective
of the medium and therefore need to be protected both offline and online,...” [12]. In
this respect some techniques and mechanisms are applied to allow users to control
their data. Indeed, the fact of being private may become an illusion that blinds
users and prevents them from identifying what data is really available to the public
[7]. Consequently, researchers and practitioners work in the development of data
protection measures that help to achieve the same level of privacy found off-line
[13].
Considering the aforementioned importance of privacy, together with the in-
crease of WBSNs, a crucial question arises: Do WBSNs provide enough mechanisms
to preserve privacy? Although significant developments have been performed like
1http://www.un.org/en/index.shtml , last access May 2014
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tools that allow users to accept or decline being tagged in a photo, much more work
is required [14, 15]. Given that WBSNs are based on managing data of multiple
users, access control is a key research area where this thesis contributes.
According to the NIST, “access control is concerned with determining the al-
lowed activities of legitimate users, mediating every attempt by a user to access a
resource in the system” [16]. In the WBSN field, a pair of issues related to access
control are distinguished, one of them associated with achieving protection against
WBSN users [17] and another related to achieve protection against WBSN providers
[18].
On the one hand, the most common access control developments are based
on creating security measures to allow users specify who may access their data.
For instance, if certain resources, such as photos, are restricted to friends, access
attempts from friends of a friend should be denied. Nonetheless, the key issue is
to provide fine-grained access control management, allowing users to specify their
preferences in detail, that is, expressive access control is the challenge pursued
[19]. For example, some photos, related to the topic “Summer Parties”, may be
available for friends from June to September 2014 and restricted to friends that
are also relatives. Another point to notice is that, traditionally, access control
management is performed before data delivery. By contrast, recent developments
pose new demands that lead to enforce access control along the whole usage process
[20]. For instance, once photos entitled “Party” are accessed, their download may
be denied.
Furthermore, as WBSNs manage data of a huge amount of users and some data
belong to more users than the owner (that is the user who uploads them to the
WBSN), co-ownership access control management is another noticeable issue. For
instance, in a photo of a street gang multiple people apart from the owner appear
and all of them become its co-owners. Thus, access control should involve the
management of owners and co-owners preferences.
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Additionally, given the wide variety of WBSNs with different purposes but with
similar type of data in use, access control management may become a burden [21].
For instance, the main goal of Facebook is to share photos and comments among
friends and friends of a friend. Similarly, but directly focused on meeting people,
Badoo allows sharing photos and making comments. Users have to upload and
manage access control in all the WBSNs in which they are enrolled, regardless of
being the same data at stake in several WBSNs.
On the other hand, WBSN providers may be a threat that requires protection
[18]. In most of WBSNs, users can establish which users may access their data but
WBSN providers are in full control of uploaded data. Therefore, providers can use
data for their own interests without, in many cases, users notice or consent.
1.2 Motivation
The general purpose of this thesis is the enhancement of WBSN access control
management, being specially focused on allowing users the specification of fine-
grained preferences. The point is to mimic real life [22]. WBSNs researchers have
to mimic daily life human interactions and behaviours. In this regard, users should
be allowed to interact with any other users regardless of the type and purpose of
the WBSNs.
Nevertheless, it should be reminded that privacy is at the top and apart from
mimicking real life, the preservation of privacy is the primary requirement [23].
WBSNs can be generally defined as systems where users interact with each other
to share data but accesses are restricted to a set of chosen users and forbidden for
the rest.
The previous issues lead to the detection of four specific problems addressed in
this thesis:
P1. Lack of fine-grained access control systems that give WBSNs
users full control over their data.
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WBSNs consist of a large number of users who own huge amounts of data and
interact with each other through the establishment of relationships. Consequently,
the point is to provide procedures that allow users to manage their data in such a
way that all possible necessities are satisfied while respecting privacy. Since the de-
velopment of traditional access control models, generally referred to as Mandatory,
Discretionary and Role Based Access Control (MAC, DAC and RBAC respectively),
a significant set of models tailored for the WBSN context have arisen. Some mod-
els focus on the update and refinement of traditional models, specially RBAC, to
be adapted to WBSN demands [24, 25]. On the other hand, new access control
models have been specially developed to meet WBSN necessities [26, 27, 28, 29].
Besides, usage control models are noticeable developments as they focus on man-
aging access not only before delivering data but also along the whole usage process
[30, 31]. The persistent control of WBSN users’ data is a desirable feature and
usage control models are key approaches in this regard. Nonetheless, proposed ac-
cess control models and mechanisms for WBSNs have a pair of deficiencies. First,
they are not expressive enough to allow users to specify all their preferences and
then, fine-grained access control management is not provided, e.g. specifying the
duration of a certain relationship together with the necessity of having a pair of
common contacts. Secondly, access control models for WBSNs are not focused on
usage control.
P2. Lack of co-ownership management mechanisms which satisfy all
user preferences without restrictions.
Commonly, WBSN data belongs to several users, namely, the owner who uploads
them and co-owners who are related to them. Thus, access control should manage
both, owners and co-owners privacy preferences. Besides, the satisfaction of all user
preferences is an essential requirement to prevent violations of some users privacy.
Several proposals focus on co-ownership management, being voting schemes the
most common solution [32, 33]. However, this type of scheme may violate some users
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privacy, e.g. the most voted option scheme violates privacy of WBSN users who do
not vote for a concrete option. By contrast, there are other type of works, namely,
the one proposed by K. Thomas et al. [34] which satisfies all user preferences if a
full consensus between owners and co-owners is reached. Nonetheless, this solution
is rather limited as, in many cases, no agreement can be found. Therefore, co-
ownership access control management should preserve owners and co-owners privacy
but in the most flexible way.
P3. Inability to reuse and jointly manage data among different WB-
SNs.
There are an assorted set of WBSNs with assorted purposes and services and
users enrol in all of them that they want to enjoy. For instance, LinkedIn is focused
on the professional audience and Facebook on the general public. Due to the lack
of interoperability, users have to create as many accounts as WBSNs in which they
want to become enrolled. Then, data management is quite laborious because data
is stored and managed in each WBSN where they are uploaded. Besides, some data
used in a particular WBSN is analogous to the one used in another and there is
not possibility of reusing them, e.g. photos in Facebook and photos in MySpace.
In this respect, several solutions are proposed [35, 36, 37]. The standard OpenID2
is an example, which can facilitate identity data interoperability. Other example is
User-Managed Access (UMA) protocol [1, 38]. Among other issues, UMA provides
users with control over data-sharing, which is a key feature towards resources and
access control policies interoperability [1, 38]. However, these contributions do not
provide a concrete procedure to achieve interoperability of resusability of resources,
identity data and access control policies. Indeed, in practice, there is not a single
approach that gets access to data, i.e. photos, or get the reuse of data, i.e. access
control policies, of a WBSN to another.
P4. Disclosures of data that lead to the violation of users privacy.
Commonly known, lots of daily news inform about the persistent disclosure of
2http://openid.net/ , last access May 2014
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WBSN users data, either by service providers3 or by attackers4. WBSN providers
are in possession of all uploaded data and, once accepted the “Terms Of Service”
at the registration phase, data can be licitly used for different purposes, e.g. com-
mercial issues. On the other hand, service providers, apart from using data licitly
(which may violate users privacy), claim that they use security measures that pre-
vent unnoticed data deliveries and disclosures. Nonetheless, multiple attacks have
been performed over popular WBSNs5 and users data has become compromised.
Therefore, data has to be appropriately protected against insiders and outsiders,
that is, against licit use by service providers and illicit use by attackers. Regard-
less what the “Terms Of Service” states and attackers could achieve, privacy must
be preserved over everything else. To address this matter cryptography has been
the primary applied technique in the literature [39, 40]. In general, data is stored
encrypted and decryption keys are delivered among authorized users. The main
drawback which should be carefully considered is that, specially in systems like
WBSNs where many data are accessed by many users, key management is a hard
task.
1.3 Objectives and contributions
The general goal of this thesis is to facilitate fine-grained access control management
along the whole usage process within and among different WBSNs in a privacy-
preserving way.
There was a need to address the previous research topics, which have been
reflected in the objectives of this thesis:
O1. Develop a model to provide expressive management achieving that
WBSN users have full control over their data. It should provide a complete
3http://www.digitaleyemedia.com/blog/boxes-you-want-to-uncheck-on-linkedin, last access
May 2014
4http://www.facebook.com/notes/facebooksecurity/protectingpeopleonfacebook/1015124
9208250766, last access May 2014
5http://allfacebook.com/camera-bug-security-loophole-version-1-1-2 b107435, last access May
2014
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solution including administrative functions.
O2. Develop a mechanism to allow co-ownership management and pro-
vide owners and co-owners with the appropriate tools to jointly manage access
control. The privacy of all users has to be preserved.
O3. Develop a mechanism that addresses interoperability and reusabil-
ity among different WBSNs reducing the necessity of managing several
WBSN accounts.
O4. Develop a mechanism to deal with undesirable accesses to WBSN
users’ data, protecting users from privacy violations. It should ensure the
ease of key management.
The achievement of these objectives has led to the next three contributions:
C1. An expressive usage control model for WBSNs (see Chapter 4) to-
gether with the complementary administrative model (see Chapter 5) that
allow fine-grained access control management. Depicting a WBSN as a graph, where
users are nodes and edges relationships, SoNeUCONABC and SoNeUCONADM are
proposed. SoNeUCONABC is an extension of UCONABC that achieves expressive
access control regarding a set of six WBSN features. UCONABC is an usage control
model based on Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC). It is extended in such a
way that users, data and relationship attributes are managed. Access control man-
agement is carried out in a privacy-preserving way, as apart from the attributes of
the administrator and the requester of a particular data, the attributes of the rest
of nodes involved in the relationships between them remain hidden. Additionally,
SoNeUCONADM is the administrative model for SoNeUCONABC . It defines the
management of revocation, delegation and other administrative tasks. The suitabil-
ity of both models is evaluated. In SoNeUCONABC the fulfilment of the required
set of WBSN features is theoretically studied. Furthermore, policy enforcement
temporal workload is measured through a proof of concept system, concluding the
appropriateness of the model for most of the features. On the other hand, the
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evaluation of SoNeUCONADM analyses the satisfaction of administrative tasks.
C2. A co-ownership management mechanism for decomposable ob-
jects (see Chapter 6) that allows the preservation of owners and co-owners privacy.
WBSN data may be not related to a single user, but to a set of co-owners as
well and, for these situations, Co-owned Personal Data management (CooPeD) is
proposed. CooPeD presents a novel technique to preserve the privacy of all users
satisfying all users demands without restrictions. Inspired by [41], objects are de-
composed in parts and assigned to users. Then, each part belongs to a particular
owner/ co-owner who individually manages it establishing his access control pref-
erences. CooPeD is developed over SoNeUCONABC and SoNeUCONADM by
extending both models to integrate co-ownership management. CooPeD has been
evaluated by means of a proof of concept system to analyse the feasibility of using
SoNeUCONABC for co-ownership management, a prototype to prove the feasibil-
ity of implementing CooPeD, and a survey to study the relevance of co-ownership
management and the usefulness and appealing of the proposal.
C3. Mechanisms to achieve interoperability and reusability among
different WBSNs including data exposure minimization (see Chapters 7
and 8). A pair of protocols constructed over SoNeUCONABC are proposed. As
a primary step, based on the UMA core protocol [1] and the FOAF project [42],
UMA+FOAF Social Nework protocol (U+F) is proposed. It attains interoperability
and reusability of resources, identity data and access control policies across differ-
ent WBSNs, where resources mainly correspond to photos, videos and audio files
and identity data refers to the users’ profile and contacts data. This protocol exclu-
sively focuses on direct relationships. Next, extended U+F Social Network protocol
(eU+F) is proposed, including the protection of data against WBSNs providers and
the management of indirect relationships, being essential the latter feature to al-
low fine-grained access control. Indirect relationships facilitate the management of
WBSN features like multi-paths, which allow accessing users’ data through mul-
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Problem Objective Contribution
P1: Lack of fine-grained
access control systems
that give WBSNs users
full control over their
data.
O1: A model to pro-
vide expressive manage-
ment, together with ad-
ministrative functions.
C1: An expressive usage
control model for WB-
SNs and its administra-
tive model.
P2: Lack of co-
ownership management
mechanisms which sat-
isfy all user preferences
without restrictions.
O2: A mechanism to al-
low co-ownership man-
agement satisfying all
owners and co-owners
privacy preferences.
C2: A mechanism to
manage co-ownership for
decomposable objects in
WBSNs.
P3: Inability to reuse
and jointly manage data
O3: Interoperability
and reusability between
C3: A mechanism to
reach interoperability
among different WB-
SNs.
WBSNs. and reusability among
different WBSNs that
P4: Disclosures of data
that lead to the viola-
tion of users privacy.
O4: A mechanism to
deal with undesirable
accesses to WBSN
users’ data, protecting
users from privacy
violations.
also minimizes unautho-
rized data exposures.
Table 1.1: Relationship between problems, objectives and contributions
tiple user relationships [17]. A prototype is developed to verify the feasibility of
implementing both protocols in a simulated environment, as well as to compare
their workload regarding a pair of well-known WBSNs, Facebook and MySpace.
Moreover, U+F and eU+F are jointly compared. As a result, it is noticed that
the temporal workload of eU+F, as expected, is higher than that of U+F. Besides,
results show that both protocols can be considered acceptable and challenging ap-
proaches that, even supposing a workload increase in comparison with Facebook
and MySpace, satisfactorily attain all established requirements.
The relationship between the detected problems, the objectives and the achieved
contributions is shown in Table 1.1.
We find that these issues are a step towards the enhancement of current WBSNs
access control management procedures. All contributions of this thesis are summa-
rized in Figure 1.1. The process starts by uploading and managing data in WBSNs,
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Figure 1.1: Overview of contributions
together with the establishment of access control policies (Message 1 of Figure 1.1).
Then, users are able to request data of users enrolled in any other WBSN, including
those whose access is direct (msg. 2 of Figure 1.1) or those whose access is indirect
and has to be performed through other user/s (msg. 3 of Figure 1.1). Besides,
unauthorized accesses to data are prevented applying cryptography and managing
access along the whole usage process (msg. 3 of Figure 1.1). Furthermore, note
that in case of co-owned data, access control enforcement involves the evaluation
and the satisfaction of the owner’s and co-owners’ policies (msg. 4 of Figure 1.1).
Nonetheless, privacy problems caused by the use of external devices, such as
photo cameras, or other elements like systems to record on-screen activities, are left
out of the scope of this thesis. On the other hand, users with whom a relationship is
established, are always considered trusted. Thus, the identification of unexpected
malicious changes in their behaviour is a matter of future work. In case users
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behaviours differ from the common one, e.g. using an anonymity server to preserve
their identity, they would be considered untrusted WBSN users, being tools to
monitor trustworthiness a starting point of research [43].
The research results published in scientific journals and conferences during the
development of the present thesis are listed in Appendix B.
1.4 Document organization
This thesis is composed by ten chapters organized in five parts:
Part I. Introduction. This part introduces the document and it includes this
Chapter.
Chapter 1. Introduction. This Chapter involves the context of the thesis, the
statement of the problem, the research objectives and the proposed contributions.
Part II. State of the art. This part analyses the state of the art associated
with this thesis. The analysis has been organised into a pair of chapters.
Chapter 2. Access control in WBSNs. This chapter presents an overview
of current trends in WBSN access control management. It introduces the main con-
cepts of access control management to afterwards, present access control models for
the WBSN field and specify WBSN access control requirements. Moreover, access
control administration and co-ownership management in collaborative environments
are analysed.
Chapter 3. Interoperability and reusability management. Applica-
tions and technologies. This chapter introduces applications and technologies
currently applied for interoperability purposes.
Part III. Proposal. This part contains the set of developed proposals to
satisfied the objectives of this thesis. There are a total of three contribution, the
first of them is divided in Chapters 4 and 5, the second proposal is presented in
Chapter 6 and the third and last contribution is split into Chapters 7 and 8.
Chapter 4. SoNeUCONABC : an expressive usage control model for
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WBSNs. This Chapter presents SoNeUCONABC . It extends UCONABC [44]
including relationship management, allowing privacy-preserving and fine-grained
access control management. Subjects, objects and relationships attributes are man-
aged in such a way that, apart from the attributes of the administrator (the owner)
and the requester of a particular data, the attributes of the rest of users remain
hidden. Besides, expressive power is attained by the definition of an access control
policy language along with its enforcement procedures.
Chapter 5. SoNeUCONADM : an administrative model for
SoNeUCONABC . This Chapter introduces SoNeUCONADM , an administrative
model for SoNeUCONABC . Basically, it presents the management of use and ad-
ministrative rights which involve managing administrative objects, delegation and
revocation.
Chapter 6. CooPeD: Co-owned personal data management. In this
Chapter a co-ownership management mechanism is presented. It protects privacy
of all WBSN users to whom an object is related. The proposal is applicable to
decomposable objects. It consists of managing objects as they where composed of
parts. Each part belongs to a particular user who individually manages it. Besides,
it is developed over SoNeUCONABC and SoNeUCONADM .
Chapter 7. UMA+FOAF Social Network Protocol. Achieving in-
teroperability and reusability between WBSNs. This Chapter describes
UMA+FOAF Social Network Protocol (U+F) to achieve interoperability and
reusability of identity data, resources and access control policies among different
WBSNs. It focuses on UMA protocol [1, 38] and the FOAF project [42]. Fur-
thermore, it works on top of SoNeUCONABC and access control management is
performed accordingly.
Chapter 8. Extended UMA+FOAF Social Network Protocol. Includ-
ing data exposure minimization and indirect relationships management.
In this Chapter U+F is extended in two ways. First, eU+F includes indirect re-
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lationships management to achieve fine-grained access control. Second, a hybrid
cryptographic approach is applied to protect data against unnoticed deliveries.
Moreover, this proposal works over SoNeUCONABC .
Part IV. Evaluation and Conclusions. In this part the evaluation and the
conclusions of proposed contributions are presented in two different Chapters.
Chapter 9. Evaluation. The evaluation of the contributions of this thesis is
presented in this Chapter. The evaluation involves:
 SoNeUCONABC is evaluated analysing its expressive power and testing the
feasibility of the proposal through a proof of concept which calculates the
temporal workload of the enforcement process.
 SoNeUCONADM is analysed assessing the completeness of the model through
a comparison with a pair of administrative models.
 CooPeD is evaluated, in first place, to assert the feasibility of its application
over SoNeUCONABC . Secondly, a prototype helps to analyse the possibility
of implementing CooPeD. Lastly, a total of 206 people worldwide have been
surveyed to test the usefulness and the relevance of the proposal.
 U+F is theoretically evaluated discussing the satisfaction of established re-
quirements and analysing its performance. Also, the performance and the
applicability of U+F is empirically analysed by a prototype development.
Additionally, results are compared with two challenging WBSNs, Facebook
and MySpace.
 eU+F is also theoretically and empirically analysed. The fulfilment of pro-
posed requirements and its performance is theoretically studied. By contrast,
enhancing the prototype developed for the evaluation of U+F, the applicabil-
ity of eU+F is empirically analysed. The protocol is compared with Facebook
and MySpace as well.
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 U+F and eU+F are jointly compared, theoretically, to analyse applied ele-
ments and empirically, to study the temporal workload of every protocol’s
phase.
Chapter 10. Conclusions. In this Chapter the conclusions of this thesis are
described. It involves a critical discussion of the work performed and the outline of
future and open research issues.
Part V. Bibliography and Appendices. This part includes the bibliography
in use, the scientific publications derived from the underlying research, and a set of
appendices that complement the main content.
Bibliography. The list of references to other research papers, technical docu-
ments and standards used in the thesis are presented herein.
Acronyms and abbreviations The set of acronyms and abbreviations that
are used throughout this thesis are described herein.
Publications. The papers related to this thesis in which the author has par-
ticipated are listed herein.
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Part II
State of the art

Chapter 2
Access control in WBSNs
The huge increase of WBSNs applications promotes the persistent development
of new technological advances. In regard to the great amount of data and users
involved in WBSNs, access control plays a key role. Users have to control, at every
moment, who and under which circumstances their data remains accessible.
This chapter presents an overview of current trends in access control manage-
ment for WBSNs. First, Section 2.1 presents the main concepts of access control
management. Next, access control models for WBSNs are described in Section 2.2.
In Section 2.3 the use of cryptography to provide access control is presented. Af-
terwards, requirements regarding access control in WBSNs are defined in Section
2.4. Section 2.5 depicts an study of the expressive power of access control policy
languages. In Section 2.6 access control administration in collaborative environ-
ments is described. Finally, co-ownership management in access control systems for
collaborative environments is presented in Section 2.7.
2.1 Access control management in WBSNs
Access control is the process of mediating requests of data managed by a system
and determining whether the request is granted or denied. In this regard, access
control policies, models and mechanisms are defined [45]. Access control policies
are generally described as high-level rules which regulate who/ under which con-
straints access is granted. Related to policies, access control models provide a formal
representation of policies, as well as the way they are enforced. Likewise, access
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control mechanisms correspond to the implementation of models, being noticeable
that a particular model can be implemented by different mechanisms. For instance,
discretionary policies are formalized in the access matrix model. This model is rep-
resented as a matrix where rows are subjects and columns are objects of the system.
Then, for each request (subject, object), the access matrix determines which actions
are available. Besides, this model can be implemented in different mechanisms, for
instance, applying an access control list where each object is associated with a list
of subjects and a list of the actions that can be performed over objects [46].
Concerning the WBSN field, this Section presents components involved in access
control management (Section 2.1.1) and the general access control enforcement
procedure (Section 2.1.2).
2.1.1 Components
Access control is one of the most relevant services related to data management
systems such as WBSNs, in which a huge quantity of users and data are at stake.
Its main goal is to protect resources and identity data from unauthorized users
and/or applications. In order to achieve this issue, the following components take
part in its provision [47]:
 Users: according to the system different sets of users are identified. In par-
ticular, in the WBSN context, for simplicity, users are usually classified as
administrators, who are the data owners and responsible of establishing access
control policies, and requesters, who request access to resources and identity
data. Nonetheless, proposals such as [48, 32] distinguish five types of users:
disseminators, who share owned data with other users; stakeholders, who are
users tagged within other users’ data; contributors, who publish data in other
users’ space; owners, who own data; and accessors, who request access to
data.
 Identity data: it refers to users’ profiles and contacts’ information.
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 Resources: it refers to photos, videos, comments and any other objects,
distinct from identity data, managed in WBSNs.
 Access control policies: they refer to high-level rules related to resources
and identity data.
 Reference monitor: it is the core component of access control manage-
ment architectures. It consists of two elements, the Policy Decision Point
(PDP) and the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). They are standardized with
the X.812 access control framework (ITU-T, 1995), being also known as Ac-
cess Control Decision Function (ADF) and the Access Control Enforcement
Function (AEF) [49]. The former provides affirmative or negative responses
in regard to the requested rights on a particular data according to defined
policies. The latter enforces decisions taken by the PDP. Both elements are
considered trusted entities.
2.1.2 Enforcement procedure
Access control mechanisms determine the concrete implementation of access control
enforcement procedures. In general, users request data to the reference monitor.
Then, the reference monitor identifies access control policies to satisfy and, regard-
ing their evaluation, the access is granted or denied.
Focusing on existing WBSNs, each of them stores uploaded resources, speci-
fied identity data and established access control policies (see Figure 2.1). Thus,
regardless of applied policies, models and architectures, access control enforcement
is carried out in the reference monitor each WBSN possesses.
2.2 Access control models for WBSNs
The emergence of computer systems supports the development of access control
models (ACMs). Traditional ACMs can be classified as Mandatory Access Control
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Figure 2.1: Current WBSNs
Model (MAC) where objects and subjects are classified according to security levels
and access is granted in regard to them; Discretionary Access Control (DAC), in
which access to information is carried out in respect to the user’s identity and a set
of authorizations or rules; and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) which focuses
on the definition of different roles, assigning permissions (rights) to roles, and, then,
assigning roles to subjects. Additionally, Attributed-Based Access Control Model
(ABAC) is a rather recent model that is currently receiving a lot of attention. Access
is granted or denied in regard to subject, data and environment attributes [50, 51,
52, 53]. Nevertheless, current software developments in which service providers
and huge amount of users and data become involved, promote the evolution of
traditional ACMs and the development of new ones.
Regarding WBSNs, RBAC is the traditional approach that has received more
attention. It has been extended in many ways to meet WBSN requirements [24, 25,
54]. Administrators assign roles to chosen WBSN users to mean that a relationship
is established among them. Access control is managed through roles and it can be
compared with the establishment and management of groups.
The ABAC model has been also applied to the WBSN context. C.W.D. Munck-
hof proposes an ACM that automatically selects a particular policy for a post or
an added message based on its attributes [55]. On the other hand, J. Park et al.
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present ACON, an ACM based on managing user, data and session attributes [30].
Nonetheless, some other authors propose models specially developed for the
WBSN context. Several works present access control models that can be classified
as Relationship-Based Access Control models (RelBAC) [26, 27, 28, 32]. WBSNs
deal with an assorted kind of relationships like unidirectional, bidirectional, direct,
indirect, etc., and the RelBAC models provide appropriate management procedures
that address these aspects. The first RelBAC model was presented by F. Giunchiglia
et al. and the novelty of this approach lays in the management of permissions as
binary relationships between users and data [26]. Similarly, other RelBAC models
focus on capturing the essence of social relationships through the management of
relationships between pairs of users, usually, administrators and requesters [27, 28,
32].
Also associated to WBSNs, Trust-Based Access Control Models (TBAC) have
been developed. They focus on using trust as a condition to access data. Depending
on the level of trust of users and data, access is granted or denied. For instance,
B. Carminati et al.’s proposal focuses on managing the type, depth and trust of
relationships between pairs of users [28]. Another related contribution is Personal
Data Access Control (PDAC), which focuses on trust computations to identify the
users that may access data [56]. Trust in this case is computed through the level
of trust that some users, who are authorized, put in others. A simpler approach
is developed in [57]. Different levels of trust are assigned to objects and access
is granted to users who prove having an equal or a higher level of trust than the
requested object.
Finally, another type of WBSN ACMs is noticed, Ontology-Based Access Con-
trol (OBAC) models. They consider assorted and fine-grained access control man-
agement systems based on the use of ontologies specially developed for WBSNs
[58, 59, 29].
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2.3 Cryptographic-based approaches to access control
in WBSNs
Several approaches combine cryptographic techniques with access control manage-
ment to provide data confidentiality. Five different categories of access control
cryptographic approaches can be distinguished in the WBSN area.
The first category involves the most simple cryptographic approaches. Basi-
cally, data is encrypted with an encryption key and decryption keys are distributed
among chosen users [60, 61, 62, 40, 63, 64, 65]. The main drawback of this kind
of approaches is key management complexity because decryption keys have to be
distributed to all appropriate users.
Y. Zhu et al. and L. A. Cutillo et al. propose group-based cryptographic
proposals ([66] and [67] respectively). The general idea behind these works is that
groups agree upon encryption keys and the decryption ones are shared between
every group member. Nonetheless, key distribution continues being a hard task.
Trying to alleviate key management, K. B. Frikken et al.’s proposal lays the
bases of the third category. Derivable keys in relation to the distance between
WBSN users are used in encryption and decryption processes. Despite the decrease
of keys distribution complexity, derivable keys may cause that undesirable users
could decrypt certain data [68].
The fourth category focuses on hybrid cryptographic schemes in which symmet-
ric and asymmetric cryptography is jointly applied. In particular, K. Graffi et al.’s
work falls in this category. They propose an hybrid scheme where data is sym-
metrically encrypted and symmetric keys are asymmetrically encrypted for each
authorized user [39]. Thus, despite the efficiency of the proposal concerning keys
distribution, storage space is neglected. Symmetric keys per encrypted data have
to be encrypted and stored for all chosen users.
From a different point of view and also avoiding key management problems,
Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) cryptography and Identity Based Encryption
2.3. Cryptographic-based approaches to access control in WBSNs 33
(IBE) cryptography establish the fifth and last category. On the one hand, ABE
focuses on creating a pair of keys, to encrypt and decrypt, in regard to an established
group of attributes. ABE schemes can be divided into two groups, Ciphertext-Policy
ABE (CP-ABE) and Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE). The former corresponds to the
association of policies with ciphertexts and attributes to users’ keys and it is a
remarkable technique in applications in which data is managed by multiple profiles,
such as in hospitals or in the army [69]. By contrast, the latter corresponds to the
attachment of policies to user keys and attributes to ciphertexts, being useful in
applications like auditing logs [51]. The main difference between both approaches
is that in CP-ABE attributes of users keys are known, while in KP-ABE they are
hidden. Particularly, four proposals apply ABE in such a way that WBSN data is
encrypted applying attribute predicates and users with the right attribute keys can
decrypt them [70, 71, 72, 73].
On the other hand, the primary innovation of IBE is the use of user identity
attributes, e.g. email, address and so on, for encryption and decryption operations
[74]. Cryptographic keys are created from public parameters together with chosen
user identity attributes. In particular, IBE is applied in R. Schlegel et al.’s work
[75]. Either ABE and IBE have meaningful advantages, namely, the unnecessary
use of a public key infrastructure which avoids certificate management and reduces
the system complexity and the cost for managing keys. However, both approaches
have some common drawbacks. First, they are particularly costly in terms of com-
putation [76]. Second, though depending on particular implementations, attribute
certificate authorities to assert the validity of attributes come into play. Lastly, the
key escrow problem [77], defined as the existence of third parties which may access
decryption keys, is inherent in IBE and ABE approaches.
In view of the foregoing, cryptography inherently increases access control man-
agement complexity, being specially affected by keys management. Several ap-
proaches release this tedious process (fourth and fifth category) but they may cause
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problems of storage space or the necessity of additional entities. Therefore, the best
option depends on concrete systems’ requirements.
2.4 Requirements of user-managed access control in
WBSNs
Access control allows users to grant or deny a certain right over particular data.
However, not all access control systems pursue the same objectives, e.g. an ed-
ucational application has to look for parental access control management and, by
contrast, a business application requires managing access control in existing depart-
ments. Focusing on WBSNs, in 2006, C. Gates proposed a set of requirements in
order to provide user-managed access control in the Web 2.0 [78]:
 Relationship-based : data administrators control the release of data based on
the established relationships with data requesters, instead of delivering infor-
mation depending on the requester role or any other feature.
 Fine-grained : users must control their information in a fine-grained way,
choosing who is able to access it and under which circumstances. It should
be possible to define fine-grained policies for both data, requesters and rela-
tionships.
 Interoperability : users access multiple WBSNs and want their data to be
used in a similar way in many of them. Access control systems should be
interoperable between different WBSNs, so, it would be possible that user
preferences follow the user whatever WBSN is used.
Furthermore, interoperability should be referred to any type of element man-
aged in WBSNs, that is, identity data, resources and access control policies.
On the one hand, WBSN data can be classified as identity data and resources.
On the other hand, access control management involves access control policies
which are considered WBSN elements.
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Figure 2.2: WBSNs features
 Sticky policies: policies should follow the data to which they apply, preventing
from uncontrolled data disclosures after being released, that is, policies should
be attached to data. This issue is related to usage control. Access control
should be enforced throughout the whole usage process [44].
Nonetheless, several proposals and recent developments help to the identification
of a new requirement which is considered of special importance:
 Protection against honest-but-curious servers [18]: WBSN users’ data has to
be protected against WBSN providers. Indeed, WBSN providers control all
uploaded data and they can be used without being appropriately notified to
WBSN users.
On the other hand, alluding to the fine-grained requirement, some features are
identified. The satisfaction of this requirement requires ACMs to have expressive
power, that is, the ability to express a wide range of policies [79]. Specifically,
in the social networking field and according to literature the consideration of the
following set of features, depicted in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, facilitates the development
of expressive WBSNs ACMs:
F1 Distance [80, 28]: WBSNs are composed of a vast quantity of users who
interact between each other. However, two users of a WBSN may not be
directly connected but indirectly, that is, a direct relationship does not exist
between them but a path connecting both users can be found considering other
users and their relationships. For instance, depicted in Figure 2.2, User3 is
indirectly connected to User1 through User2.
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Figure 2.3: Flexible elements in access control policies
F2 Common-contacts [80, 19, 81]: WBSNs users have, in multiple circumstances,
common contacts. In this proposal such contacts are defined as the establish-
ment of an unidirectional relationship (see Feature 5) from the administrator
to his contacts and an unidirectional relationship (F5) between the requester
and his contacts. For instance, in Figure 2.2 User2 is unidirectionally con-
nected with User4 and User5, and User7 has an unidirectional relationship
with both users too. Then, User2 and User7 have User4 and User5 as com-
mon contacts.
F3 Clique [80, 19]: a set of WBSNs users forms a clique, that is they belong to a
close-knit group in which all contacts are bidirectionally connected between
each other. For instance, User1, User4 and User6 depicted in Figure 2.2 form
a clique.
F4 Multi-path [82, 17]: WBSNs consist of users that establish connections with
other users of the WBSN. When two users are not directly connected but
indirectly, it is said that a path exists between both. In particular, several
paths may exist between two users, that is, with each path involving a different
set of ordered nodes. For instance, in Figure 1, User3 is connected to User8
by a pair of paths which are different because they are composed of a distinct
sets of nodes.
F5 Direction [28, 19, 83]: a relationship can be established in an unidirectional or
bidirectional way. The former corresponds to the case in which a relationship
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request is only established in one direction. For example, in Figure 2.2, User6
has acknowledged that User7 has a relationship with herself but User7 has not
acknowledge any relationship between User6 and himself. On the contrary, the
latter, a bidirectional relationship, implies that both users have acknowledge
the existence of a relationship between the other and him/ herself.
F6 Flexible elements in access control policies [83, 84]: WBSNs involve users,
resources, as well as identity data, and relationships. Then, access control
policies should be defined applying any characteristic related to these ele-
ments, i.e. the users’ age, as well as the combination of characteristics, e.g.
the users’ hobbies and the relationships’ expiration date. For instance, in Fig-
ure 2.3, User3 grants access to users (e.g. User7) who are over 20 and under
30 (20 @ age @ 30) and who are distanced a pair of hops (path with length
two), where the relationship of the first hop is highly (H) trusted and has the
role colleague and the relationship of the second hop is highly trusted and
started before 2012. Also regarding fine-grained management, in Figure 2.3,
User2 establishes that given a particular requester (such as User6), all users
involved in every path that connects the requester and User2, have to highly
trust the requester.
2.4.1 Academic proposals and WBSN in use analysis
In the light of WBSN requirements, their management poses appealing issues at
stake. In order to analyse recent advances in user-managed access control systems
for WBSNs, a set of 50 academic proposals that work on privacy in WBSNs and 9
of the most currently used and active WBSNs are assessed against the requirements
previously described.
Tables 2.1-2.4 and 2.5 summarize the results of the analysis. In general terms,
academic proposals largely differ from WBSNs in use. Academic contributions are
specially focused on cryptographic access control procedures and the development of
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novel techniques to facilitate access control management. By contrast, the majority
of active WBSNs tend to manage access control in a simpler way, neglecting impor-
tant requirements such as interoperability or protection against honest-but-curious
servers.
In order to structure the analysis, in each proposal and WBSN in use, the
following features related to aforementioned requirements have been examined:
 Relationship-based
– All academic proposals and WBSNs in use are based on relationships
and then, this feature is not studied.
 Fine-grained
– Elements in access control policies: specification of elements in-
volved in access control policies. Note that the management of indirect
relationships, which does not require any particular element but a spe-
cific algorithm or mechanism exists, is pointed out with symbol γ.
– Policy definition: specification of languages or tools used to develop
policies, like XML.
– Details on policy evaluation and enforcement procedures: de-
scription of ways to carry out policy evaluation and specific enforcement
procedures.
 Interoperability
– Elements to interoperability: specification of elements applied to-
wards the development of interoperable systems.
– Interoperable elements: specification of elements managed in WB-
SNs (identity data, resources and access control policies) that could be
interoperable between different WBSNs.
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 Sticky policies
– Sticky elements: specification of elements used to implement sticky
policies.
 Protection against honest-but-curious servers
– Protection techniques: indication of techniques used to prevent
servers from accessing data that users do not authorize.
– Protection elements: specification of the type and quantity of ele-
ments used to protect data. For instance, a pair of public/private keys
per user.
– Trusted entity: identification of trusted entities. They can be users,
groups of users or a particular device, for instance, a storage device.
Finally, there are a pair of symbols to notice. Symbol “X” refers to the fact
that a given approach has explicitly mentioned that an aspect is out of the scope of
the proposal, and symbol “-” implies that an approach does not point out anything
about a specific issue.
2.4.1.1 Academic proposals for WBSNs
A total of 50 academic proposals focus on access control in WBSNs. The summary
of the analysis is presented in Tables 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4.
Regarding the fine-grained requirement the analysis draws interesting results. It
is noticed that 16 approaches manage roles [85, 86, 35, 36, 37, 87, 63, 70, 71, 72, 65,
88, 73, 24, 54, 89] and 9 works also manage trust [90, 58, 57, 67, 65, 31, 91, 56, 28].
By contrast, few approaches manage assorted elements such as users’ location [36],
data attributes [92, 73, 93, 30, 55, 29], users attributes [85, 88, 94, 95, 96, 93,
30, 29] or time periods [88]. Furthermore, extremely similar to current WBSNs, a
total of 12 approaches manage relationship types, that is, being friend of, worker
of, etc [28, 94, 91, 27, 97, 83, 32, 95, 96, 98, 99, 58]. On the contrary, assorted
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elements are supported by [93, 30], mainly, conditions and obligations. The former
set corresponds to environmental or system factors considered in the access control
enforcement process and the latter set refers to elements to satisfy before, during
of after the access is granted. Moreover, relationships distance is also considered
and several works support and manage indirect relationships [90, 58, 70, 65, 73, 28,
94, 56, 91, 97, 83, 95, 96]. Related to relationships, a noticeable feature common to
most of proposals is the management of unidirectional relationships. This matter
reflects that access control mechanisms are established from one user to another and
the particular implementations are the ones which make relationships bidirectional.
In what concerns interoperability, 12 contributions address this requirement [57,
92, 100, 86, 35, 36, 37, 61, 60, 88, 101, 1]. In general, resource interoperability
demand requesters to obtain elements to get access to data. These elements can be
referred to as tokens. Particularly, the ITU-T X.812 recommendation, which focuses
on data networks and open systems communication security, describes tokens as
elements possibly created by requesters and composed of multiple information [49].
Besides, the recommendation highlights that tokens differ from certificates in that
certificates are delivered by a trusted authority. In this study only [88] and [1]
implicitly mention the use of tokens, in particular, OAuth tokens1. However, in the
remaining works that address interoperability, tokens are represented in multiple
ways, such as XML files [100] or tickets [92], and can be composed of assorted
features, like keys [100] or digital signatures [86]. One relevant common point of
some proposals is the use of tokens to attest relationships [35, 86, 57, 100, 60].
Conversely, identity data interoperability has not received a lot of attention.
Some approaches focus on the interoperability of users’ profiles and leave aside the
interoperability of users contacts data. Indeed, interoperability of users’ profiles is
specifically related to the use of tokens [1] and Uri’s [90, 61]. Commonly, a service,
generally provided by an Identity Provider (IdP), stores and delivers user identifi-
1http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749, last access May 2014
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cations. For instance, in [61], OpenID2, a decentralized identification standard is
used by users to identify themselves through an URL. Similarly, [90] uses a specific
service to manage identity based on the FOAF ontology. Note that OpenID and
FOAF are described in Chapter 3.
As identity data, interoperability of access control policies has not been stud-
ied so far. The management of interoperable policies is pointed out in [101] but,
surprisingly, policies have to be stored in every WBSN where users are enrolled in.
On the contrary, in [1] policies are established in an independent entity in charge
of enforcing access control and delivering tokens. Indeed, [1] applies User-Managed
Access (UMA) protocol (described in Chapter 3). UMA facilitates the management
of interoperable resources and access control policies simultaneously.
Only 6 proposals address the sticky policy requirement. Specifically, the ma-
jority of them make use of ABE in regard to an established group of attributes.
Recalling that ABE cryptography involves specifying policies in keys or cipher-
texts, it naturally helps to control access to data wherever it is used [70, 71, 72, 73].
Nonetheless, [101, 31] propose the development of a client-side mechanism, e.g. a
plug-in installed in the browser, to enforce access control along the whole usage
process and not only at data delivery. This mechanism verifies established access
control policies either periodically or per user action, thus increasing the client
computation costs in relation to access control management.
A total of 17 recent proposals make use of cryptography before storing data in
the server. Therefore, they are in the position of fulfilling the protection against
honest-but-curious servers requirement [62, 40, 67, 87, 63, 65, 66, 68, 70, 71, 72, 64,
61, 60, 39, 73, 75]. Detailed in Section 2.3, a total of five categories are distinguished
concerning cryptography in access control for WBSNs. The overall procedure con-
sists of using public-private key pairs in multiple and assorted algorithms, being
key management one of the main problems at stake.
One last point of this analysis addresses the trust put by the system in sev-
2http://openid.net/get-an-openid/, last access May 2014
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eral entities. In what concerns the protection against honest-but-curious servers
requirement, the lack of cryptographic techniques requires trusting storage entities.
However, there are some exceptions and several cryptographic proposals also trust
particular devices but it is not due to confidentiality needs but to preserve data
from unauthorized deletions [87] or from unfairly key managements [68, 75].
From this study several results are drawn. Firstly, the lack of use of assorted
access control policy elements is identified. Only 5 approaches manage trust and
a similar amount of them work with indirect relationships. WBSNs deal with an
assorted set of characteristics such as users hobbies, users’ age, the date of es-
tablishment relationships, etc., that are prone to be used in the access control
enforcement process to achieve more fine-grained management. In second place, a
relevant set of works are candidates for reaching interoperability but only regard-
ing resources. Indeed, interoperability of identity data like users’ contacts data is
not even mentioned. Thus, proposals should work in the development of systems
focused on interoperable and reusable identity data, resources and access control
policies. Furthermore, it should be noticed that cryptographic approaches must
relieve the burden of managing keys. As a final remark, sticky policies pose a
tough challenge to address. Studied proposals focus on ABE cryptography but, as
an alternative, a particular infrastructure could be deployed at the client-side to
guarantee continuous policy verifications.
2.4.1.2 WBSNs in use
Many WBSNs are currently used by thousands of people. For the sake of simplicity,
9 of the most representative WBSNs in use have been studied according to features
described above. The overall results are summarized in Table 2.5 which points out
the simplicity of access control management procedures in contrast to academic
proposals.
With respect to the fine-grained requirement, there is a common pattern in
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Table 2.5: Analysis of access control features in WBSNs in use
Analysed features
Elements in Policy Details on policy Interoperable Interoperable Sticky Protection Protection Trusted
access control definition evaluation and elements data elements techniques elements entity
WBSNs policies enforcement mechanisms
LinkedIn (2003)1 Role, gamma - Resource granted if satisfying - - - - - -
data privacy policies according to
policy elements
Hi5 (2003)2 Role, data - Resource granted if satisfying - - - - - -
privacy policies according to
policy elements
Facebook (2004)3 Role, location, XACML Resource granted if satisfying - - - - - -
data privacy policies according to
policy elements
Orkut (2004)4 Role, email - Resource granted if satisfying - - - - - -
policies according to
policy elements
Badoo (2006)5 Data privacy - Resource granted if satisfying - - - - - -
policies according to
policy elements
Twitter (2006)6 Data privacy - Resource granted if satisfying - - - - - -
policies according to
policy elements
Picasa (2002)7 Data privacy, gamma - Resource granted if having URL Resources - - - -
the appropriate token
MySpace (2003)8 Role, gamma, age, - Resource granted if satisfying URL Resources - - - -
data privacy policies according to
policy elements or having
the appropriate token
Flickr (2004)9 Role, gamma, XACML Resource granted if satisfying URL Resources - - - -
data privacy policies according to
policy elements or having
the appropriate token
1 http://www.linkedin.com/ , last access May 2014
2 http://www.hi5.com/ , last access May 2014
3 http://www.facebook.com/ , last access May 2014
4 http://www.orkut.com/PreSignup , last access May 2014
5 http://badoo.com/ , last access May 2014
6 https://twitter.com/ , last access May 2014
7 https://picasaweb.google.com/home , last access May 2014
8 http://www.myspace.com/ , last access May 2014
9 http://www.flickr.com/ , last access May 2014
access control policies that consists of using roles and data privacy. Note that data
privacy corresponds to mark data as public, private or restricted to a set of users.
Besides, all analysed WBSNs manage bidirectional relationships, except for Twitter
and MySpace. In the former, administrators request users to be followers of them
but not necessarily in the other way round. In the latter, MySpace, administrators
make (out connections) or receive (in connections) friendship requests and they may
accept them, distinguishing between in, out and in-out connections. By contrast,
apart from relationship’s direction, other elements such as relationships creation
time, size of data or users nationality, are neglected.
Three WBSN, namely, Picasa, MySpace and Flickr, manage tokens and thus,
are candidates for addressing the interoperability requirement. Picasa, focused on
photos management, applies tokens which take the form of URLs. Likewise, Flickr,
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that also focuses on photo management, uses URLs to provide access to photos.
This WBSN is specially relevant for public photos management. Everybody is
able to access some selected photos through an URL. Moreover, Flickr allows the
management of rights in regard to notes, commentaries and photos. Similarly,
MySpace, a WBSN to share data such as photos, videos or music, uses URLs as
tokens as well. However, MySpace only uses tokens for photos, applying simpler
techniques for other types of data like wall messages. Therefore, tokens seem to be
specially valuable for photo management.
Furthermore, regarding trusted entities, WBSNs do not detail whether some
entity or object is trusted or not. Then, as there is no evidence of the fact that
WBSNs address protection against honest-but-curious servers, it is concluded that
trust should be put into servers, as well as, in users with whom relationships are
established.
In conclusion, WBSNs in use provide certain fine-grained management. More-
over, as in academic proposals, roles are the main elements of access control policies.
On the other hand, some WBSNs in use apply tokens and can be candidates for
providing resource interoperability. Nonetheless, they do not provide real interop-
erable functionalities such as the visualization of photos of one WBSN in another.
Finally, it is remarkable that nothing is mentioned in regard to the sticky-policies
requirement.
2.5 Expressive power of ACMs for WBSNs
The management of three of the identified requirements (interoperability, protection
against honest-but-curious servers and sticky-policies) has been studied in depth.
However, the fine-grained requirement needs further analysis. As stated in Section
2.4, an ACM, to be expressive in the WBSN field, has to facilitate the management
of the following six features: (F1) distance, (F2) common-contacts, (F3) clique, (F4)
multi-path, (F5) direction and (F6) flexible elements in access control policies.
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Expressive power means the ability of ACMs to support a wide variety of poli-
cies. More specifically, the expressive power of an ACM is a measure of the range
of supported policies. Given a pair of models (A and B), if all policies that can be
represented in B can also be represented in A, then A is at least as expressive as
B [102, 79]. Note that though each considered model is attached to a particular
policy language and the expressive power of the model is analysed using that policy
language, in this work expressive power is referred to the ACMs.
Techniques to compare expressive power of ACMs have received some attention,
though not particularly focused on ACMs for WBSNs. For instance, Ganta et al.
present a formalization to compare expressive power focused on Typed Access Ma-
trix Model (TAM), Augmented TAM and their variations [103]. Similarly, Bertino
et al. present a framework for reasoning about ACMs [102]. In this case, the
framework focuses on mapping rules (composed of objects, subjects, privileges and
authorizations) of a couple of models to a common language based on mathematical
logic, and comparing results to determine the model that is at least as expressive
as the other one. Afterwards, Tripunitara et al. propose a theory for comparing
models based not only on the state of the model, expressed by a particular access
control policy, but on the state-transition [79]. Their proposal expresses an ACM
as a set of states, policies and state-transitions rules to define how to pass from one
state to another. With the same purpose but from a different perspective, several
approaches apply simulation techniques to perform the comparison [104, 105].
On the other hand, some contributions analyse several features of access control
in WBSNs, though not being particularly related to expressive power. Carminati
and Ferrari present a survey of access control in WBSNs that studies features such
as the kind of relationships existing in current WBSNs and the applied manage-
ment procedures [17]. From a more specific point of view, A. Lazouski et al. survey
literature related to UCONABC usage model, studying among other aspects man-
aged elements in access control policies [20]. Moreover, Cheng et al. point out the
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necessity of achieving expressive fine-grained policies and study characteristics of
different ACMs for WBSNs like the management of multiple relationships types
[83].
In this work, the comparison of expressive power of ACMs for WBSNs has been
done by analysing whether the policy languages linked to each ACM are able to
express a set of predefined policies P1-P7. Next, Section 2.5.1 describes the motiva-
tion and details the applied methodology. Section 2.5.2 presents the proposed set of
policies P1-P7, applying inductive reasoning to assure that they are representative
of a general case of some of the considered features (see Appendix C). Section 2.5.3
summarizes the analysis of 24 ACMs (the details of the analysis can be found in
Appendix C).
2.5.1 Motivation and methodology
Bertino et al. proposal inspires the comparison performed herein. They propose a
framework to homogeneously represent ACMs to be later compared [102]. In par-
ticular, models are represented under a common logic language and their expressive
power is compared by analysing their structural and access equivalence. The former
refers to verifying if models are built from the same set of structural components
and the latter to checking whether models instances enforce the same set of accesses.
Nonetheless, Bertino et al. framework is not appropriate for WBSNs because
it is specially focused on DAC, MAC and RBAC, thereby limited for the large
quantity of WBSN access control management elements. This framework manages
access control policies (called authorizations) composed of objects, subjects and
privileges, which are a reduced set of elements for the WBSN field. For instance,
relationships are essential WBSN elements, as well as subjects, objects or relation-
ships attributes, and they are hard to manage within Bertino et al. framework in
its current status. Then, instead of comparing structural and access equivalence, to
analyse and compare the expressive power of WBSN ACMs, where a varied set of
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access control elements is at stake and an assorted set of policies can be considered,
the semantic equivalence of access control policies is compared herein.
Given the definition of a policy to be constructed which is composed of several
features, semantic equivalence is defined as the identification of the fact that access
control policies constructed by using the policy language of every ACM to analyse,
can express all features involved in the proposed policy. For instance, the policy
“grant access to friends of a friend” can be expressed in multiple policy languages
but the semantic meaning should be analogous in all of them. Thus, ACMs that
own policy languages which allow the specification of a given access control policy
(pointed out as expressive) would be considered ACMs with expressive power re-
garding features attached to the established policy. Indeed, thanks to the proposed
semantic equivalence technique, the expressive power of ACMs is assessed without
the need of translating them into a common, unified representation.
The comparison methodology proposed herein consists of several tasks. Ini-
tially, concerning the fine-grained requirement, seven access control policies to cover
all identified features (distance, common-contacts, clique, multi-path, direction and
flexible elements in access control policies) are proposed in Section 2.5.2. Applying
inductive reasoning, it is asserted that the model that expresses a policy linked to a
particular feature can express any policy associated with this feature (see Appendix
C.1). However, inductive reasoning is not applied to direction (F5) and it would be
extremely tedious in respect to fine-grained (F6) due to several reasons. Regarding
F5, this feature exclusively requires the creation of directional and bidirectional
relationships and consequently, generalization does not have to be applied. By con-
trast, according to F6, the amount of attributes that can be managed is extremely
varied and their generalization is unattainable. Subsequently, 24 approaches are
analysed to establish whether the definition of the proposed access control policies
using the policy language provided in each work is possible (see Appendix C.2).
Finally, a summary and a discussion are presented according to the semantic equiv-
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alence analysis of each studied proposal. The mentioned set of proposals focus on
ACMs for WBSNs as well as mechanisms that, without proposing a specific model
but being based on a particular one, contain a policy language. Besides, based on
Section 2.2, these approaches are classified under RBAC, RelBAC, ABAC, TBAC
and OBAC.
2.5.2 Specification of access control policies used to evaluate ex-
pressive power
According to WBSNs features, namely, (F1) distance, (F2) common-contacts, (F3)
clique, (F4) multi-path, (F5) direction and (F6) flexible elements in access control
policies, it is considered that, in a WBSN, an administrator establishes the following
set of access control policies to grant access to a particular data to a requester. Note
that some of the proposed access control policies involve the management of more
than a single feature. Additionally, for the sake of simplicity, all models are assumed
to exclusively provide the right to access an object leaving aside other rights, such
as writing or deleting. Notice that rights can be grant or deny but the latter
one is not managed because rejections can be expressed applying negatives. For
instance, “deny access to contacts considered friends” is analogous to “grant access
to contacts not considered friends”.
The proposed policies are the following ones:
P1 Access is granted to users who are friends of neighbours of his/ her relatives if
the relationship between his/ her relatives and his/ her relatives’ neighbours
was established before year 2,000. (F1 and F6)
P2 Access is granted to users who have three friends in common with the admin-
istrator of the requested object. (F2)
P3 Access is granted to users who belong to a clique in which two users and
the administrator of the requested object are involved, having all of them a
friendship relationship. (F3)
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P4 Access is granted to users who are connected to the administrator by two
different paths composed of unidirectional relationships oriented from the re-
quester to the administrator. Moreover, relationships involved in all paths
have to be highly trusted. (F4 and F6)
P5 Access is granted to users who are friends of the administrator of the requested
object, also having a bidirectional relationship with him/ her. (F5)
P6 Access is granted to users who are friends of the administrator of the requested
object. (F5)
P7 Access is granted to users if they are females under 30 years old or if they are
females under 40 who have studied computer science or if they are females
who have studied computer science and physics. (F6)
2.5.3 Analysis of the expressive power of ACMs for WBSNs
Once concluded the evaluation of the expressive power of a set of 24 ACMs for
WBSNs, detailed in Appendix C.2, in this Section a summary of the conclusions
is presented. The most appropriate model corresponds to the one that allows the
specification (based on the proposed model-dependant definitions) of as many poli-
cies as possible, facilitating the expression of a wide set of user preferences. Table
2.6 presents a summary of the analysis. Each policy is marked as completely (
º
)
or partially (P) defined according to the achieved expressive power. Moreover,
note that policies that involve more than a single feature, P1 and P4 in particular,
require
º
or P per each involved feature. No marks are used for undefined features.
The most surprising issue is that, even being models specially focused on WB-
SNs, none of them allows the expression of all identified features (Section 2.4), thus
limiting the possibilities of users to manage their personal preferences. Further-
more, concerning the ACMs classification (RBAC, RelBAC, ABAC, TBAC and
OBAC), models based on roles seem to be the least expressive while those that
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Table 2.6: Expressive power comparison of ACMs
Policies
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7
WBSN Models (Distance) — (Flexible elem. in a.c.p.) (Common-contacts) (Clique) (Multi-path) — (Flexible elem. in a.c.p.) (Direction:Bidi.) (Direction:Unidi.) (Flexible elem. in a.c.p.)
RBAC
[24] J. Li et al.
º º
[54] A. Tapiador et al.
º º
[89] A. Ahmad et al.
º
TBAC
[57] B. Ali et al. — P
º
[28] B. Carminati et al.
º
— — P
º
[94] T. Abdessalem et al.
º
— — P P
º
P
[56] W. Villegas et al. P — —
º º
[91] H. Wang et al. P — —
º º
RelBAC
[27] P. Fong et al.
º
— P
º º º
—
º º
[97] P. Fong et al. P
º º
P —
º
[83] Y. Cheng et al.
º
— P
º
[32] H. Hu et al. P
º
[95] I.B. Dhia
º
— P —
º º º
P
[96] I.B. Dhia
º
— P —
º º º
P
[98] G. Bruns et al.
º
— P
º
P —
º º
ABAC
[93] J. Park et al. —
º º º º º º
[30] J. Park et al. —
º º º º º º
[55] CVD. Munckhof
º º
[71] S. Jahid et al. — P
º
[70] R. Baden et al. — P
º
[73] S. Braghin et al.
º
— P
º
OBAC
[29] A. Masoumzadeh et al.
º
— P
º º
P —
º º
P
[58] B. Carminati et al.
º
—
º
[99] M. Alizadeh et al.
º
º
: A feature is completely expressed
P : A feature is not completely expressed
manage relationships and attributes are the most expressive ones.
According to indirect relationships (F1 and P1), the great majority of models
deal with them. More specifically, 10 out of 24 achieve the successful definition of
indirect relationships with an unlimited distance between users [29, 28, 94, 27, 83,
58, 98, 95, 96, 83]. By contrast, [97] and [32] only define two hops relationships.
Concerning common contacts (F2 and P2), a total of 6 models out of 24 manage
this feature [93, 30, 29, 27, 97, 98]. Nonetheless, even attaining a successful defini-
tion of P2, it would be desirable to work in describing access control enforcement
procedures similarly to [98].
A challenging issue is the specification of cliques (F3 and P3) because their man-
agement involves a great deal of complexity. Surprisingly, this feature is managed
by the same models that deal with F2, except for [98]. As highlighted in [80], users
involved in a clique have to be discovered from unreachable users and the difficulty
of its management is not even mentioned in Fong et al.’s proposals. Besides, no
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guidelines regarding access control enforcement are provided.
On the other hand, multi-path (F4 and P4) is other appealing feature that 4
models out of 24 manage [29, 27, 97, 98]. Nevertheless, three of them ([29, 97, 98]) do
not fully deal with F4 as considered in P4. They cannot define policies which include
multiple and different paths. Indeed, satisfying F4 is a challenging matter in the
WBSN context [82, 17], although it can be simplified to groups management. For
instance, the existence of the relationship “relative” and the relationship “friend”
can be compared with the creation and management of a group of friends and a
group of relatives.
Relationships direction is another studied feature (F5, P5 and P6). Concerning
bidirectional relationships (F5 and P5), they are interestingly managed by 13 out
of 24 proposals. Assorted techniques are applied to deal with this type of rela-
tionships: specific attributes are created [93, 106], pairs of directional relationships
are established [29, 94, 98] or, as in the majority of current WBSNs, relationships
are considered inherently bidirectional [24, 97, 32]. However, notice that [94] un-
successfully defines P5 since the created policy is satisfied by unidirectional and
bidirectional relationships. On the other hand, in what concerns unidirectional re-
lationships (F5 and P6), 20 out of 24 approaches manage them. Those that are
based on cryptography require exchanging decryption keys and thus, unidirectional
relationships are implicitly established [95, 96, 73]. By contrast, other approaches
like the one proposed by M. Alizadeh et al. [99] highlight the management of
directed labelled relationships.
In regard to flexible elements in access control policies (F6, P1, P4 and P7), the
models proposed by J. Park et al. [93, 30] are the most expressive ones, attaining
the proper specification of P1 and P7. According to P1, fine-grained management
is considered in [29, 28, 27, 83]. In particular, these proposals particularly focus on
relationships roles. On the other hand, concerning P4 and meeting expectations,
TBAC models express the proposed trust relationship. Finally, only J. Park et al.
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models [93, 30] successfully achieve the specification of P7. In general, except for
J. Park et al. models [93, 30], ACMs do not include disjunctives management and
then, the creation of as many access control policies as sentences connected by dis-
junctives is missing. Furthermore, the management of multi-valued attributes is,
again, only managed by [93, 30]. A. Masoumzadeh et al. [29] and T. Abdessalem
et al. [94] models could be easily modified to manage this kind of attributes but
currently, they do not deal with them. As a final remark, despite the unreach-
able generalization of F6 (pointed out in C.1), much more improvements must be
performed to express varied preferences using, simultaneously, disjunctives and con-
junctives together with different attributes.
In the light of this analysis, the models proposed by A. Masoumzadeh et al.
[29], P. Fong et al. [27] and J. Park et al. [93, 30] are the most expressive for
social networking applications. Their level of semantic equivalence is significant
as they allow the definition of a lot of features. The first pair of proposals focus
on relationships while the latter are based on attributes management. Thus, it is
asserted that the development of expressive ACMs for WBSNs has to go towards
the management of relationships, as well as the management of attributes of users,
objects and relationships.
Moreover, given that J. Park et al.’s models [93, 30] are based on UCONABC
and it is a mature model which lays the bases of the first contribution of this thesis,
its description is presented in the following section.
2.5.3.1 UCONABC model
The UCONABC model considers eight components: subjects (S), that are entities
that exercise rights on objects; objects (O), that are entities which subjects hold
rights on; subject attributes (ATT(S)) and object attributes (ATT(O)) that refer
to features associated with subjects and objects, respectively; rights (R), which
are recognized as privileges exercised on objects such as read or write; Authoriza-
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tions (A), that correspond to predicates on subject and object attributes that are
evaluated in order to decide whether the requested right on a specific object made
by a certain subject should be allowed or denied; oBligations (B), that represent
predicates that must be satisfied before, during or after the right is granted; and
Conditions (C), that correspond to environmental or system factors which are taken
into account during the access decision process.
Additionally, UCONABC introduces a pair of decision properties that are ap-
plied in respect to A, B and C. First, continuity refers to the enforcement of the
usage decision along the whole usage period (pre/ ongoing). Second, mutability
refers to changes produced in attributes along the usage process (pre/ ongoing/
post). Based on both features, continuity and mutability, the usage has to be re-
voked when policies become unsatisfied. Pre/ ongoing authorizations (preA/ onA),
as well as pre/ ongoing conditions and obligations (preB/ onB and preC/ onC
respectively) are applied in UCONABC to manage usage control. In this regard, a
Usage Decision Facility (UDF) and a Usage Enforcement Facility (UEF) which are
always active [107] are applied in the usage control process. UDF identifies changes
in attributes and UEF enforces access control accordingly.
In the original UCONABC model, it is assumed that an access control policy is
defined by the system’s administrator and this policy is applied to all users in the
system. A recent work by Salim et al. propose an administrative model, orthogonal
to the UCONABC model, where the attributes and rights of subjects and objects
are established through assertions made by authorized subjects [106].
2.6 Access control administration in collaborative en-
vironments.
This Section introduces the essential points of access control administration, which
are the context of this thesis. First, administrative tasks are introduced (Section
2.6.1). Second, types of administration, as well as positive and negative points of
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each of them according to WBSNs are described (Section 2.6.2). Finally, an analysis
of administrative management features is presented (Section 2.6.3).
2.6.1 The power of administration
Access control administration ensures that users do not make unauthorized access
requests [108]. From traditional systems where a single administrator manages the
permissions of all users, as well as from systems where users manage permissions of
the data they create, e.g. UNIX operating system, the development of collaborative
systems leads to reconsider administrative tasks.
Coming back to the 90’s, given the maturity of the Role Based Access Control
Model (RBAC) proposed by R. Shandu et al. [109], its attached administrative
model can be used as a precedent in the identification of administrative tasks [110].
In a nutshell, in RBAC, administrative permissions (analogous to rights) are exclu-
sively applied to administrative roles and other permissions are applied to any other
kind of roles. Then, administrative tasks are based on the assignment of users to
roles; the assignment of permissions to roles; and the assignment of roles to roles.
Administrative tasks are summarized as follows:
 Who is the entity in charge of creating, updating and deleting access control
preferences.
 Who is the entity in charge of associating preferences with data.
 How preferences are associated with data and data with data owners.
Furthermore, administrative issues also involve administrative rights manage-
ment. Two types of rights are distinguished, namely, use and administrative rights.
Use rights consist of operations performed with objects, e.g read right, and admin-
istrative rights correspond to operations performed over the right of objects, e.g.
the right to give read right. The management of both types of rights is essential
and delegation and revocation are remarkable operations in this regard. Delegation
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focuses on granting a right to a user, while revocation undoes the effects of dele-
gation. In particular, weak and strong revocation are differentiated. The former
refers to simply remove granted permissions and the latter refers to recursively re-
voke permissions from those to whom the grantee granted the permissions. Based
on these rights and operations, the following administrative tasks are added to the
previous ones:
 Who is the entity in charge of managing revocation.
 Who is the entity in charge of managing delegation.
 How weak and strong revocation are managed based on use rights and admin-
istrative rights.
 How delegation is managed based on use rights and administrative rights.
In the social networking field administration focuses on managing uploaded re-
sources, specified identity data and established access control policies (recall Section
2.1). Thus, WBSN administrative tasks are equivalent to the ones above mentioned
but considering that resources, identity data and policies are the elements at stake.
2.6.2 Types of administration
From the traditional point of view, types of administration can be classified in two
categories centralized and decentralized [111]. In the following, administration types
together with pros and cons of each of them, are described:
 Centralized : a single entity decides who can get into the system. Admin-
istrators configure the system deciding which users can get access to which
data.
On the positive side, this is the simplest administration type. It helps to
reduce management costs because except for the administrator, nobody is
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involved in the administration process. However, it is not specially appropri-
ate for WBSNs because in this area users desire to individually manage their
data.
 Decentralized : multiple entities decide who can get into the systems. Access
requests are administered by users instead of by a central entity. Besides,
in some cases data management may involve multiple users, e.g. in a photo
several users can be depicted, and apart from the owner, other users are
pointed out as administrators too. These users, in the role of administrators,
are called co-owners.
Positive points of decentralized administration focus on the possibility of
collaboration in social environments. Decentralization facilitates that each
WBSN user manages his data. However, on the negative side, the complex-
ity of access control management increases. Even more, in case co-ownership
management, preferences of owners and co-owners have to be jointly evaluated
and all possible conflicts have to be identified and solved.
2.6.3 Analysis of access control administration in collaborative en-
vironments
Based on identified administration types and tasks, this Section analyses 21 propos-
als in the literature that address administrative issues in collaborative environments.
Note that this study is not exclusively focused on WBSNs, but extended to collab-
orative environments due to a pair of reasons. On the one hand, WBSNs manage
data which may be related to multiple users and then, they can be pointed out as
collaborative systems. On the other hand, a small amount of proposals focus on
administrative issues in the specific context of WBSNs.
In general, 6 contributions fall in the WBSN category [58, 112, 82, 113, 114, 115],
3 proposals in document sharing [116, 117, 118], one proposal is based on grid
environments [119] and the rest of them focus on other general collaborative systems
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Table 2.7: Administrative features analysis
Proposals Administration Delegation Revocation
[59] B. Carminati et al. (2011) D
[82] A.C. Squicciarini et al. (2009) D
º

[88] H. Zhang et al. (2012) C
[112] M.R. Thompson et al. (2003) D
º º
[113] A.C. Squicciarini et al. (2010) D
º

[114] A. Ahmad et al. (2012) D
º º
[115] Y. Jung et al. (2013) D
º
[116] Y. Ren et al. (2011) D
[117] M. Prilla et al. (2006) D
º
[118] A. Imine et al. (2009) D
º
[119] M. Lorch et al. (2003) D
º º
[120] H.F. Wedde et al. (2003) D
[121] R. S. Shandu et al. (2010) D
º º
[122] R. S. Shandu et al. (2011) D
º º
[123] W.K. Edwards (1996) C
[124] K. Sikkel et al. (1997) D
º º
[125] Z.Y. Zhang et al. (2011) D
º º
[126] R.K. Thomas (1997) C
[127] E. Cohen et al. (2002) D
º

[128] V. Gligor et al. (2002) D
º

[129] J. Jin et al. (2006) D
º
: mentioned but not managed
[120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 88].
This analysis studied the administration type, namely, centralized (C) or decen-
tralized (D) and how delegation and revocation are managed. Table 2.7 presents
results of the analysis. Symbol * means that a particular feature has been mentioned
but not managed.
In what concerns the administration type, 18 approaches deal with D adminis-
tration and just 3 proposals focus on C administration. As expected, administration
tends to be decentralized (recall Section 2.6.2).
Concerning centralized administration, in [123] a central administrator man-
ages roles and policies. Furthermore, the need of dynamism is highlighted and the
change of user roles, at runtime, is an essential matter to deal with. Similarly,
[126] proposes team management. Teams are composed of users with the same role
whose management is left to a general administrator. Likewise, in [88] groups are
managed by a central authority in such a way that users are added to groups and
rules, based on user attributes, time periods and resource usages, are applied to
62 Chapter 2. Access control in WBSNs
groups.
The majority of approaches are based on decentralized administration, allowing
users to individually manage their personal data. For instance, in [118], the admin-
istrators initiate the administration process by notifying updates to affected users
who become involved in the administrative management process. By contrast, in
[129, 112] users who want to become involved in a particular administrative process
have to request it. Other proposals divide data, particularly documents, among
users and they work over each owned piece of data [116]. A different solution are
proposed by M.R. Thompson et al. [112] and A. Ahmad et al [114]. M.R. Thomp-
son et al’s work is based on certificates jointly signed by all users involved in the
administrative process. However, A. Ahmad et al propose transfer, multiplication
and division operations [114].
Delegation, associated with decentralized administration, is addressed in a total
of 9 approaches. In collaborative environments several users have to cooperate to
achieve a common goal. Then, delegating permissions breaks the power of a central
administrative user by sharing administrative tasks among different parties. The
most of approaches focus on permissions delegation [121, 122, 124, 119, 112, 88, 114],
being the proposals of Z.Y. Zhang et al. and J. Jin [129] the only ones which propose
role delegation [125] and E. Cohen et al.’s proposal which exclusively mentions the
difficulty in managing delegation in organizational environments [127].
Related to revocation management, in multiple cases users may regret having
granted a certain use or administrative right to a user. A total of 10 proposals
provide mechanisms to deal with revocation and other 3 contributions mention
the relevance of its management [128, 82, 113]. They focus on weak revocation
in respect to rights [121, 122, 117, 119, 114] and group memberships [118] and on
strong revocation regarding delegated rights [124, 125, 115] and certificates [112].
In sum, administration in collaborative environments tends to be decentralized.
This is specially remarkable in WBSNs as they involve the management of lots
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of users and data. Besides, most of analysed approaches propose revocation and
delegation mechanisms, thereby highlighting the relevance of their management as
part of the administration process.
2.7 Dealing with co-ownership in access control sys-
tems for collaborative environments.
WBSNs make use of data that can be usually associated with multiple users. Then,
joint ownership, also referred to as co-ownership, is pointed out as a demanding
necessity. In relation to this issue, this Section presents the concept of co-ownership
in access control systems (Section 2.7.1) and the analysis of how a significant amount
of proposals in the literature deal with co-ownership (Section 2.7.2).
2.7.1 Access control management and administration of co-
ownership
Data owners, also known as administrators, upload data to WBSNs or write or use
them within its personal WBSN profile. Nonetheless, these data may be related to
multiples users who are referred to as co-owners (recall Section 2.6.2).
Due to the aforementioned necessity of joint ownership, access control should
consider the identification of co-owners along with the management of owners and
co-owners access control preferences [89]. However, user preferences may be con-
tradictory, e.g. a photo owner may want to make a photo public and a co-owner
may prefer to keep it private. In view of this situation, negotiation mechanisms to
deal with conflicts of interests are needed. For instance, a negotiation technique to
establish preferences according to the most voted preferences is a common solution
[130].
Access control administration cannot be disregarded. Co-ownership manage-
ment requires that multiple users administrate access control, thereby becoming
administration more difficult. All co-owners and the owner of a particular data
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Table 2.8: Co-ownership management analysis
Proposals Neg. Mechanisms Management elem.
[32] H. Hu et al. (2012)
º
Groups membership
[33] A.C. Squicciarini et al. (2011)
º
Groups membership
[34] K. Thomas et al. (2010)
º
General conditions
[41] F. Zhu et al. (2008) Roles
[48] H. Hu et al. (2011)
º
Groups membership
[82] A.C. Squicciarini et al. (2009)
º
Users depth
[83] Y. Cheng et al. (2012)
º
User relationships
[112] M.R. Thompson et al. (2003) Roles
[113] A.C. Squicciarini et al. (2011)
º
Users depth
[116] Y. Ren et al. (2011) Groups membership
[117] M. Prilla et al. (2006)
º
 Roles
[120] H.F. Wedde et al. (2003)
º
Roles
[128] V. Gligor et al. (2002)
º
Users and object
attributes
[130] B. Carminati et al. (2011)
º
Users trust
and depth
[131] Q. Xiao et al. (2012)
º
Depth, groups
membership
[132] A. Besmer et al. (2010)
º
 Groups membership
[133] R. Wishart et al. (2010)
º
 General conditions
[134] Y. Sun et al. (2010)
º
Users trust
[135] D. Lin et al. (2008)
º
General conditions
: mentioned but not managed
should take part in the administration process. Particularly, administrative tasks
include the specification of how co-owners and owners preferences are established,
as well as, how they are evaluated. Likewise, revocation and delegation should be
also addressed in this new scenario.
2.7.2 Analysis of co-ownership management and administration in
WBSNs
To have a general overview about joint ownership, apart from studying co-ownership
management in WBSN, this Section analyses co-ownership in other kind of collab-
orative systems. A total of 19 proposals are analysed, examining a pair of features,
the application of negotiation techniques and the type of elements involved in access
control policies. Note that revocation and delegation are not studied because their
application does not differ from the one presented in Section 2.6.
From the whole set of proposals just 10 contributions fall in the WBSN category
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[130, 83, 32, 48, 112, 82, 113, 33, 131, 34], 3 proposals fall in documents sharing
[116, 117, 41] or the remaining set fall in general collaborative systems [120, 128,
132, 133, 134, 135]. Results of the analysis are depicted in Table 2.8. Note that
symbol * means that a particular feature has been mentioned but not managed.
First, concerning negotiation techniques, it should be noticed that collaborative
environments such as WBSNs may produce conflicts of interests between users
caused by contradictory preferences. In order to cope with this matter a great
variety of negotiation mechanisms are proposed. Indeed, 3 approaches mention the
necessity of negotiation [117, 132, 133] and 13 approaches propose varied solutions.
In general, the most common negotiation technique is based on voting schemes
[120, 32, 128, 130, 134, 33]. Given a set of preferences, the number of votes that
each of them receives is used to calculate which preferences apply. For instance,
in [130] access is granted regarding the satisfaction of all, one or the majority of
established owners and co-owners preferences.
Similarly, H. Hu et al. proposes a solution where owners and co-owners prefer-
ences are managed as sets [48]. In case a conflict of interest appears due to existence
of a subset, a superset, a partial set or a disjoint set of user preferences, measures
of the privacy risk and the sharing loss (factors affected by the loss of sharing a
piece of data) help to determine the preferences to apply. Following similar bases,
[83] presents three intuitive techniques focused on the disjunction, the conjunction
or the priority order of operators applied to user preferences.
From other point of view, A.C. Squicciarini et al. work in the automatic de-
tection of access control preferences calculating the similarity between tagged users
[82, 113]. Thus, automatic tools are used as negotiation mechanisms. The main
drawback of this work is that users do not specify their preferences and automatic
tools may do not really satisfy users expectations.
Other approach, though quite restrictive, is developed by D. Lin et al., where
four negotiation possibilities are offered [135]: permit-overrides, if a user’s prefer-
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ences are satisfied, the access is granted; deny-overrides, if a user’s preferences are
not satisfied, the access is denied; first-one-applicable, the first suitable user’s pref-
erences are the ones applied; and only-one-applicable, a single user’s preferences are
applied.
Nonetheless, all mentioned negotiation techniques have a common point of fail-
ure. Owners and co-owners preferences may be contradictory and then, some users
privacy may become compromised, thereby violated. Trying to reach a full con-
sensus among owners and co-owners preferences, Q. Xiao et al. proposes CAPE,
a mechanism based on managing personal opinions and peer effects [131]. Users
adjust their access control preferences regarding decisions of other users until a
consensus is reached. However, the impossibility of achieving a full consensus is
discussed when a user does not change his preferences even having taken into ac-
count other users’ decisions. Indeed, K. Thomas et al.’s approach is the only one
that completely respects users privacy [34]. The solution consists of calculating the
intersection of all user preferences to grant or deny access accordingly.
The second and last point of analysis is the type of elements involved in access
control policies. A significant percentage of approaches (11 out of 33) focus on roles
management [122, 117, 124, 120, 125, 41, 126, 123, 127, 129, 112]. Users are assigned
to roles with a set of permissions and they manage access according to roles they
belong to. Similarly, some proposals use groups. Being member of a group means
having a certain amount of permissions over a set of resources [118, 136, 116, 32, 48,
132, 33, 88, 131]. For instance, in [118] groups are composed of an administrator
and several users. Administrators specify access control preferences to establish the
users who can read and write over a document. It should be noticed that groups are
pre-established in some contributions. In H. Hu et al.’s proposal there are four pre-
established groups [48, 32] (presented in Section 2.1): disseminators, contributors,
owners, accessors. Likewise, in [132, 33] users are divided in two groups, owners
and co-owners.
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On the other hand, an appealing issue in the WBSN context is the management
of trust and depth between users [59, 137, 130, 134, 82, 113]. Users put trust in
their contacts with whom are connected at different depths (e.g. in Facebook the
maximum depth is 2, friend-of-a-friend). Note that depth is analogous to feature
distance. In addition, the use of users and objects attributes is applied in a couple
of approaches [119, 128]. Finally, a total of 3 contributions leave open the set of
applied access control management elements [121, 133, 135].
In the light of this analysis, it can be concluded that a significant set of ap-
proaches work with owners and co-owners but management procedures may violate
users privacy. The voting scheme is the most common negotiation technique but
contradictory preferences may compromise users privacy. Indeed, just K. Thomas
et al. propose the intersection of all user preferences to completely preserve all users
privacy. However, this solution is significantly restrictive because access is denied
unless all users reach a full consensus.
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Chapter 3
Interoperability and reusability
management. Applications and
technologies.
Several applications and technologies facilitate interoperability to give access to
data managed in one place from another. In this regard, reusability is a significant
feature to consider as, for instance, reusable profiles would let users manage their
identity data as a global identity. Reusability could be a powerful complementary
feature to interoperability because if a pair of elements are interoperable, they can be
analogously used and then, reused. Nonetheless, despite the benefits that reusing,
i.e. saving storage, and interoperability, i.e. simplicity of data management, can
jointly provide, they have not been mentioned together.
Concerning the social networking field, only a pair of distributed WBSNs have
paid attention to interoperability, namely, Diaspora and Friendica. Furthermore,
there are well-known protocols, such as OAuth, applied to the development of dis-
tributed systems which are a key step towards interoperability. Moreover, apart
from protocols, the definition of interoperable, as well as reusable file formats is a
necessary requirement. Particularly, the description of people and their relation-
ships are essential WBSN data which should be reusable and interoperable.
According to mentioned above, this chapter presents, in Section 3.1 the defini-
tion of interoperability. Section 3.2 describes reusability. Next, Section 3.3 describes
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a couple of distributed WBSNs focused on interoperability. Section 3.4 introduces
protocols to develop distributed systems. Finally, Section 3.5 presents a pair of file
formats which may be applied for interoperable and reusable purposes.
3.1 Interoperability definition
In 1990 interoperability was defined as “the ability of two or more systems or compo-
nents to exchange information and to use the information that has been exchanged”
[138]. More specifically, in the technological area, interoperability is defined as “the
capability to communicate, execute programs, or transfer data among various func-
tional units in a manner that requires the user to have little or no knowledge of the
unique characteristics of those units.”(ISO/IEC 2382-01). In this regard, given the
amount of software and hardware daily developed, lots of standards have been pro-
posed, e.g. send meeting requests and other calendar data to other internet users
[139], being organizations like the International Organization of Standardization
(ISO) in charge of this process.
Moreover, the technological area involves persistent enhancements and devel-
opments of systems and applications, thus requiring the continuous search of in-
teroperability. This is the case of WBSNs, there are a great amount of them and
users are forced to be enrolled in all WBSNs that they want to enjoy. In particu-
lar, the interoperability problem in WBSNs is known as “the walled garden” [140].
WBSNs are depicted as walled places where it is extremely hard to climb over a
wall to reach another (see Figure 3.1). Pointed out in Chapter 2, interoperability
in WBSNs should be related to elements managed in them, namely, identity data,
resources and access control policies. Interoperable identity data would allow users
to specify their profiles and contacts in a single WBSN, being accessible in all of
them in which users are enrolled. Similarly, resources interoperability would be
extremely comfortable from the users point of view. It would allow the upload of
resources in a WBSN remaining them available in other WBSNs. Besides, in terms
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Figure 3.1: Walled garden problem in WBSNs
of privacy, access control policies interoperability is specially appealing. It would
reduce the burden of specifying what is accessed by whom per resource and WBSN.
Therefore, it would help to reduce users errors caused by repetitive actions.
3.2 Reusability definition
From the software engineering point of view, reusability is defined as “the use of
existing software components to construct new systems” [141]. By contrast, in WB-
SNs, reusability can be described as the reuse of identity data, resources and access
control policies in as many WBSNs as a user is enrolled. For instance, some years
ago SixApart announced that WBSN users could reuse their social graphs anywhere.
Indeed, [142] points out that much more work is required to implement mechanisms
that really facilitate the reuse of profiles across various networking sites and applica-
tions. Nonetheless, despite that the reuse of identity data has been noticed, neither
proposals have been developed in this regard, nor reusability of resources or access
control policies has been mentioned.
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3.3 Decentralized social applications
This Section describes the main existing decentralized WBSNs, Diaspora (Section
3.3.1) and Friendica (Section 3.3.2), which look for privacy and interoperability.
Nonetheless, none of the WBSNs neither mention reusability, nor describe how
they work to analyse if they could achieve reusability of some elements.
3.3.1 Diaspora
Diaspora1 is a distributed social network based on a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) architecture
in which peers store their personal resources in a particular host and leave them
available for their contacts. Besides, cryptography can be applied to encrypt stored
data.
The real focus of Diaspora is to achieve interoperability though not details of how
to achieve it are provided. Indeed, this WBSN exclusively interacts with Diaspora
servers, called pods. Moreover, either for not being an application trivial to install
or for not being supported by successful platforms like Windows, Diaspora is far
from being one of the most used WBSNs.
3.3.2 Friendica
Another decentralized WBSN is Friendica2. One of its main strengths is private
data management. Besides, developers claim that Friendica supports friends from
other applications like Facebook, Diaspora or Twitter.
Similar to Diaspora, this WBSN is not commonly used and no information
about how it works is provided. Again, the low use of this WBSN may be caused
by the installation process. Though developers are simplifying this process, it re-
quires a significant effort in comparison with using famous WBSNs like Facebook
or LinkedIn.
1https://joindiaspora.com/ , last access May 2014
2http://friendica.com/ , last access May 2014
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3.4 Protocols
This Section describes protocols that facilitate the development of decentralized
systems. Firstly, OpenID, a protocol to allow interoperable authentication (Section
3.4.1). Moreover, OAuth, a protocol that provides a method for clients to access
server resources on behalf of a resource owner, is presented (Section 3.4.2). Lastly,
UMA protocol, focused on access control decentralization, is introduced (Section
3.4.3)
3.4.1 OpenID
OpenID3 is an open protocol that allows authentication. Users firstly register with
an OpenID provider specifying their credentials, namely, a user name and a pass-
word. Then, this provider grants the user a URL that allows his authentication,
together with a password as a complementary security measure. Using the provided
URL and the password, users may authenticate themselves to a chosen service,
which must implement OpenID, without the need of creating an account or being
registered in the service.
In a nutshell, once in the possession of an OpenID URL, the protocol consists
of the following steps: (1) the user contacts to the service (a relying party) that
he wants to authenticate to and introduce his URL; (2) the service redirects the
user to the user’s OpenID provider which asks for the password; (3) the IdP verifies
the password and, if the verification is successful, sends an authentication token
to the service and redirects the user to the service. Consequently, identity data
is interoperable and reusable because provided URLs allow users to authenticate
themselves in any service running OpenID.
Despite the benefits that this standard provides, that is, simplifying authentica-
tion procedures and facilitating the interoperable authentication, it has not received
a lot of attention. Currently, services like Flickr, MySpace, Google or Facebook,
3http://openid.net/ , last access May 2014
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among others, implement this protocol. This situation may be produced due to the
amount of security problems involved in the authentication process with OpenID,
like phishing attacks [143]. Likewise, the fact that all requests pass through the IdP
leads that this entity gets to know all access attempts.
3.4.2 OAuth
OAuth is an open protocol to allow secure authorization [144]. A service is allowed
to access users’ personal information that is stored in a service provider without
disclosing any user credential to the service.
Assuming that a user stores photos in a service providerA and he desires using
his photos in a particular serviceB without disclosing his credentials in serviceB,
the authentication of the user works as follows : (1) serviceB requests a request
token to the service providerA; (2) the service providerA grants a key to serviceB;
(3) serviceB directs the user to service providerA; (4) service providerA obtains
the users authorization for the request token and directs the user to serviceB; (5)
serviceB requests an access token to service providerA using the request token; (6)
service providerA grants to serviceB the access token which can be used to access
the protected resources.
OAuth is used in a well-known set of services like Google, Facebook, LinkedIn,
Amazon, etc. Nonetheless, security issues are also at stake. For instance, users have
to understand the meaning of authorizing a service to access data stored in a service
provider, thereby avoiding the disclosure of more information than the one required
for the requested service [145]. Moreover, apart from security, interoperability is
another goal that this protocol tries to achieve but unsuccessfully. According to
OAuth specification, some components are undefined, e.g. client registration, and
then, services should be appropriately configured in respect to service providers to
allow resources and identity data interoperability and reusability between different
types of them. Indeed, in the lasted OAuth RFC the following is mentioned: “How-
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ever, as a rich and highly extensible framework with many optional components, on
its own, this specification is likely to produce a wide range of non-interoperable
implementations”.
3.4.3 User-Managed Access (UMA)
The UMA architecture and core protocol [1, 38], based on OAuth, achieves the
following goals:
 Dedicated access relationship service: in different web domains, this service
has to provide users with control over data-sharing and service-access rela-
tionships between online services hosting and accessing data.
 User-driven policies: users have to establish access policies over their data
using their preferred managing tool.
 Support for claims: the establishment of access policies implies the attachment
of properties that users, who want to access to a particular resource, must
posses before the authorization can be granted.
 User management of access control: users are able to modify the conditions
of access and terminate relationships easily.
On the other hand, UMA architecture consists of five entities (Figure 3.2):
 Requesting Party, who can be a corporation, a web user or any other legal
person.
 Authorizing User (AU), who delegates access control from their chosen hosts
to an Authorization Manager.
 Authorization Manager (AM), entity that acts on behalf of an AU and evalu-
ates access requests made by a requester against applicable policies and issues
access tokens if applicable. It plays the role of a PEP, a PDP and a Security
Token Service,
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 Host, web application that is used by an authorizing user to store and manage
protected resources. It acts as a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) because it
carries out the delivery of data once presented the right access token.
 Requester, application that interacts with a host to get access to protected
resources and interacts with an AM to obtain an access token.
Regarding the protocol, three steps are identified: (1) user introduces host to
AM, which refers to the establishment of a trust relationship between the host and
the AM. Besides, users specify policies in regard to uploaded resources; (2) requester
gets access token from AM, that corresponds to the acquisition of a token to succeed
in accessing a particular resource after delivering the appropriate claims; and (3)
requester wields access token at host to gain access, which refers to the delivery
of the requested token to obtain the requested resource. Particularly, claims are
properties that must be satisfied to get a token. Current improvements are trying
to reach a specific definition of claims, being IdPs in charge of their delivery.
Therefore, UMA provides key features to achieve resources and access control
policies interoperability and reusability between different services because resources
are stored in Hosts and access control policies in AMs, thus facilitating the access
from different services to resources and access control policies.
Finally, it is noticeable that several UMA implementations4 are developed,
though not related to WBSNs. There are one commercial UMA authorization server
and a total of three publicly available projects, particularly, the Fraunhofer AISEC
project (which offers a client, an AM and a Host currently running), the OXAuth
project (that facilitates the implementation of UMA for enterprise usages) and the
SMART project (which involves the implementation of UMA together with sample
applications). Besides, the first UMA interoperability testing5 is being prepared to
assess the interoperability between existing UMA implementations.
4https://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+Implementations?src=context
navchildmode , last access May 2014
5http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+Interoperability+Testing , last
access May 2014
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Figure 3.2: UMA interactions. Source: [1]
Figure 3.3: FOAF example
3.5 Files format
This Section introduces the Friend-Of-A-Friend (FOAF) project (Section 3.5.1) and
Microformats (Section 3.5.2), the main couple of file formats used to describe WBSN
identity data, that is, profile and relationships data.
3.5.1 Friend-Of-A-Friend (FOAF)
FOAF is a project which provides a machine-readable ontology to describe peo-
ple, things they create and do, and links between them [42]. It combines the use
of the Resource Description Framework (RDF) and the Web Ontology Language
(OWL). More specifically, the FOAF specification provides guidelines to structure
and develop files in which personal data, such as name, phone, homepage, interests
or photos or known users, like friends or relatives, are described. In particular, all
defined tags are detailed in [146]. Nevertheless, FOAF is open, decentralized and
extensible. Consequently, new enhancements are currently being performed. Figure
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Figure 3.4: Microformats example
3.3 presents an example of a person Dan Brickley with an image, a homepage and
an openID identification.
Identified in [58], FOAF seems a promising approach in regard to the speci-
fication of users identity within the WBSNs’ context. Multiple WBSNs, such as
Twitter, and social applications, like Second Life, make use of it6 7.
3.5.2 Microformats
Microformats8 allow adding information to web pages. It is used to describe some
type of elements, e.g. a product, a person, a company, etc., and attached properties,
e.g. a product has a brand, a name and a price. In general, Microformats use
attribute class of HTML tags to assign short and descriptive names to entities,
as well as to their properties. Several of them have been developed being hCard
and hCalendar the ones that are ratified. For instance, applying hCard, Figure 3.4
presents the description of a user with a nick name, an organization and a telephone.
This approach is applied in several services. For instance, Facebook, Flickr
and .Mac Webmail supports hCard. However, from the WBSN point of view,
Microformats are not as user-friendly as FOAF because they are not particularly
focused on people description.
6http://www.xul.fr/web-2.0.html, last access May 2014
7http://www.w3.org/wiki/FoafSites, last access May 2014
8http://microformats.org/, last access May 2014
Part III
Proposal

Chapter 4
SoNeUCONABC: an expressive
usage control model for WBSNs
and the enforcement mechanism
WBSNs consist of users who share data among other users through the establish-
ment of relationships, emerging the necessity of mimicking daily life interactions
[22]. The main goal is the development of expressive ACMs that facilitate the
definition of any kind of user preferences from a private point of view.
There are a great amount of ACMs specially developed for the social networking
field or that can be applied to this context but any of them offers the appropriate
level of expressive power. As a starting point, concerning studies presented in
Chapter 2, [93], [30], [29] and [27] are selected as the most expressive models.
Expressive power is mainly related to the management of relationships, users,
objects and their respective attributes. Thus, an ABAC model seems to be an ap-
pealing model to work with. On the other hand, in contrast to current ACMs that
focus on protecting resources until the access is granted and related to the sticky
policy requirement, new developments require to manage access along the whole
usage process [20]. For instance, undesirable copies or unnoticed dissemination of
data should be avoided. In this regard, given that [29] and [27] are mainly based
on relationships and put aside usage control, and [93, 30], based on UCONABC
[44], manage user, objects and consider usage control, the latter pair of works are
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the chosen proposals to start up. Indeed, extending [29] or [27] would require,
among other issues, the complex task of converting them into usage control models.
Consequently, UCONABC is extended by including relationship management and
thus, Social Network UCONABC (SoNeUCONABC), an expressive usage control
model for WBSNs, along with its enforcement mechanism, is proposed. Note that
UCONABC has been chosen instead of [93] or [30] because of its maturity and
scientific relevance. Besides, it is assumed that SoNeUCONABC is complemen-
tary to [93] and [30] and, for instance, the addition of sessions and activities to
SoNeUCONABC is considered a matter of future work.
The work presented herein comprises in Section 4.1 the conceptualization of
a WBSN. In Section 4.2 a formal description of SoNeUCONABC is presented.
Furthermore, an access control policy language using BNF notation is defined in
Section 4.3. According to the proposed language, Section 4.4 details the enforce-
ment mechanism. Finally, a high level architecture related to SoNeUCONABC
implementation is depicted and described in Section 4.5.
4.1 Conceptualization of WBSNs
Commonly, WBSNs are modelled as graphs, being Harary who, in 1953, applied
graph theory regarding group behaviour, social pressure, cooperation, power and
leadership [147]. Indeed, Harary is considered one of the pioneering of the applica-
tion of graph theory to group behaviour.
More specifically, a graph is characterized by a huge quantity of entities, called
nodes, and a vast quantity of connections between the nodes, called edges. In
general terms, when modelling a WBSN as a graph, users correspond to the nodes
and user relationships to the edges. This type of representation has been used by
many authors in recent literature, being Carminati one of the most representative
[17, 148, 28].
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4.1.1 Resources
In a WBSN, the set of considered resources includes photos, videos, wall messages
and personal messages that are private and directly written to a certain person or
a group of people. Resources are a particular type of data which will be referred to
as D.
Additionally, resources may be attached to multiple attributes that will be re-
ferred to as ATD   atd1, atd2, ..., atdnATD where nATD is the total number of
attributes. Resources attributes can be classified in two groups. First group in-
volves own features of resources such as the type, the creation time, the size and
so on. Second group refers to any kind of characteristics that can be assigned to
resources, for example the fact of being private, confidential or public, or the topic
of the resource among others.
4.1.2 Actions
In a WBSN several actions can be performed on resources and identity data. The
set of defined actions is denoted as AC. Main four actions that can be performed
over resources and identity data are: read, equivalent to visualize any kind of con-
tent; update, equivalent to write down tags in videos or photos, or changing any
commentary previously written; insert an element, equivalent to upload a photo or
a video to the WBSN; and delete an element. Nonetheless, if needed, more actions
can be considered.
4.1.3 Users
The set of users of a WBSN is identified herein as V. Although many types of
users can be distinguished (recall Section 2.1.1), for simplicity but without losing
generality and considering a single piece of data (resource or identity data), di, it will
be distinguished the administrator of the data, i.e., administratordi, that is the
user who administers the data access controls, and the requesters, i.e., the remaining
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users of the WBSN that may request access to that piece of data. Therefore, all
data administered by a user vi is denoted as Di, where Di b D.
As it happened with resources, users may have a set of attributes which corre-
spond to their profiles and are part of their identity data. This set of attributes
is referred to as ATV   atv1, atv2, ..., atvnATV  where nATV is the total number
of users attributes. On the one hand, a user profile links each user with his/her
nationality, age, music preferences and so on. On the other hand, there is other
group of attributes, called user contextual attributes [149], that describe a user’s
personal mood, like happy, nervous and so on, or his/her current activity like eating,
running, etc. A user’s location is a particularly relevant user contextual attribute in
WBSNs like Google Latitude, in which this information is the main data managed,
or in WBSNs such as Facebook Places, in which user’s location can be associated
to data.
4.1.4 Relationships
In a WBSN, a user can usually accept and withdraw the establishment of relation-
ships with other users of the WBSN. As mentioned above, relationships correspond
to edges of the social graph which connects directly or indirectly pairs of users.
Direct relationships between users of a WBSN are identified herein as E. This
set corresponds to contacts’ information and it is part of users identity data. A
set of attributes can be associated with a direct relationship. This set is denoted
as ATEi   ate1, ate2, ..., atenATE. The most important of these attributes are the
relationship direction, namely, directional and bidirectional, and the relationship
type, that is, the relationship semantic meaning which may be also called relation-
ship role by some authors. Furthermore, users may be involved in several roles, e.g.
being simultaneously “friend” and “co-worker” of a certain user.
Relationships may have other attributes such as creation time or history. Addi-
tionally, users may attach other attributes to their relationships such as a level of
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trust [28] and a certain duration. Level of trust corresponds to a quantitative mea-
sure to determine the strength or weakness of a relationship. Concerning duration,
it is the time during which the relationship remains valid.
Furthermore, two WBSN users may not be directly connected but indirectly,
existing a path, P , connecting both nodes and composed of other users and their
direct relationships. In this regard, the concept of user relationships and their
attributes can be generalized to consider both direct and indirect types. The set
of indirect relationship is then denoted as P and their attributes are derived from
those involved in every ei > P .
4.1.5 Context
Context information is other aspect that may be considered when modeling a
WBSN. The set of these features is denoted as CX. Dynamic, assorted and ex-
ternal features such as communication network status, service availability or other
quality parameters can be involved here.
4.1.6 Summary of the conceptualization
The conceptualization provided above is summarized in this Section and depicted
in Figure 4.1.
A WBSN is conceptualized as a directed multigraph, G, composed of the follow-
ing elements: G:{V, ATV, E, ATE, D, ATD, AC, CX }. V corresponds to the graph
nodes, which represent the WBSN users and each of them has a set of associated
attributes that can be derived using the mapping ATV. E are edges which represent
direct relationships between pairs of users and each of them has a set of associated
attributes derived with the mapping ATE. D refer to WBSN resources with have
a set of attributes attached derived with the mapping ATD. Moreover, AC are the
actions to be performed over objects. Finally, CX represents the system’s context.
Note that P, related to indirect relationships, is not included because this set of
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Figure 4.1: Web Based Social Network Conceptualization
relationships is constructed with E.
Finally, it should be noticed that as the conceptualization presented above is
performed from a logical point of view, the way in which the storage is carried out,
centralized like Facebook, decentralized such as Diaspora, encrypted or in plaintext,
as well as, the way of specifying and managing relationships, are not particularly
considered.
4.2 Formalization of SoNeUCONABC
Recalling that a WBSN can be defined as a graph, G, in which nodes (V ) corre-
sponds to users, edges (E) to relationships and resources (D) refer to elements that
are somehow associated with users. Assuming this structure, the proposed model
called SoNeUCONABC , mainly focuses on managing users (S), objects (O) and
relationships (RT ) attributes.
Contrary to UCONABC which only manages direct relationships [150], the
SoNeUCONABC ACM extends the UCONABC model by including a new in-
dependent entity, relationships (RT ), and its attributes, relationships attributes
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Figure 4.2: SoNeUCONABC
(ATT RT ). The new entity, RT , is composed of the sets of relationships (direct
and indirect, as described below) between pairs of users. The remaining entities, at-
tributes and functions considered in the UCONABC model are also considered in the
SoNeUCONABC model. Access control is now managed through the establishment
of policies defined over authorizations (A) built over ATT S, ATT O, ATT RT 
and rights (R), obligations (B) and conditions (C). Note that graph terminology
is applied according to [151] and that elements of the WBSN conceptualization can
then be related to those in SoNeUCONABC as follows:
 Subjects (S) are the WBSN users (V ) who play the role of requesters. User
attributes, referred to as users profiles, can be derived with the mapping
vAT  S Ð  ATT S. Notice that vAT includes multiple individual mappings
such that vATi  S Ð  ATT Si. For example, vAT1  S Ð  AGE where
AGE contains all possible values for the AGE attribute.
 Objects (O) are WBSN resources (D) that refer to as photos, videos, wall
messages and personal messages. Additionally, they have attached a set of
object attributes that can be derived with the mapping dAT  O Ð  ATT O.
For instance, a possible individual mapping is dAT1  O Ð  TITLE.
 Relationships (RT ) represent the set of existing relations between the users of
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the WBSN which is part of users identity data. Under the approach taken in
this work, given a request s, o, r (where s is the requester, o the requested
object and r the requested right over o), a specific set of relationships rt is
considered to manage access control. In particular, rt is defined as the set of
relations that exist between the administrator a of the requested object o and
the requester s.
Consider that a path p in G is a sequence of alternating vertices vi > V and
edges ei > E such that pi   vi0 , ei1 , vi1 , . . . , vij1 , eij , vij , . . . eik , vik where i is
the path identifier, j the node order and k the length of the path. Let P
be the set of all simple strong paths in G. A path pi is said to be simple if
no node occurs more than once, i.e., ¦iq, ir where q, r > 0, . . . , k, if iq x ir,
then viq x vir . A path pi is said to be strong if for all nodes vij in the path,
except for the initial node vi0 , there exists an edge eij in the path such that
eij   vij1 , vij that is, an edge that links forwards both nodes vij1 and vij
(in the direction from vij1 to vij ). In Figure 4.3, a simple strong path may be
found between v8 and v1 using the edges referred to as e13, e21 and e7. The
path will be (v8, e13, v5, e21, v3, e7, v1). Note that in the case of the figure the
number in the subscripts is just an identifier of the specific node or edge.
Let Vpi and Epi be respectively the node set and edge set of path pi. Then,
pi , the enriched path of pi, is built by adding to Epi the edges of G that link,
either forwards or backwards, two consecutive nodes of path pi. Thus, P
 is
the set of enriched paths pi built from paths in P. Enriched paths are rep-
resented as pi   vi0 , e1i1 , . . . ; e2i1 , . . . , vi1 , . . . , vij1 , e
lj
i1
, . . . ; e
lj
i2
, . . . , vij , . . . ,
vik1 , e1ik , . . . ; e2ik , . . . , vik, being lj the multiplicity of edges between nodes
vij1 and vij and k the length of the path. Note that edges that link two
consecutive nodes of the path have been classified in two groups (separated
by a semicolon), that contain respectively the forward and backward edges.
Symbol g indicates that no edge exists in that direction. For instance, in
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Figure 4.3: Relationships example, GRT  v8,v1
Figure 4.3, given the set of nodes v8; v5; v3; v1, p1 is an enriched path de-
fined as (v8, e13;g, v5, e21; e22, v3, e7; e6, e5, v1). Note that edge e12 is not
included because although it links two nodes of path p1 , these nodes are not
consecutive. This example highlights that enriched paths facilitates expressive
power management because they allow navigating along all the relationships
between a pair of users, no matter if they are direct or indirect.
Let va and vs be respectively the nodes representing the administrator a of
the requested object o and the requester s. Then rt is built as the set of
all enriched paths, from P, that allow reaching node vs from node va. It is
considered that each enriched path in rt is a relationship between va and vs.
In the example shown in Figure 4.3, rt for va   v8 and vs   v1 is formed by the
vertex set Vrt   v8, v4, v2, v7, v6, v5, v3, v1 and the edge set Ert is composed
by all continuous arrows.
Attributes of the relationships between va and vs are derived from the at-
tributes of the direct relationships that compose them. The set of attribute
values associated to direct relationships is denoted as ATT E and can be
derived with the mapping eAT  E Ð  ATT E. As in the case of the
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other attribute mappings, eAT is composed by multiple individual mappings;
for example, eATi  E Ð  ROLE, where ROLE contains all possible val-
ues for the ROLE attribute. As enriched paths contain one or more edges,
the concatenation of the attributes of these edges constitute the set of at-
tributes of the enriched path and they can be derived with the mapping
pAT  P  Ð  ATT P  with ATT P    ATT Ene and ne the number of
edges in the considered enriched path. The structure of the enriched path
(number of edges between two consecutive nodes and their direction) needs to
be kept, therefore, the set of its attributes may be represented following the no-
tation used to represent an enriched path but excluding the nodes. Consider,
for example, the enriched path p1 such that v8, e10, e11;g, v4, e2; e1, v1.
Let’s assume that only edge attributes of ROLE and TRUST are consid-
ered, and that their values for the edges in p1 are eAT e10   friend,3,
eAT e11   colleage,2, eAT e2   friend,4 and eAT e1   friend,3.
Then, the attributes of the enriched path p1 will be represented as pAT p1  
friend,3, colleage,2;g, friend,4; friend,3. Therefore, a set of
relationships, rt, has also associated a set of attributes ATT RT , which can
be derived with the mapping rtAT  rtÐ  ATT RT  and built similarly from
the attributes of its enriched paths.
Note that although rt is defined as the set of enriched paths between va and
vs, the relationships information could be condensed in the subgraph induced
from the nodes involved in those relationships.
 Rights (R) refer to the actions (AC) that can be performed over WBSN
resources and identity data such as read, update or delete.
 Authorizations (A) are the rules defined as functional predicates over
ATT S, ATT O, ATT RT  and R, that have to be satisfied, before or
while the usage process, in order to grant a right to a subject on an object.
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 Obligations (B) refers to requirements that users have to satisfy before or
while the usage process.
 Conditions (C) correspond to requirements regarding the system or the envi-
ronment status that have to be satisfied before or while the usage process.
Lastly, it is remarkable that in this model the unique data managed are the
attributes of the requester, of the administrator of the requested object and of the
relationships between the administrator and the requester. Therefore, attributes
of the rest of nodes involved in indirect relationships remain hidden when access
control is enforced.
4.3 Access control policies
A request is expressed as s, o, r. In SoNeUCONABC , access control policies
(ρ) are defined in terms of authorization A (predicates over ATT S, ATT O,
ATT RT  and R), obligations B and conditions C. As illustrated next, the re-
quested r > R over o > O is granted if the values of ATT S of the requester,
ATT O of the requested object and ATT RT  the set of relationships between
the administrator and the requester satisfy the appropriate ρ. Note that although
the general definition of access control policies is based on ATT RT , given that
ATT RT  is built from ATT E, this last set of attributes is the one directly man-
aged during policies specification and enforcement. Therefore, the key matter is the
definition of the set of attributes types regarding ATT S, ATT O and ATT E,
detailing possible operators, as well as, the way of constructing policies.
4.3.1 Policy attributes
Attribute types can be classified as follows:
 Boolean (B). These attributes can take a pair of values. For instance, the
subject attribute married can take values “Yes” or “No”.
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 Free-valued (FV). These attributes can take a value from a set of multiple
possibilities. This attribute type is divided in two groups:
– Numeric (M): it refers to attributes which have numeric values. For
example, the subject attribute age may take values from 15 to 99.
– String (S): it corresponds to attributes whose values are strings of char-
acters. A key example is the direct relationship attribute role which
takes values “friend”, “colleague”, “relative” and so on.
 Data structures (D): it refers to structures in which numeric, string and
boolean attributes can be combined. For instance: the direct relationship
attribute creationT ime takes values following the pattern “dd/ mm/yyyy-
hh:mm”, where dd refers to the day, mm refers to the month, yyyy refers to
the year, hh refers to the hour and mm refers to the minute when the relation-
ship was established. Moreover, notice that the construction of multivalued
attributes can be created as a data structure, e.g., a list.
4.3.2 Policy operators
Regarding attributes management, the following set of operators can be applied:
1. Logical operators L   ,S- S . Operator , represents a logic AND, operator
- refers to a logic OR and operator  represents negation. Operators , and
- can be applied to two elements that can be attributes of boolean type or
boolean expressions result of applying a functional or complex operator (see
below). Operator  can be applied to one of these elements.
2. Functional operators F  @ S A S 6 S > S  . These operators are applied
to two attributes of numeric or string type. For example, given the subject
attribute age, the age of a pair of users, v1 and v2, can be compared by
building the expression agev1 @ agev2 to identify if v1 is younger than v2.
The result of applying these operators is a boolean value. Note that a concrete
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specification of string types management should be defined according to each
particular context.
3. Complex operators X . These operators are an open set based on the com-
bination of logic and functional operators and they are applied to data struc-
tures. For instance, assuming the existence of a list of attribute values such
that attiV alue1, attiV alue2, ..., attiV aluen, xi > X can be defined as an op-
erator which goes recursively through the list until identifying a particular
attribute value. The result should be also a boolean value.
4.3.3 Policy construction
Concerning the above operators, constraints and policy attributes, each pol-
icy (ρ) in SoNeUCONABC model is generally depicted as ρA;∂b;∂c, that is,
ρρs;ρo;ρrt; r;∂b;∂c.
More specifically, ρs, ρo and ρrt correspond to predicates (αattwi) built using
operators applied to the attributes of a subject, ATT S, an object, ATT O, and
the set of relationships between the subject and the administrator of the requested
object, ATT E, where w in αattwi can take three possible values – s, o or e –,
to indicate the set of attributes that the attribute used in the expression belongs
to. Moreover, ∂b and ∂c refer to sets of obligations and conditions. Policies are
formally described through BNF notation [152]. For the sake of simplicity, when
a specific mapping on an entity should be used to obtain the value of an attribute
(e.g., ages, titleo, or trustei), only the name of the mapping will be used (i.e.,
age, title, or trust), as the policy construction allows to clearly identify the entity
to which the mapping should be applied in each case.
 Regarding ρs and ρo, ρs (analogously ρo) is defined as follows:
– ρs   ‘g’S ‘ ’ αatts1  ‘,’S‘-’  ‘ ’ αattsj, which means that
predicates applied over subjects attributes can be connected by dis-
junctives and/ or conjunctives and/or negatives (αattsi) For instance:
94
Chapter 4. SoNeUCONABC : an expressive usage control model for
WBSNs and the enforcement mechanism
ρs   age A 18 , student   uc3m
 By contrast, ρrt is composed of predicates built over ATT RT . It consists of
a list of three elements: the first one (σ) corresponds to the set of conditions
(expressed as paths, ψ) that enriched paths in rt must satisfy; the second one
($) refers to the number of times that the only path σ involves, should exist
in rt; and the last one (δ) corresponds to the number of nodes involved in a
clique, being σ composed of a single forward direct relationship. Indeed, δ is
directly related to the number of different bidirectional enriched paths that
exist in a clique with the formula PNK 1 P K,N  1 where N   δ  2 (N is
the number of members of the clique excluding va and vs) and P K,N refers
to the number of K-permutations in a set of N elements.
According to the previous description of ρrt elements, the proposed policy
language allows the definition of policies with cliques (applying δ) and poli-
cies that involve conditions regarding multiple paths (applying σ), multiple
instances of one particular path (applying $) or multiple types of different
paths (applying multiple and analogous ψ in σ).
– ρrt  ‘g’ S σ, $, δ
– σ   ψ ‘,’S‘-’ ψ, which means that σ is composed of the disjunction
and/ or the conjunction of multiple paths ψ.
* ψ   τ; τ, which means that each path ψ is composed of a set τ
of direct relationships at different hops, being symbol “;” applied to
distinguishing hops. The amount of hops in a path can be calculated
in respect to the amount of “;” plus one.
· τ   fertSbertS‘g’ ‘,’S‘-’ fertSbertS‘g’, which means that τ is
composed of the disjunction and/ or the conjunction of forward
fert and backward bert relationships.
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· fert    ‘ ’ αattei ‘,’S‘-’  ‘ ’ αattei , which means that
each direct forward relationship fert is built over the disjunc-
tion and/ or the conjunction and/or the negation of predicates
applied over relationship attributes (αattei).
· bert   fert
For example: ρrt   role   friend , role   friend , role  
friend; role   friend,g,g refers to the existence of a pair of paths.
One of them corresponds to a forward and a backward friendship rela-
tionship. The other one corresponds to a friend of a friend forward
relationship.
– $  ‘g’Sn, where n > Z and n A 2. Note that in case $ takes value n, σ
must be composed of a single path ψ to identify n occurrences of such
path. Otherwise $ is g. For instance: ρrt   role   friend;role  
relative, creationY ear A 2010,2,g expresses the necessity of exist-
ing, at least, a pair of paths of length two where the first hop involves
a forward friendship relationship and the second hop involves a forward
relative relationship which must have been created after the year 2010.
– δ  ‘g’Sn, where n > Z and n A 0. Note that if δ takes a value distinct
from g, then σ must correspond to a single path ψ composed of a for-
ward relationship. Besides, the existence of a backward relationship of
the same type as the forward one is assumed. Otherwise δ is g. For
instance: ρrt   role   friend , trust   high,g,3 corresponds to
the existence of a clique of three users where the relationships between
each pair of users are highly trusted and have the role friend.
 r   writeSreadS....
 ∂b   ‘g’ S abligationn.
 ∂c   ‘g’ S conditionn.
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Then, a right (r) to an object (o), whose attributes satisfy ρo, is allowed if
the attributes of the requester (s) satisfy ρs, the set of relationships between the
administrator of o and the requester, directly or indirectly, satisfy ρrt, and ∂b and ∂c
are also satisfied: alloweds, o, r ρρs;ρo;ρrt; r;∂b;∂c. Notice that components
of ρ, except for r, can be empty (g). This issue can be used to specify public
policies or establish undetermined object, subject or relationship conditions. For
instance: ρ   g; title   party; g;g,g,g; read;g;g expresses that objects
entitled “party” can be read by users whom the administrator has some kind of
relationship with, as long as users are located at a maximum length of 2 hops.
On the other hand, concerning mutability and continuity management, policies
can be analogously defined for pre and on-going usage processes. Specifically, they
are defined as ρpreρs;ρo;ρrt; r;∂b;∂c and ρongoingρs;ρo;ρrt; r;∂b;∂c. Then, as
long as attributes change and regarding the stage of the usage process, the ap-
propriate access control policies are evaluated. Nonetheless, the unpredictability
of conditions and obligations definition has to be discussed. For instance, in the
WBSN Badoo, an obligation exists such that three photos should be uploaded to
the personal profile before accessing to other users’ albums. On the other hand, a
devised obligation may require to have five contacts before accessing to other users’
profiles. By contrast, a possible condition is referred to the system’s load capacity
(e.g. free or busy), that is, accesses are rejected until the system is free. These ex-
amples illustrate the large set of possible conditions and obligations that can exist.
Consequently, such variability together with the aim of getting as much flexibility
as possible, support the inappropriateness of providing a concrete specification of
both types of elements herein.
4.4 Access control enforcement
Access control enforcement is carried out through the execution of a set of functions
which, in this proposal, are linked to the proposed policy language.
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Once a request s, o, r is received, stored policies are retrieved. A pair of alter-
natives to enforce access control are identified. The first one is based on searching
for enriched paths between the administrator a of the requested object o and the re-
quester s throughout the whole WBSN graph (G), and verifying the policies during
the process. On the other hand, the second approach first builds the set rt. After-
wards, policies are verified considering this set. Given the difficulty in accurately
measuring the complexity of the first alternative, the second alternative is adopted
herein. This alternative allows the reuse of rt while verifying policies, as well as the
calculation of the upper bound of the computational complexity concerning access
control enforcement.
The enforcement process is divided in four main activities, see diagram of Figure
4.4, namely, 1) the enforcement setup, 2) the verification of policy elements which is
composed of six activities related to the evaluation of elements involve in policies,
3) the construction of rt between the administrator a and the requester s and
4) the usage control process. The first activity consists of retrieving policies of
the administrator. Then, per each policy ρ, the right r, ρs and ρo are evaluated.
Subsequently, rt is constructed (if required) and ρrt is evaluated. The next activities
correspond to the evaluation of conditions and obligations (∂c and ∂o respectively).
Finally, access control is managed along the whole usage process. Note that the set
of ρpre is the first one evaluated. Besides, note that the evaluation order of elements
involved in each policy ρ can be altered due to efficiency reasons and, for instance,
conditions can be evaluated before ρrt.
More specifically, the work-flow of the enforcement process in terms of applied
activities and actions involved in them is depicted in Figures 4.5 and 4.6. Along
this section, actions correspond to the developed functions and they are pointed out
in square brackets. The enforcement setup involves the retrieval of access control
policies of the administrator a of the requested object o, to start the evaluation of
each of them [FindSubjectPolicies].
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Figure 4.4: Activity diagram of the enforcement process.
Regarding the construction of rt, it consists of the set of enriched paths between
the administrator a and the requester s [CreateRT ]. This structure is recursively
built identifying contacts of the administrator a, at different hops, from whom
the requester s is reached and storing attached enriched paths [GetNumContacts/
GetConnectedUser]. The recursion is performed and rt constructed until path
length is 6. This upper limit is established due to theoretical studies [153]. Note
that ATT S of intermediate nodes are not retrieved and evaluated. An identifier
of these intermediates nodes is only necessary to jump from one node to another
until constructing rt. Besides, identifiers do not have to disclose users’ information.
Another activity is the evaluation of policies. Per each policy ρ, elements in-
volved in it are evaluated, namely, subject, objects and relationships attributes
(involved in ρs, ρo and ρrt respectively), the established right r, conditions (∂c)
and obligations (∂c) [Match]. Firstly, the requested right r is evaluated against the
right r > ρ [MatchR]. Next, it is verified if predicates (αattsi) involved in ρs and
built over different types of ATT S (boolean B, free-values FV or data structures
D), match attributes of the requester s [V erifyDAttTypes/ V erifyFV AttTypes/
V erifyBAttTypes]. Subsequently, the same process is performed for ρo and at-
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Figure 4.5: Enforcement process work-flow.
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Figure 4.6: Enforcement process work-flow of the verification of ρrt.
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tributes of the requested object o.
Thirdly, the evaluation of ρrt is carried out in three different steps [MatchRT ],
see Figure 4.6. The primary step is the validation of cliques when δ A 0 and
σ consists of a single path ψ with just a forward direct relationship fert in τ
[V erifyClique]. If a clique is evaluated, the lengths of all possible enriched paths
in the clique between the administrator a and the requester s are initially cal-
culated [CalculateCliquePaths]. More specifically, these lengths are calculated
from the formula PNK 1 P K,N  1 (recall Section 4.3.3) where K-permutations
in a set of N elements should be performed, being N the number of members of
the clique distinct from the administrator a and the requester s. Then, all en-
riched paths in rt whose length corresponds to the calculated ones, are stored
[GetEnrichedPathsWithLength]. Simultaneously, the forward relationship fert
from σ is retrieved [GetErtDivision]. Finally, stored paths are processed identify-
ing forward and a backward relationship at each hop [GetDirectRelAtt] and verify-
ing if these relationships satisfy attribute predicates of fert [MatchDirectPaths].
The second step in the evaluation of ρrt is the verification of multiple instances
of a particular type of path in rt [MatchPathPolicy]. This issue is verified when
$ A 2 and σ consists of a single path ψ. After identifying the length of path
ψ [GetLengthPath], enriched paths of rt are processed storing those with such
length [GetEnrichedPathsWithLength]. Then, ψ is processed retrieving all di-
rect forward and backward relationships in each hop, that is, τ [GetDirectRelAtt].
Similarly, regarding stored paths of rt, forward and backward relationships in
each hop are also retrieved [GetDirectRelAtt]. The last part is the evaluation
of retrieved backward and forward relationships of ψ against those of paths of rt
[MatchDirectPaths].
The last step in the verification of ρrt consists of evaluating paths of different
types, that is, when σ is the only element in ρrt different from g. It is equivalent to
the second step but individually processing every ψ in σ [GetPathsPolicies]. Once
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all paths ψ are evaluated, it is finally verified that enriched paths of rt satisfy σ,
that is, it is verified that all paths are connected according to operators (, and/ or
-) σ involves [V erifyPolicy].
Policies evaluation finishes with the verification of obligations (∂b) and condi-
tions (∂c) [MatchO/ MatchC]. However, given their variety, ∂b and ∂c, enforcement
should be attached to each particular implementation and thus, left for systems’
developers.
Finally, usage control has to be taken into account. Each time an attribute
or a policy is somehow updated, the enforcement process is repeated applying the
appropriate rt previously constructed or re-constructing a new if the stored rt is
affected by produced changes [ContinuityCheckAccess]. Moreover, it is noticeable
that ρongoing management is attached to particular implementations. Therefore,
usage control has to be integrated within an entity (such as, the PDP and/or
the PEP recall Section 2.1) who adequately manages data requests and changed
elements.
More details regarding applied functions are presented in Appendix D.1, where,
based on [154], the concrete specification of every function is depicted and explained.
Note that, for simplicity reasons, auxiliary functions such as GetF irstNode, are not
pointed out herein but their use is detailed in the Appendix.
4.5 SoNeUCONABC high level architecture
SoNeUCONABC is an ACM and then, multiple architectures can be developed
in its regard. The architecture depicted in Figure 4.7 is the one proposed herein.
For simplicity reasons, it is centralized and access control management is enforced
within each WBSN. Nonetheless, a decentralized architecture considering a simpli-
fied version of SoNeUCONABC is also proposed in this Thesis and it is described
in Chapters 7 and 8.
WBSNs store and manage users, objects and relationships. WBSN users upload
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Figure 4.7: SoNeUCONABC high level architecture
objects, referred to as resources, define access control policies, establish identity
data, namely, their contacts’ information and their personal attributes, and request
rights over other users’ resources or identity data. More specifically, the high level
architecture consists of the following four components:
 Data bases (DBs): there are as many DBs as each WBSN requires. Mainly,
stored data refers to access control policies, resources and identity data
 Management module: this module allows to perform administrative operations
(detailed in Chapter 5), such as the creation and update of access control
policies.
 Reference monitor : as described in Section 2.1, the reference monitor is the
core component of access control systems and it is responsible for the enforce-
ment process. Given users requests, it verifies requests versus access control
policies and grants or denies access accordingly. In what concerns ρpre, the
reference monitor is located at the server-side, that is, where access control
policies are stored and evaluated but it may depend on particular implemen-
tations.
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 Usage reference monitor : enforcement in regard to ρongoing requires the intro-
duction of a Usage Decision Facility (UDF) and a Usage Enforcement Facility
(UEF) (recall Section 2.5.3.1) which compose an entity called herein usage
reference monitor. Although it must be studied in respect to particular im-
plementations, UDF may be located at the server-side to detect attributes
changes and UEF may be located at the client-side (i.e. in the browser) to
enforce access control along the usage period. As a matter to notice, devel-
opers must be aware of the most critical web application security risks ([155])
in order to face them.
The relation between SoNeUCONABC entities and above components is clear.
DBs store information related to users (S), their resources (O and ATT O), iden-
tity data (users’ profiles, ATT S, and contacts’ information, E and ATT E) and
access control policies (A), the reference monitor manages access control concerning
ρpre and the usage reference monitor takes part in the usage control process in what
concerns ρongoing.
4.6 Summary of the chapter
In this Chapter, an expressive ACM, called SoNeUCONABC , has been presented
together with a policy language, the attached enforcement functions and its high
level architecture. This model achieves fine-grained access control management in
a privacy friendly way, such that subject attributes of nodes involved in the rela-
tionships between the administrator and the requester of an object remain hidden.
Chapter 5
SoNeUCONADM :
administrative model for
SoNeUCONABC
Some of the uploaded data to WBSNs are personal data and they are in multiple
cases out of control. A careful supervision and management of all WBSNs data is
a demanding and a challenging necessity. At a primary step, SoNeUCONABC , an
expressive usage control model that allows fine-grained access control management
has been proposed in Chapter 4. However, the identification and specification of
administrative tasks is the following step. In this Chapter SoNeUCONADM , an
administrative model for SoNeUCONABC , is presented.
This Chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 introduces administrative fea-
tures, particularly, tasks and rights. In Section 5.2 SoNeUCONADM is described.
Lastly, Section 5.3, according to SoNeUCONABC high level architecture (see Sec-
tion 4.5), describes components involved in administrative management.
5.1 Towards administration
Prior to the description of how administration is performed in SoNeUCONADM ,
administrative tasks to address (Section 5.1.1) and the available rights to manage
(Section 5.1.2) are detailed in the following Sections.
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5.1.1 Administrative tasks
Studied in Section 2.6.1, administration involves multiple tasks. They can be clas-
sified in a couple of groups regarding tasks related to:
 The identification of who is involved in administrative issues. These tasks
refer to who manages access control policies, who associates policies with
resources and identity data and who manages revocation and delegation.
 The definition of how administrative issues are performed. These tasks cor-
respond to how policies are associated with resources and identity data, how
resources and identity data are associated with their owners and how revoca-
tion and delegation are managed.
5.1.2 Rights management
Two types of rights are differentiated, use rights and administrative rights. The
former ones, which are referred in SoNeUCONUCON to as Rights (R), are based
on operations that can be performed with objects, e.g. read, and operations that can
be carried out over objects, e.g. tag, move, copy, etc. By contrast, administrative
rights (AR) refer to the management of elements involved in the access control
decision process, as well as the management of delegation and revocation.
5.2 SoNeUCONADM definition
Users enrolled in a WBSN become owners of uploaded resources, established iden-
tity data (mainly profile data) and defined access control policies (recall Chapter
2). Thus, SoNeUCONADM is based on ownership, such that owned elements
are managed by their owners. Particularly, administrative objects (AO) refer to
elements involved in the access control decision process, namely, managed subjects
(S) and their attributes (ATT S), objects (O) and their attributes (ATT O),
direct relationships (E) and their attributes (ATT E) and access control policies
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Figure 5.1: SoNeUCONADM
(ACP ). Depicted in Figure 5.1, in SoNeUCONADM owners grant use rights R
over objects O regarding policies ACP and execute administrative rights AR over
administrative objects AO. In this regard, following Sections describe use rights R
and administrative rights AR management (Section 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 respectively).
5.2.1 Use rights management
Each owner specifies as many access control policies as desired and leaves them in
a pool of policies to be evaluated when a request is received for executing some
right over one of his owned objects. Contrary to other models, policies in ACP
are not directly associated with data and its owner but to the owner exclusively.
For instance, the policy “grant read access to data entitled PARTY to users older
than 20 ” is created, associated with an owner and located in his pool of policies.
Next, when an object of a particular owner is requested, all policies associated with
him are evaluated, verifying authorizations (A), composed of subjects, objects and
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relationship attributes and the granted right (ATT S, ATT O, ATT RT  and
r), obligations (∂b) and conditions (∂c). If there is a policy ρi within the set of
policies defined by an owner (Powi) that matches the request, the right r over the
requested object o is granted to the requester s. Assuming that the expression
owner“element” means being owner of “element”, it is formally defined as:
s, o, r granted
 Powi= ρi > ACP ~ownerρi   ownero,
§ρiAATT S,ATT O,ATT RT , r;∂b;∂c > Powi~
ρiAATT s,ATT o,ATT rtownero, s, r;∂b;∂c   true
5.2.2 Administrative rights management
This Section details the management of administrative objects (AO), revocation
and delegation. In general, being owner of a particular administrative object ao
grants administrative rights AR over it to manage the object and its attributes
and to delegate and revoke use rights R and administrative rights AR over it. It is
formally defined as:
s, ao,management granted
 s   ownerao
s, ao, delegation granted
 s   ownerao
s, ao, revocation granted
 s   ownerao
5.2.2.1 Administrative objects management
The management of administrative objects AO is based on the creation, the modi-
fication and the deletion of owned elements (see Figure 5.2). Specifically, as afore-
mentioned, AO consists of S, ATT S, O, ATT O, E, ATT E and ACP .
Concerning S, users can create an account in every WBSN which they want
to be enrolled in and then, they become owners of each established access control
policy, identity data and uploaded object. Likewise, WBSN users may cancel the
account at any time. In terms of ATT S, the attributes of the user associated
to an account can be established by its owner, retrieved from an IdP where they
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Figure 5.2: Administrative objects (AO) management
may have been previously stored or obtained from personal devices, e.g. identity
cards may store the value of attribute BIRTH DATE. Indeed, these attributes are
considered identity data of WBSN users.
In relation to O, owners upload objects, referred to as resources like photos,
to WBSNs. In centralized WBSNs like Facebook these objects are stored in DBs
owned by the WBSNs themselves. By contrast, decentralized WBSNs like Diaspora
allow the storage of objects in chosen hosts. Moreover, uploaded objects should be
deleted whenever desired. Regarding ATT O, the attributes of the objects owned
by a user can be defined by this user, e.g. attribute TITLE, or obtained from objects
metadata, e.g. LOCATION. However, if required, owners have to allow WBSNs to
process objects metadata and automatically establish attributes values.
On the other hand, regarding E, users can create, update or delete direct rela-
tionships (with the edge starting at themselves and finishing at other user) and the
attribute values of these relationships ATT E. Besides, ATT E are considered
identity data and then, they can be stored and thus retrieved, from IdPs.
Lastly, owners can create, update or delete access control policies ACP which
include the specification of A, ∂b and ∂c. Recalling Section 4.3, each access control
policy ρ consists of ρs;ρo;ρrt; r;∂b;∂c.
As a final remark, it is noticeable that, though ATT S, ATT O and ATT E
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are open sets of attributes, their use is bounded by WBSNs, because only those
which are supported can be applied. It is the same case as with ∂b and ∂c involved
in ACP , their use depends on available options.
5.2.2.2 Delegation management
Delegation focuses on giving permissions over an object to other users for a period
of time or permanently. Delegating R can be compared with the establishment of
access control control policies, if users who request a particular r > R over an object
satisfy established policies, r is granted.
On the contrary, the delegation of AR requires the definition of the following
function:
 DELEGATE(vk,vj ,oi,λ): It states that vk gives a specific AR λ to vj over oi.
λ refers to a partial delegation, to delegate some AR, or a complete delegation,
to delegate all AR and change the owner of the delegated object. In case of
complete delegation, λ takes the value . Conversely, in a partial delegation, λ
may take the value, e.g., AR-R to express that only the permission to grant use
rights R is delegated. Note that in the administrative model proposed herein,
this operation is permanent, being left for future work the management of
temporal delegation.
In SoNeUCONADM the delegation of AR compels the permanent delegation of
all AR. Thus, the object over which the operation is executed, becomes property
of the delegatee. The delegation operation should be enforced such as λ takes the
value , DELEGATE(vk,vj ,oi,).
5.2.2.3 Revocation management
Revocation undoes the effect of delegation. In other words, it is the operation
that undoes the granting of a right over an object to a user. As identified in
Chapter 2.6, two types of revocation are distinguished, weak and strong. However,
5.2. SoNeUCONADM definition 111
SoNeUCONADM only manages weak revocation of use rights R because recursive
delegations are not applied and administrative rights AR are permanently delegated.
Specifically, in SoNeUCONADM revocation is the result of the modification,
either of attributes or policies. For instance, assuming that objects entitled “work”
are accessible to co-workers, this policy holds until the title of objects entitled
“work” changes. Indeed, it is extremely related to usage control and the application
of mutability and continuity attributes. Mutability refers to the fact that attributes
can be updated at any time. On the other hand, continuity refers to the enforcement
of access control along the whole usage process. Both attributes are directly related
to revocation because if initial conditions change along the usage process, access
decisions have to be taken again [20] and they may cause the revocation of granted
rights. Based on [156], revocation can be also divided between direct and indirect:
 Direct revocation can be enforced, at any time, by the owners of resources and
identity data. Data owners may decide to revoke rights previously granted,
updating or deleting an access control policy, as well as changing attributes.
For instance, if the right to access a photo entitled “Classes” is granted to
relationships with role “classmates”, revocations can be caused by the update
of the title of the photo or by the update of the role of a classmate relationship.
Likewise, if the policy “Grant access to Friends to all photos” is updated
to “Grant access to Friends to photos entitled Birthday”, it may prevent
requesters from getting requested rights in subsequent requests or while the
usage process.
In the revocation process, apart from the data owner, the Usage Reference
Monitor is the entity at stake, that is, the UDF and UEF in particular (recall
Section 2.5.3.1). When policies are updated or attributes are changed, the
UDF is informed about that. Afterwards, it informs the occurred event to the
UEF and lastly, the UEF enforces the re-evaluation of policies.
 Indirect revocation is caused by uncontrolled situations. Particularly, it is
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performed when access control policy attributes expire or change. “Auto-
matic” attributes updates, either subjects, objects or relationship attributes,
can cause revocation of granting rights.“Automatic’ means that no users in-
teractions are required. For instance, if the right to access a photo entitled
“High-school” is granted to users under 18, revocations occur when requesters
turn to 18 years old. Note that “automatic” updates are specially related to
attributes in which time is directly or indirectly involved.
The management is equivalent to direct revocation except for the fact that
the UDF identifies updated attributes.
5.3 SoNeUCONADM high level architecture
Following the architecture presented in SoNeUCONABC (Section 4.5), administra-
tive tasks are described accordingly. Particularly, depicted in Figure 5.3, WBSN
users unload resources and identity data and establish access control policies to
allow certain users have rights over their data. Administrative tasks are related to
the following entities:
 Data bases (DBs): policies, resources and identity data DBs.
 Management module: this is the core component of administrative issues and
it is divided in two modules.
– Access control policy module: it provides users with tools to create,
upload and delete access control policies.
– Resources and identity data module: it provides users with tools to
upload resources and manage their attributes appropriately, e.g. the
specification of their title or their description. Likewise, it also allows
the specification of identity data, e.g. users’ addresses or users’ hobbies.
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Figure 5.3: SoNeUCONADM high level architecture
 Usage reference monitor : in case revocations take place, this component acts
accordingly. The UDF is informed about attributes and access control policies
updates and subsequently, it notifies the event to the UEF which enforces
access control as required.
In regard to the proposed administrative model and its relation with this archi-
tecture, administrative issues are specially supported by the management module.
5.4 Summary of the chapter
SoNeUCONADM , an administrative model for SoNeUCONABC , has been pre-
sented. It manages administrative objects, as well as delegation and revocation of
use and administrative rights. This Chapter concludes with the specification of ad-
ministrative issues within the high level architecture presented in SoNeUCONABC .
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Chapter 6
CooPeD: Co-owned Personal
Data management
WBSN resources may belong to multiple users. Resources are uploaded by owners
but they can be related to co-owners as well. For instance, users tagged in photos
can be considered co-owners of the photo [33]. Therefore, resources management
should support the preservation of owners and co-owners privacy.
Assorted techniques combine owners and co-owners preferences, being the voting
scheme the most common one (recall Section 2.6.3). Nonetheless, contradictory
preferences may compromise users privacy, i.e. the owner chooses to leave his
resources public and a co-owner prefers to keep them private. The only proposal
that solves this matter is the one proposed by K. Thomas et al. [34] where all user
preferences are intersected to reach a full consensus. However, this is a restrictive
technique and even being desirable the preservation of users privacy, a trade off
between privacy and users demands is an essential requirement. In other words, a
system may become useless if it is too restrictive.
On the other hand, current developments focus on grating or denying access
to an entire piece of data without wondering about the fact that data can be,
for instance, presented in a different way regarding owners and co-owners privacy
preferences.
To contribute on this issue, this Chapter presents CooPeD (Co-owned Personal
Data Management), a system that deals with co-ownership management of decom-
posable objects, being particularly focused on image-based data (photos and videos
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without audio). It is focused on managing objects that are composed of parts, as
it happens in [41]. Owners upload objects and manually or automatically assign
parts to users to whom they are related to, being these users referred to as co-
owners. Then, each owner and co-owners individually manages his privacy prefer-
ences. Fine-grained access control to each part is provided as the SoNeUCONABC
and SoNeUCONADM usage control models are applied. Particularly, both models
are extended herein to support co-ownership.
This Chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 presents an overview of the
approach. A description of CooPeD is detailed in Section 6.2. Finally, Section
6.3 extends the high level architecture proposed in previous chapters to deal with
co-ownership management.
6.1 CooPeD overview
CooPeD is assumed to be used in WBSNs applying the SoNeUCONABC usage
control model to manage access control. However, this model has to be extended
to include the management of co-owned personal data. In particular, the proposed
extension is applied to decomposable image-based objects, such that, Objectj  
PiObjectj .Parti Objectj .Background.
In SoNeUCONABC , each object, is managed by the user who uploads it, that
is, its owner (also referred to as administrator). Nonetheless, the extension of the
model should allow that each Objectj .Parti is managed by the user related to it,
who should be its administrator and referred to as a co-owner of the object that
contains the part. Note that Objectj .Background is a fixed part of each object and
under the proposed approach it is exclusively related to and managed by its owner.
The extension affects both models, SoNeUCONABC and SoNeUCONADM .
In general terms, once the owner and the co-owners have established their pri-
vacy preferences by specifying a set of access control policies, in their regard and
based on each object request, access to parts and background is granted or denied.
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Figure 6.1: Co-ownership management of an object
If access is granted parts are visible and on the contrary, parts are hidden. An
example is presented in Figure 6.1, where an object is composed of three parts in
addition to the background, such that a pair of co-owners and the owner establish
access control policies. The owner creates a policy to grant access to users older
than 18. By contrast, co-owner1 grants access to users older than 24 and co-owner2
creates two policies, one to grant access to friends and other to grant access to users
older than 20. Due to these restrictions three different situations are distinguished:
1) Part1 is the only one hidden, e.g. a user who is 23 years old gets access to Part2,
Part3 and the background; 2) Part1 and Part2 are hidden, e.g. a user who is 19
years old gets access to Part1 and the background; and 3) all parts, as well as the
background, are hidden, e.g. a user who is 16 years old does not get access. There-
fore, access control management is privacy-preserving, considering and respecting
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the privacy preferences of all users.
It is noteworthy the unnecessary development of negotiation mechanisms be-
cause each object’s part is independently managed by a particular user and conflicts
cannot exist.
6.2 CooPeD description
This Section presents the types of objects managed in CooPeD (Section 6.2.1) and
the extension of SoNeUCONABC in respect to both, access control (Section 6.2.2)
and administrative management (Section 6.2.3).
6.2.1 Objects at stake
Access control looks for protecting users privacy through the protection, mainly, of
users personal data. According to the EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC),
personal data refers to “any information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person (‘Data Subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified,
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one
or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or
social identity”[157].
As a result of above considerations and recalling the CooPeD applies to decom-
posable objects, parts should correspond to elements that identify or facilitate the
identification of a particular user. For instance, translating into a real situation
the aforementioned example (see Figure 6.1), Part1 corresponds to the image of
co-owner1 himself, Part2 to the image of co-owner2’s car and Part3 to the image
of the owner himself. Then, parts can be users or elements they possess, such as
animals, vehicles, houses, elements they are carrying, etc. Nonetheless, objects de-
composition is quite restrictive as it depends on the amount of parts that users
can distinguish and automatic tools can perform. Besides, it is assumed that each
object’s part is assigned to a single user and the management of parts related to
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multiple users is left for future work. For instance, an image of a couple of users in
front of their house opens up the discussion about who has to manage the part of
the image related to the house.
Therefore, this proposal is focused on a pair of image-based types of objects,
photos and videos (without audio):
 Photos are composed of assorted elements such as users, vehicles, animals,
etc., being desirable that all users related somehow to them manage access
control. For this purpose, considering that H. Lipford et al. mentioned the
appropriate use and possible application of graphical techniques to manage
access control [158], the analysis of recognition techniques to identify elements
within photos is essential.
 Videos (without audio) are compared with a sequence of photos, thereby they
can be also decomposed. Nonetheless, as there are a great amount of photos
per video, their management is significantly more tedious and complex.
Lastly, it is noticeable that CooPeD is based on image-based data, although
other objects like documents, music or videos with audio can be also applied. Once
access control policies of the owner and co-owners are verified, the requested doc-
ument, music or video with audio can be processed accordingly. In the case of
documents, the appropriate sentences can be hidden; in relation to music, the right
notes can be silenced; and in regard to videos with audio, the appropriate tracks
can be omitted. Nonetheless, managing this type of objects involves a great deal of
technical complexity. For instance, in a video record (with audio), a user may say
“last night I went out with Charles”, being indispensable the appropriate identifi-
cation of co-owners in all photo sequences as well as in the audio track until doing a
complete decomposition. Therefore, this contribution focuses on image-based data
and leaves for future work the management of other kinds of data.
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Figure 6.2: SoNeUCON coownership management
6.2.2 Extension of SoNeUCONABC usage control model
SoNeUCONABC is extended in such a way that the entity Objects (O) includes
an additional link to state that objects are composed of objects (Figure 6.2). Each
object oi is decomposed in n objects o
j
i such that oi   P
n
j 0 o
j
i . Therefore, a tree
structure T oi, where oji are the leaves, can be identified (Figure 6.2). In CooPeD,
managed objects are image-based, photos and videos (without audio) which are
decomposed in the background and multiple parts, that is, objects composed of
objects. In this regard, a decomposed object consists of the background of the
image o0i , and as many objects o
j
i as required. Depicted in Figure 6.3, o1 consists
of three objects being o01 the background. It must be noted that decompositions
can be recursively performed creating a tree T oi, h of depth h where each oji at a
given depth may become the root of a sub-tree. However, for the sake of simplicity
and without losing generality only one level of decomposition is considered herein
and recursion is left for future work.
Concerning attributes, the existence of oji leads to the emergence of additional
in ATT O. A new atto can be the type of the part of the decomposed object.
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Figure 6.3: T o1 example
Then, analogously to SoNeUCONABC , ATT O can be derived from the mapping
dAT  O Ð  ATT O. Furthermore, given that an oi is composed of several oji ,
each oji inherits at first attoi from its parent object.
6.2.2.1 Access control policies specification
In terms of access control policies, their structure remains as ρρs;ρo;ρrt; r;∂b;∂c
(see Chapter 4). The main change is that ρo can involve additional ATT O.
Indeed, the use of these attributes helps to reach fine-grained access control policies
particularly when co-ownership management takes place. The atto partType
would help to determine the precise type of an object oji to which the policy applies.
If partType takes the value user, it means that the oji to whom it is attached refers
to the image of the owner/ co-owner himself. Similarly, if partType takes value car,
it states that the oji to whom it is attached corresponds to the owner’s/ co-owner’s
car.
In Figure 6.1, the proposed example depicts an object oi which is decomposed
in four parts B,P1, P2, P3 where B refers to the background. In the example the
established access control policies are pointed out below. All users specify partType
to reach fine-granularity and guarantee that their established policies are enforced
when oji come into play:
 User1 (Owner:)
ρ1   age A 18; g; partType   User; g;Read; g; g
 User2 (Co-owner1):
ρ1   age A 24; g; partType   User; g;Read; g; g
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Figure 6.4: Activity diagram of the enforcement process.
 User3 (Co-owner2):
ρ1   g; g; partType   car; role   friend,g, g; Read; g; g
ρ2   age A 20; g; partType   car; g;Read; g; g
6.2.2.2 Access control policies enforcement
When r > R over oi > O is requested and oi has been decomposed in o
j
i objects,
co-ownership management starts. Access control enforcement is divided in three
main activities, see Figure 6.4. First, co-ownership enforcement setup is carried
out, identifying involved co-owners and parts oji of the requested object. Secondly,
according to each oji of the owner and of the co-owners, the enforcement of their
access control policies is performed as in SoNeUCONABC (Section 4.4). Finally,
after the evaluation of the owner and the co-owners policies, the requested object
oi is processed accordingly.
Again, as in SoNeUCONABC , the work-flow of the enforcement process in
terms of applied activities and actions involved in them is depicted in Figure 6.5.
Likewise, actions correspond to developed functions and they are pointed out in
square brackets. The enforcement starts identifying parts oji of the requested object
oi that belong to the owner [FindObjects]. Similarly, co-owners linked to the
requested object oi are noticed [FindCoOwners] and objects parts o
j
i attached to
each of them are identified [FindObjects].
Concerning the activity of enforcement setup, the verification of access control
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Figure 6.5: Enforcement process work-flow.
policies is carried out analogously to SoNeUCONABC (recall Section 4.4).
Finally, objects are processed according to the owner and the co-owners access
control policies, and the requested right r is (or is not) granted [ProcessObject]. In
particular, if the request matches the conditions of an access control policy of the
owner and an access control policy of each co-owner, the requested right r over the
requested object oi is granted. By contrast, if the request does not match conditions
of any policy of the owner and any policy of the co-owners, r is not granted. On
the other hand, if the request matches conditions of a policy of the owner or with
the conditions of a policy of some co-owners, oi is processed and r over appropriate
oji is granted.
Note that the concrete specification of every function is presented in Appendix
D.2.
6.2.3 Extension of SoNeUCONADM
First of all, the different between R and AR should be recalled (Chapter 5). R refer
to operations that can be performed with objects, e.g. read, move, copy, etc. On
the contrary, AR correspond to the management of elements involve in the access
control decision process, as well as delegation and revocation.
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In the extension of SoNeUCONADM , described in the following Sections, AR
management is extended to include decomposition management (Section 6.2.3.1), as
well as changes in terms of delegation (Section 6.2.3.2). The rest of administrative
functions, namely, the management of use rights R, administrative objects AO and
revocation, remain as in SoNeUCONADM .
Furthermore, a total of three issues should be noted. Firstly, the background
of an image is always managed by owners. Even though no other oji would be
attached to the owner, he is in the possession of the background to delegate R
over it. Secondly, in case a given oji could not be assigned to any user, e.g. the
related user is not a WBSN user, it would be attached and managed by the owner
as well. Lastly, it should be pointed out that administrative objects (AO) involve
decomposable objects and then, for an object o each oji is also considered an ao.
6.2.3.1 Decomposition management
Each object oi is uploaded by a user, the owner, who owns R and AR over it. Then,
if oi can be decomposed in o
j
i , the owner (or the WBSN on his behalf) decomposes
it and assigns a co-owner to each oji . As a result, co-owners owns use rights R and
administrative rights AR over their oji . Decomposition is formally defined as:
s, ao, decomposition granted
 s   ownerao , ao > O , ao   set of oji
6.2.3.2 Delegation management
Also recalling Chapter 5, delegation focuses on giving permissions to other users
over certain elements. Delegating R can be compared with the establishment of
access control control policies. By contrast, the delegation of AR, which is assumed
to be permanent, applies the function DELEGATE(vk,vj ,o,λ) where λ takes the
value . Besides, it can be executed manually or automatically. The owner of
an oi can manually identify o
j
i and delegate administrative rights AR accordingly.
By contrast, a WBSN can automatically detect users linked to oji and enforce the
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Figure 6.6: Co-ownership management high level architecture
delegation on the owner’s behalf. Moreover, both the WBSN and the owner are
assumed to be trusted to execute this operation.
Note that, from a privacy point of view, the permanent delegation of AR is an
essential requirement because it is assumed that each oji should be always managed
by its owner/ co-owner. Then, though the operation DELEGATE may consider
temporal delegations in the future work, co-ownership management should prefer-
ably apply permanent delegations.
6.3 Co-ownership high level architecture
Co-ownership management requires the development and deployment of the ar-
chitecture depicted in Figure 6.6. It is rather similar to the one proposed in
SoNeUCONABC except for the inclusion of some new tasks and a new pair of
modules:
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Figure 6.7: Hidden techniques
 Data bases (DBs): there are DB for policies, resources and identity data. DBs
have to store the resources and attach to them their decomposed parts and
the identifiers of co-owners. Recall that objects are analogous to resources.
 Management module: this module is in charge of administrative operations.
Specifically, the module Resources management module is introduced to pro-
vide tools to decompose resources and link each of them to the appropriate
co-owners.
 Reference monitor : it is responsible for the enforcement process. Given users’
requests, it verifies access control policies of owners and co-owners and grants
or denies rights accordingly. Moreover, before granting requested rights over
requested resources, it interacts with the Resources processing module to pro-
cess the policies related to those resources.
 Usage reference monitor : it enforces access control at usage time. The main
issue related to co-ownership management is based on the need of identify-
ing changes in owners access control policies and changes in co-owners access
control policies. The UDF has to identify occurred events and the UEF en-
forces access control. Nonetheless, some changes may require processing used
resources and thus, interactions with the Resources processing module are
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required.
 Resources processing module: this is a new module introduced to manage co-
ownership. Specifically, it provides tools to hide parts of resources according
to the enforcement of access control policies. Note that hiding techniques can
be very assorted, see Figure 6.7. A simple technique may focus on cover-
ing resources with opaque figures, while a more sophisticated one may focus
on replacing a resource part (of a decomposed resource) with another that
prevents the identification of the replaced part.
6.4 Summary of the chapter
WBSNs manage resources of multiple users and some of them are not related to a
single owner, but to multiple co-owners as well. To solve privacy problems caused
by co-ownership management this Chapter has presented CooPeD, a mechanism to
protect all users privacy through the management of decomposable objects. It is de-
veloped over SoNeUCONABC and SoNeUCONADM usage control models. Specif-
ically, access control management and administrative management are described in
regard to previous models, together with the applied high level architecture.
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Chapter 7
UMA+FOAF Social Network
Protocol. Achieving
interoperability and reusability
between WBSNs
Assorted services are offered by different WBSNs to encourage their involvement.
To reduce the burden of creating multiple accounts, uploading data and establishing
access control policies, this contribution proposes a protocol towards interoperabil-
ity and reusability.
In general, developments focused on interoperability may reach resuability as
well, though there are some exceptions. For instance, [101] addresses interoper-
ability of policies but as they have to be stored in each WBSN, reusability is not
achieved. However, recalling Chapter 3, though interoperability and reusability
have been independently noticed, their joint application has not been addressed.
In WBSNs resources, identity data and access control policies are the data at
stake (recall Section 2.1). Some approaches look for providing interoperability either
of resources or identity data or access control policies and just [1] provides interop-
erable resources and policies. Nonetheless, neither interoperability nor reusability
is managed in respect to identity data, resources and access control policies simul-
taneously.
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This Chapter presents an architecture and the complementary protocol to at-
tain interoperability and reusability between users directly connected who are en-
rolled in different WBSNs. Note that this protocol allows considering contacts
enrolled in different WBSNs, thus Alice in LinkedIn may have Bob of Facebook as
a contact. The proposed solution is based on decentralizing access control policies,
resources and identity data management. The main contribution is the develop-
ment of the UMA+FOAF Social Network Protocol (U+F). This protocol is based
on the User-Managed Access (UMA) core protocol [1] to address the decentral-
ization of resources, identity data and access control policies, and on the Friend-
Of-A-Friend (FOAF) project [42] to address the description of identity data. The
SoNeUCONABC model is taken as the underlying base to manage access control
(recall Chapter 4).
First, an overview of the approach is presented in Section 7.1. Afterwards, the
system model is proposed in Section 7.2, describing the proposed architecture, the
requirements, the trust and adversarial model, and the applied FOAF files. Finally,
the description of the protocol is detailed in Section 7.3.
7.1 System overview
Currently, each WBSN provides the storage of personal data, access control policies
and resources and the establishment of relationships, resource uploads and updates.
WBSNs can be depicted as different worlds. For instance, assuming that a user has
a Facebook account and other user has a MySpace account and each of them wants
to visualize resources and identity data of the other, these activities are infeasible.
In order to simplify access control management in WBSNs, based on a particular
application of UMA and FOAF, UMA+FOAF Social Network Protocol (U+F) is
presented.
Described in Section 3.4.3, UMA is applied to manage data no matter where
they live on the web. In the social networking context, WBSN users, referred to as
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Authorizing Users (AUs) in UMA, establish resources in chosen Hosts, identity data
in chosen IdPs and access control policies in chosen Authorization Managers (AMs).
Moreover, given the amount of entities that may exist in the system proposed herein,
Certification Authorities (CA) provide certificates to attest entities’ trustworthiness.
Then, once data is located in chosen repositories, WBSNs, on behalf of users, act
as UMA Requesting Parties (RPs). Per each resource or identity data request,
WBSNs contact with the right Host or IdP which redirects them to the appropriate
AM to verify access control policies. However, access control policies verification
requires the satisfaction of claims, which refer to structures with all necessary data
for the policies verification process. Given that the U+F proposal considers direct
relationships, claims should refer to, at least, an accreditation of the fact that the
requester has some kind of relationship with the owner of the requested resource
or identity data. In U+F, this accreditation is obtained from the IdP of the owner
of the requested resource or identity. Afterwards, when WBSNs provide AMs the
requested claims, if access control policies are satisfied, the AMs deliver access
tokens. Finally, access is granted when tokens are presented to the right Host
or IdP. As a result of this description, depicted in Figure 7.1, U+F allows that
a pair of users, User1 and User2, even being enrolled in Facebook and MySpace
respectively, may interact with each other because identity data and resources are
accessed through both WBSNs. Moreover, given that User1 has other account
in Badoo, if desired, resources, access control policies and identity data used in
Facebook can also be used in this WBSN, reaching reusability. Note that in this
example, an IdP, a Host and a pair of AMs are applied per user. Nevertheless, each
user can choose the amount of IdPs, Hosts and AMs to use, e.g. a Host may offer
limited storage per user and some of them may be required.
Furthermore, identity data, composed of users profiles and contacts data, can be
described in different ways. In relation to this, given the flexibility FOAF provides
(recall Section 3.5), identity data is described using FOAF.
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Figure 7.1: WBSN applying U+F
In further detail, U+F is composed of three phases. The first phase is the
initialization. It refers to the configuration of entities and elements involved in
the protocol. Subsequently, the second phase starts when a user logins in a
WBSN. At this moment, the user accesses to his identity data and contacts data,
which are stored in the chosen IdP. Besides, his resources, stored in a particular
Host, remain available. The last phase is the access data of a direct contact
who is enrolled in a different WBSN. In particular, this last phase is divided in
accessing to the contact’s identity data and accessing to the contact’s resources.
Last but not least, access control is based on SoNeUCONABC . WBSN users
are the subjects (S) who own resources, referred to as objects (O), with attributes
attached to them (ATT O). Additionally, users own profiles composed of values of
users attributes (ATT S) and their contacts’ data, referred to as direct relation-
ships (E) with attributes attached (ATT E). Nonetheless, in this Chapter two
simplifications on the SoNeUCONABC model are assumed. The first simplification
is that only direct relationships between WBSN users are considered (that is a user
specifies having a direct relationship with other users to express that they are his
contacts). However, access control management in U+F assumes the existence of
7.2. System model 133
a bidirectional relationship between the requester and the administrator of a re-
quested resource or identity data. Then, for instance, if UserA wants to access to
a resource of UserB, it is required that UserA has specified having a relationship
with UserB, as well as UserB has specified having a relationship with UserA. These
direct relationships must be stored in each user’s FOAF file. The second simplifi-
cation considered herein is that access control policies exclusively involve ATT S,
ATT O and ATT E. Thus, obligations (B) and conditions (C) are left out of
the protocol’s scope.
Furthermore, regarding access control enforcement, U+F also focuses on a sim-
plified version of SoNeUCONABC . In this usage control model, access control
enforcement starts by constructing the rt structure, composed of all enriched paths
between the requester and the administrator of a requested object, and continuous
with the evaluation of access control policies in regard to rt (recall Section 4.4). By
contrast, in U+F, rt is not constructed. The use of rt is specially useful for indirect
relationships management and as U+F manages direct relationships, the construc-
tion of rt is discussed in the extension of U+F presented in Chapter 8. Likewise, the
consideration of usage control and all identified WBSN features, namely, direction,
distance, multi-path, common-contact, clique and flexible elements in access control
policies, are also discussed in Chapter 8.
7.2 System model
U+F model involves the definition of the architecture (Section 7.2.1), the system
requirements (Section 7.2.2), the applied FOAF files (Section 7.2.3) and the trust
and adversarial models (Sections 7.2.4 and 7.2.5 respectively).
7.2.1 Architecture
U+F is composed of an architecture and the associated protocol. In regard to the
architecture, it is composed of the five entities described below (Figure 7.2). Note
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Figure 7.2: U+F architecture
that, as mentioned above, multiple Hosts, IdPs and AMs can be used but, for the
sake of clarity, a single Host and a single IdP per user and an AM per each of these
entities are considered.
1. User (U): a user has different roles. On the one hand, a user plays the role
of a UMA’s Requesting Party (RP) who is able to access resources of his
contacts through WBSNs. On the other hand, a user also plays the role of an
Authorizing User (AU) by performing three main operations, (1) placement
of resources in his Host together with later updates of them, (2) deployment
of his FOAF file in his Identity Provider (IdP) and (3) deployment of policies
in his Authorization Managers in respect to resources and identity data.
2. Identity provider (IdP): repository of FOAF files which are placed by AUs, as
well as provider of claims. Furthermore, IdPs act as a PEP when providing
FOAF files. Notice that this entity is a Host but instead of storing resources, it
stores identity data. Besides, to manage claims, per each user, IdPs store a list
of IdP Certification Authorities (IdP CAs) that each user considers reliable.
Moreover, to guarantee communications with WBSNs that are trusted by
users, per user, a list of WBSN Certification Authorities (WBSN CAs) which
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are considered trustworthy is also stored.
One last remark is that IdPs can refer to personal servers of WBSNs users or
servers of particular companies.
3. Host : repository of resources, analogous to a data base service, in which the
AU stores resources. Moreover, it acts as a PEP, delivering resources once
the right token is presented.
Analogous to IdPs, Hosts may refer to personal servers of WBSNs users or
servers of particular companies.
4. Authorization Manager (AM): entity that evaluates policies previously estab-
lished by an AU. However, to achieve this purpose the AM requests claims to
perform policy validation and delivers tokens. Therefore, each AM acts as a
PDP and plays the conceptual role of a Security Token Service. Also, in order
to verify claims, they store, per each user, a list of the IdP CAs trusted by
the user. Likewise, to communicate with WBSNs considered trusted by users,
per user, a list of WBSN CAs which are considered reliable is also stored.
Note that these lists have to be analogous (for consistency) to the ones estab-
lished in IdPs and then, AMs can contact IdPs to obtain both lists before the
protocol’s execution.
On the other hand, concerning access control policies, they are defined over
SoNeUCONABC , namely using objects, subjects and direct relationship at-
tributes to some extent (ATT S, ATT O and ATT E).
5. Social Networks: referred to as WBSNs, provide an interface to show resources
and identity data and also, provide the management of wall comments, re-
source comments and any other extra services. Moreover, this entity acquires
the role of the requester in UMA and performs three main operations: (1) it
acts on behalf of a RP and interacts with Hosts to reach protected resources;
(2) it interacts with AMs to get the appropriate token in regard to requested
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resources; and (3) it interacts with the adequate IdP to get users’ personal
data each time a user session starts. This last operation is performed after
the authentication between the user and his Host and IdP.
Each WBSN owns a certificate generated by a WBSN Certification Authority
(WBSN CA). Therefore, once a request is sent from a WBSN to another,
taking jointly the role of a requester, called herein Fat Requester, certificates
authenticate both WBSNs. Note that this is one difference concerning UMA,
that is, a pair of entities act as a single one.
6. Certification authorities (CA): these entities are in charge of delivering certifi-
cates to trusted entities to allow them signing interchanged messages. They
can be compared with traditional certification authorities that issue public key
certificates. The delivery of certificates is carried out according to particular
criteria and rules whose specification is left as an open research issue.
A pair of groups are distinguished. A first group provides certificates to IdPs
(IdP CAs) and another group to WBSNs (WBSN CAs). Then, per user,
AMs and IdPs store a list of IdP CAs to ensure, along the protocol execution,
that claims are provided from trusted IdPs. Likewise, IdPs and AMs store,
per user, a list of WBSN CAs to ensure that interoperability is only allowed
between trusted WBSNs. Thus, for instance, a UserA enrolled in a WBSNA
cannot access resources or identity data of a UserB enrolled in the WBSNB,
unless UserA trusts the WBSN CA that has issued the certificate to WBSNB,
that is, that WBSN CA is listed in his WBSN CA list stored in AMs and
IdPs.
The existence of groups of CAs instead of a single entity considered the root
is due to the worldwide use of these applications. Huge quantity of people
in multiple countries make use of WBSNs and a central entity would be im-
practical. Likewise, also looking for the simplification of the management of
certificates, there are CAs to independently certify IdPs and WBSNs.
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7.2.2 Requirements
According to U+F features, the following requirements have to be achieved:
1. Interoperability and reusability in regard to direct relationships.
The communication and interchange of data between multiple users enrolled
in different WBSNs has to be attained.
2. Resources and identity data confidentiality and access control. Re-
sources and identity data have to be exclusively delivered and used by autho-
rized users and entities involved in the protocol.
3. Resources and identity data integrity. Resources and identity data do
not have to be altered along the protocol execution.
4. Chain of trust. Given the great set of entities at stake, the final receiver has
to be able to verify that entities through which interchanged messages pass
are trusted.
5. Access minimum identity data. The amount of identity data accessible
by WBSNs has to be minimized. Once a WBSN accesses to a user’s identity
data, the management has to be carried out using the least possible data.
Indeed, this is directly related to “The principle of least privilege” which is
based on the fact that every program should operate using the least possible
amount of privileges [159]. In particular, this is called data minimization [160]
and it can be identified as a common principle in the development of Privacy
Enhancing Technologies.
7.2.3 Personal file structure
Identity data refers to the own user profile and the user’s contacts data which are
structured in a FOAF file specially developed for U+F. FOAF is particularly used to
describe people and their contacts relationships. In the FOAF project specification
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[146] several attributes are already established, like “familyName”, “homepage” or
“interest”, related to a particular user, and “knows”, that refers to the existence
of a relationship with someone. However, apart from these possibilities offered by
FOAF, some other attributes have been created in this work (see Figure 7.3).
Regarding profile data, the attribute “nationality” is proposed. It refers to the
nation where the user comes from and “WBSNs”, attribute which refers to the
name of WBSNs, separated by a space, that the contact is registered in. Moreover,
profile data consists of, at least, the user name and the user email address that, for
security reasons, is stored after having applied a hash function to it.
On the other hand, in what concerns relationship data, the following attributes
per direct relationships have been developed: “creation date”, that refers to the date
when the relationship was created; “trust”, that corresponds to a low, medium or
high trust level related to the relationship; “duration”, which corresponds to the
period in which the relationship remains valid and it includes a starting and an
ending date; and “WBSNs” analogous to the one mentioned above. Moreover,
regarding relationships, they are unidirectional and supposing that a user, called
Bob, has a work relationship with a user called Alice, his FOAF file includes Alice’s
relationship but it does not necessarily in the other way round. The FOAF file
depicted in Figure 7.3 corresponds to this example.
Nonetheless, in the protocol, reduced FOAF files are also used, called in [61]
sub-profiles. In general terms, they correspond to FOAF files without relationships
information. In U+F, these files are used in the acquisition of claims. Furthermore,
the quantity of included user attributes depends on access control policies. For
instance, some users may have access to nationality while others may not.
7.2.4 Trust model
In U+F the trust model is based on the following assumptions:
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Figure 7.3: Proposed FOAF file including new fields
 IdPs, Hosts and AMs are trusted in the sense that they provide secure storage
and they are honest to guarantee no protocol deviation.
 WBSNs provide secure data management by not disclosing users resources or
identity data. However, they may attempt to impersonate users.
 Trust management is left to CAs that issue certificates to trusted IdPs and
WBSNs according to a set of criteria not defined in this work.
7.2.5 Adversarial model
An adversary in this model is an entity that can perform the following actions:
 It can inject and alter data to provide unauthorized accesses to resources or
identity data.
 It can can get tokens some time after being delivered by AMs to get access to
resources or identity data. Besides, an adversary can access any other data
interchanged in the protocol.
 It may try impersonating IdPs and WBSNs to, again, get access to resources
or identity data.
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Note that Denial of Service (DoS) attacks can not be performed by an adversary
as the protocol works on the assumption that existing techniques, e.g. for load
balancing, are applied.
7.3 U+F protocol description
The description of U+F is divided in the definition of messages content (Section
7.3.1) and the description of the execution procedure (Section 7.3.2).
7.3.1 Messages content
Along the protocol an assorted set of messages is interchanged. More specifically,
messages content is classified under three different categories, operations, elements
and structures, where structures correspond to sets of elements over which opera-
tions are performed.
7.3.1.1 Operations
Operations involved in U+F correspond to digital signatures that are performed by
WBSNs and IdPs to guarantee their trustworthiness.
7.3.1.2 Elements
In general, there are six elements within interchanged messages: user identifiers,
tokens, file identifiers, tickets, signatures and redirections.
1. All messages have user identifiers, which correspond to the identifiers of the
requester and the administrator of a requested file. As in a great amount of
applications, user identifiers are defined as emails though, for security reasons,
they are not stored in plain text but as a hash.
2. Tokens should contain an expiration time. Note that, according to the OAuth
specification [144], the protocol which lays the bases of UMA, tokens generally
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correspond to a random string associated to a resource and an expiration time.
Point out in [144], the misuse of access tokens to impersonate a resource
owner is out of the scope of OAuth specification. In order to face up to
impersonations attacks, in U+F WBSNs are assumed to be trusted.
By contrast, although in this protocol impersonations are avoided, on the
assumption that they may exist, a possible solution could be including the
identification of the administrator and the requester as part of tokens. Be-
sides, requesters would have to sign tokens once delivered to IdPs or Hosts.
Nonetheless, this alternative requires a deep analysis because it would in-
crease the protocol’s workload due to the new set of required operations and
interchanged messages.
3. File identifiers, as its name suggests, each of them identifies a particular
WBSN file, either identity data (a FOAF file) or a resource.
4. Once a particular piece of data is requested to an IdP or Host, it delivers a
ticket that identifies the requested data and it is used to acquire the access
token in the right AM.
5. Each time a signature is performed the serial number of the public key cer-
tificate of the signing entity and the signature date and time is attached to it.
Notice that some messages interchanged along the protocol are signed and,
to do it properly, signing entities have to acquire the time from a trusted site
such as the NIST Internet Time Service1. Besides, signatures have to be iden-
tified as short-term certificates issued by trusted entities (note that a trusted
entity depends on users’ preferences). Such signatures are specially significant
in messages interchanged to acquire claims because they certify certain users
attributes and a particular relationship between a pair of users.
6. Redirections refer to the location of the entities to which redirections are
1http://www.nist.gov/pml/div688/grp40/its.cfm , last access May 2014
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Table 7.1: Interchanged messages in U+F
Id Name Content
M1 Token request Ticket YWBSNR Cert Serial NumberY
Date timeWBSNRsignatureYSkWBSNR Cert(Complete Message)
M2 Token request redirection Ticket YAM location
M3 Token response redirection Ticket YTokenvalue
M4 Token response Ticket YTokenvalueYWBSNR Cert Serial NumberY
Date timeWBSNRsignatureYSkWBSNR Cert(Complete Message)
M5 File request R Id YFile Id
M6 File indirect request R Id YA IdYFile IdYWBSNR Cert Serial NumberY
Date timeWBSNRsignatureYSkWBSNR Cert(Complete Message)
M7 File response R Id YFile
M8 Claims request R Id YA IdYDataRrequest
M9 Claims structures response R Id YA IdYAccreditationRYDataRresponseY
IdPR Cert Serial NumberYDate timeIdPRsignatureY
SkIdPR (Complete Message)
M10 Claims response Claims structures response YRelationshipR AY
IdPA Cert Serial NumberYDate timeIdPAsignatureY
SkIdPA (Relationship R A) YWBSNR Cert Serial NumberY
M11 Certify direct relationship R Id YA IdYAccreditationRYIdPR Cert Serial NumberY
Date timeIdPRsignatureYSkIdPR (Accreditation R )Y
Relationship R A YWBSNR Cert Serial NumberY
Date timeWBSNRsignatureYSkWBSNR Cert(Complete message)
M12 Relationship certified R Id YA IdYRelationshipR AYIdPA Cert Serial NumberY
Date timeIdPAsignatureYSkIdPA (Relationship R A)
M13 Simple token request Ticket
M14 Simple token response Ticket YTokenvalue
M15 Token validation Ticket YTokenvalue
M16 Simple claim request R Id YAccreditationRrequest
M17 Simple claim response R Id YIdPR Cert Serial NumberYAccreditationRY
Date timeIdPRsignatureYSkIdPR (Accreditation R)
performed and, in particular, they are urls.
In sum, a total of 17 different messages are interchanged along the protocol.
All messages and their content are described in Table 7.1, where symbol Y implies
concatenation and S means signature. Interchanged messages mainly follow UMA’s
core protocol specification [38], although some new fields haven been added in some
cases and a few new messages have been specified.
7.3.1.3 Structures
In U+F there are four main types of applied structures. First, the Accreditation
which identifies who is the requester of a particular requested file.
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The second structure applied in this protocol is called RelationshipA-B and
it refers to the identifiers of the users involved in the relationship. Moreover,
this structure is particularly defined as first: hash email Requester and end:
hash email Administrator.
On the other hand, a pair of structures are specially used to verify the satis-
faction of each established access control policy. The first structure corresponds to
Data request which consists of the name of the set of attributes that are involved
in the applied access control policy and must be provided by the requester. It is
defined as attributes: att1 att2 att3 .... Finally, the last structure corresponds to
Data response which includes the values of all requested attributes in a Data request
and it is defined as attributes: att1 att2 att3 ... attributesData: valueAtt1 valueAtt2
valueAtt3.
7.3.2 Execution procedure
The U+F protocol is divided in three phases: (1) the initialization phase, in which
the user, in the role of AU, initializes all entities involved (except for CAs and other
users) and, acting as RP, provides his WBSN with all necessary information to get
required data; (2) User logs in to a WBSN, in which a user in the role of a RP
logs in to a WBSN and accesses to his profile, contacts and resources; and (3) User
accesses to a contact’s data, a user, also in the role of a RP, tries to access the
profile and resources of a contact who is registered in a different WBSN.
It should be noticed that analogous to many web applications in which per-
sonal data is managed, communications between entities are carried out through a
confidential and authenticated channel which also provides data integrity, such as
SSL.
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7.3.2.1 Initialization
The initialization phase focuses on preparing entities with all required information.
It is also divided in three different steps: registration of entities, registration of
resources and identity data and specification of main information in WBSNs.
Registration of entities. The registration of entities involves the registration
of a Host at an AM and the registration of an IdP at an AM, which can be the
same AM or a different one. In particular, these registrations are equivalent to
the introduction of a Host to an AM described in UMA [1]. The key point is the
establishment of a trust relationship between a Host or an IdP and an AM. This is
carried through the participation of a user in the role of an AU. He introduces the
Host or the IdP in the chosen AM to make available later validation of tokens.
Notice that an AU can perform this registration more than once. It is possible
that, as mentioned in Section 7.2.1, each AU chooses several Hosts, AMs and IdPs.
To conclude, the registration process finishes when the user specifies in his AMs
and IdPs the list of trusted IdP CAs.
Registration of resources and identity data. This phase focuses on regis-
tering new resources and the appropriate FOAF file in the selected Host and IdP.
Specifically, the registration of resources and identity data is equivalent to the anal-
ogous part of UMA [1]. Once again each user takes the role of an AU. The main
point is the update of a resource in a Host and the update of the FOAF file in an
IdP, together with their later registration in chosen AMs and the establishment of
access control policies.
Specification of main information in WBSNs. Once a user enrols for the
first time in a WBSN, the specification of the IdP in which his FOAF file is stored
and the Host which stores his resources is indispensable. Consequently, the WBSN,
once a user is logged or a request from other WBSN is received, is able to access
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Figure 7.4: User logs in to a WBSN
to the user profile, including personal attributes and contacts, as well as, to user
resources.
7.3.2.2 User logs in to a WBSN
Each time a user logins in a WBSN, taking the role of a RP, three processes are
carried out, his authentication, the acquisition of his profile and contacts and the
acquisition of his resources which remain accessible. In order to acquire these data,
the user is authenticated against his IdP and Host by the WBSN and, then, each
WBSN, in the role of a requester and on behalf of the user, contacts to user’s IdP
and Host to get his FOAF file and resources respectively. The step of accessing a
protected resource of UMA protocol [1] is executed a couple of times, one to get
the FOAF file and another to acquire resources. This process can be performed
repetitively and, even more, it can be used to achieve multiples resources in a single
execution. It is depicted in Figure 7.4 and each message identifier is pointed out in
brackets regarding Table 7.1.
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The process requires the acquisition of claims and the necessary mutual authen-
tication between the RP and his Host and IdP (message 1, 2 of Figure 7.4) to later
delegate access to WBSNs, being these issues not detailed in UMA. Authentication
can be carried out applying multiple mechanisms and protocols. Using symmetric
cryptography, some mechanisms in what concerns the Challenge-Response proto-
col are a feasible choice. By contrast, though increasing complexity, public key
cryptography is another alternative, for example using the mutual authentication
mechanism proposed by [161]. However, guaranteeing that WBSNs do not im-
personate a user requires the performance of the authentication procedure in the
logging in and out of the WBSN to inform the user’s IdP and Host that he is
connected or not. Furthermore, also trying to prevent this issue, all signatures car-
ried out by IdPs and WBSNs, that are mentioned along the paper, include a time
stamp. Therefore, users, together with access control policies, specify an accepted
time stamp threshold. Also, notice that IdPs and AMs acquire the time from a
trusted site such as the NIST Internet Time Service [162].
The login phase starts requesting the user’s FOAF file to IdP User1 (msg.
3). Due to the need of getting an access token, the request is redirected to
AM IdP User1 which requests claims before providing the token (msg. 4-6). Claims
correspond to a proof to identify the RP. In order to acquire them, the WBSN in
which the RP delegates requests the accreditation of the RP to IdP User1 (msg. 7).
Then, this IdP provides requested claims, that is, a signed structure composed of
a reduced FOAF file with the name and email of the user (msg. 8). Subsequently,
when AM IdP User1 receives claims, it verifies the signature, making use of the
list of IdP CAs specified by the user, and validates access control policies to later
deliver the appropriate token (msg. 9). Finally, the token is presented to IdP User1
and the requested file is lastly delivered (msg. 10-13). Once claims and tokens are
obtained, they are stored in the WBSN for the whole session of the user. Then,
if needed, they are delivered without having to be requested again. Nonetheless,
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the erasure of tokens and claims when a user logs out is required to prevent user
impersonations.
On the other hand, user’s resources are requested following the same procedure
though without requesting claims but reusing (msg. 14-22). Indeed, claims are
stored in WBSNs along each user session to be repetitively used until they expire
if they do so.
As a final remark, according to messages’ content pointed out in Table 7.1, the
verification of signed messages requires to check if signing entities are or not within
the established lists of IdP CAs and WBSN CAs. In case that signing entities are
not in the lists, the protocol is aborted. The dynamic enlargement of lists through
the inclusion of new entities is left for future work.
7.3.2.3 User accesses a contact’s data
Once a user is within a WBSN in multiple circumstances desires to access data of his
contacts. However, if contacts are enrolled in different WBSNs, interactions between
these applications are indispensable. First of all, given a user of WBSN1, User1,
which wants to access resources of one of his contacts, User2, all WBSNs in which
User2 is registered in have to be identified. Indeed, this information is available
in the FOAF file of User1, as described in Section 7.2.3. Then, User1 chooses
one WBSN, for example WBSN2, and the procedure described in this Section is
performed.
When User1 desires to visualize the profile and resources of User2, he access
User2 relationship, and if this user also has a relationship with User1, his profile
and resources are delivered according to User2’s access control policies.
This process is composed of a pair of executions of the step of accessing a
protected resource within UMA protocol. One execution is carried out to acquire
the reduced FOAF file of User2. As this file is reduced, contact relationships of
User2 are not included and attributes are available according to access control
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Figure 7.5: User accesses a to contact FOAF file
policies. The second UMA execution corresponds to the acquisition of resources of
User2 and it can be performed repetitively.
For the sake of brevity only and due to the analogy between acquiring the profile
and resources of User2, which only differs on requesting data to an IdP or to a Host,
the following Section presents the acquisition of User2’ FOAF file. The process is
depicted in Figure 7.5 and details, in brackets, messages identifiers regarding Table
7.1.
FOAF file acquisition The procedure differs from UMA in a couple of points.
On the one hand, WBSN1 and WBSN2 play together the role of a Fat Requester,
as pointed out in Section 7.2.
On the other hand, claims are clearly detailed. In particular, to obtain the
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token that grants access to requested identity data, the AM IdP User2 requests
claims to User1 that consist of three elements. The first element corresponds to a
proof that certifies the existence of a bidirectional relationship between User1 and
User2, such that (explained in Section 7.1) User1 is in User2’s FOAF file and on
the other way round (P1). Therefore, assuming that User2 is already in the FOAF
file of User1, the proof refers to a relationship structure regarding the existence of
User1 relationship in the FOAF file of User2. The second element corresponds to a
proof of possessing some attributes. It is a structure that depends on access control
policies, thereby attributes can be requested or not and they can differ from one
request to another (P2). The last proof corresponds to the identification of the RP,
User1 (P3).
More specifically, User1 can request User2’s FOAF file or delegate in WBSN1.
Supposing that User1 delegates in WBSN1, this WBSN requests to WBSN2 User2’s
FOAF file which redirects the request to IdP User2 (messages 1, 2 of Figure 7.5).
Next, this entity also redirects to AM IdP User2 to get the access token (msg. 3-6).
However, AM IdP User2 requests claims before delivering the token (msg. 7, 8).
It should be noticed that structures involved in Claims request are empty except
for requested attributes. In particular, claims corresponds to a signed structure in
relation to requested attributes (P1), a signed relationship structure which iden-
tifies the relationship between both users (P2) and a signed structure to certify
User1’s identity (P2). Consequently, WBSN1 acquires claims through IdP User1
and IdP User2. First, IdP User1 delivers all the three structures. Afterwards, the
last pair of them are sent to WBSN2 and redirected to IdP User2 (msg. 9-12) to
verify the existence of a relationship between User2 and User1 (User1 in User2’s
FOAF file). When IdP User2 successfully performs the appropriate verifications,
it signs the received relationship structure, introducing a time stamp, and sends
it back to WBSN1 (msg. 13, 14). Next, WBSN1 sends claims to AM IdP User2
(msg. 15, 16). Finally, the access token is delivered and presented to IdP User2
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which provides the requested FOAF file (msg. 17-23).
Eventually, there are some points to remark. Firstly, the acquisition of resources
and profiles can be performed multiple times and depends on access control policies
attached to them. In case many data are joined under the same policy, the token
obtained provides access to all of them. On the contrary, if each resource has a
different access control policy attached to it, the token acquired would only provide
access to a single piece of data. Secondly, as pointed out in Section 7.3.2.2, claims
are stored in the WBSN that initially sends the request to, if required, be later
delivered without the need of requesting them again. Similarly, if the procedure of
achieving data, either resources or identity data, is executed repetitively in a WBSN,
tokens are stored in the WBSN that initially sends the request and they may remain
valid, thereby reused, if their expiration times are not exceeded. Then, in such cases
the procedure is simplified since messages to get tokens are not required.
7.4 Summary of the chapter
This Chapter has presented U+F, a protocol to achieve interoperability and
reusability of identity data, resources and access control policies among different
WBSNs. It is based on a pair of proposals, mainly, UMA protocol and the FOAF
project. Furthermore, access control management is carried out concerning a sim-
plified version of SoNeUCONABC usage control model.
Chapter 8
Extended UMA+FOAF Social
Network Protocol. Including
data exposure minimization and
indirect relationships
management
Given the quantity and assorted purposes of WBSNs, users want to interact with
people no matter the WBSN in which they are enrolled, thereby attaining inter-
operability and reusability according to resources, identity data and access control
policies.
Moreover, most of WBSN users look for new people to whom establish some
kind of relationship, without necessarily being direct contacts. Indeed, indirect
relationships are an inherent property of the society. As C. Calhoun noticed [163],
society is a question of social integration where the growing relevance of indirect
relationships is related to modernity. Indirect relationships in WBSNs correspond
to the number of jumps that users can perform from one user to others, also called
depth [28, 148], and their establishment is essential. Furthermore, to attain fine-
grained access control the establishment of indirect relationships is indispensable
because a significant number of WBSN features are associated with them, namely,
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distance, multi-paths and common-contacts (recall Section 2.4).
Other desirable feature is the protection of data against unnoticed or non-
consented uses. There have been several attempts to conceal data from servers
[164, 165] and, regarding recent trends, it is referred as data exposure minimization
(recall Section 2.4). In the great majority of cases, when registering in a WBSN the
acceptance of the established privacy policy is mandatory. Multiple WBSN privacy
policies specify the management and use of all uploaded data. An extremely related
example is the new Google’s privacy policy in which the use of all users’ data to
improve experience in Google applications is detailed [166].
U+F achieved interoperability and reusability regarding direct relationships be-
tween WBSNs combining the application of UMA + FOAF (Chapter 7). In order
to address the remaining couple of features, particularly, data exposure minimiza-
tion and indirect relationships management across different WBSNs, this Chapter
presents the Extended UMA + FOAF Social Network protocol (eU+F). It com-
bines, under the bases of SoNeUCONABC , the application of UMA and FOAF,
together with cryptographic techniques.
This Chapter is structured in the following Sections. At a starting point, an
overview of the system is presented in Section 8.1. In Section 8.2 the system model
is described, including the system architecture, the requirements, and the trust
and adversarial models. Next, Section 8.3 describes the protocol. In Section 8.4
developed cryptographic schemes to deal with data exposure minimization are de-
tailed. Finally, changes to improve eU+F access control management regarding a
full consideration of SoNeUCONABC are discussed in Section 8.5.
8.1 System overview
U+F achieves interoperability and reusability among different WBSNs (Chapter 7).
However, a pair of demanding necessities are out of the scope of U+F. First, as in
current WBSNs, indirect relationships have to be managed. Second, data is out
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Figure 8.1: U+F vs eU+F
of users full control as WBSNs can use them for their own purposes without users
consent. As a result, in order to face up these new challenges, in this Chapter a
more powerful and secure protocol is proposed, the Extended UMA+FOAF Social
Network Protocol (eU+F) (see Figure 8.1).
From a more specific point of view, like in U+F, identity data corresponds to
the profile and contacts of each user, and they are stored in the form of FOAF
files within IdPs; resources are stored encrypted in chosen Hosts; and access control
policies are located in AMs, which perform access control on behalf of the users.
However, the eU+F differs from U+F in that that resources and identity data are
delivered encrypted and they have to be decrypted in the users browsers. Moreover,
apart from the phases applied in U+F (Initialization, User logins in a WBSN
and User accesses data of a direct contact), eU+F involves a new phase, User
accesses data of an indirect contact. It consists of accessing to an indirect
contact enrolled in another WBSN (different from any other). It is divided in the
acquisition of identity data and resources and it works similarly to the access to a
direct contact data, but requiring a proof to verify the existence of the appropriate
indirect relationship.
This extended version, like U+F, manages access control on a simplified version
of SoNeUCONABC where the rt structure is not constructed in order to verify
access control policies. Instead, the alternative approach mentioned in Section 4.4
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of this thesis is adopted: “The first one consists of searching for enriched paths be-
tween the administrator a of the requested object o and the requester s throughout
the whole WBSN graph (G), and verifying the policies during the process”. Further-
more, in eU+F, it is assumed that users access data of indirect contacts that can be
reached from their direct contacts, that is, this is how (indirect) contacts are discov-
ered. Moreover, recalling features managed within SoNeUCONABC usage control
model, namely, direction, distance, common-contacts, multi-path, clique, flexible at-
tributes and according to the proposed policy language (Section 4.3), eU+F focuses
only on indirect relationships management and cliques, common-contacts and multi-
paths are not considered. Nonetheless, eU+F can be extended to deal with all of
these features, as well all as to manage usage control, being both issues discussed
in Section 8.5.
In the following, the way that eU+F proceeds is illustrated with an example
(see Figure 8.2). Analogously to U+F, assuming a direct relationship between U2
and U1, and the fact that U1 wants to access U2’s data, the access is granted if
the relationship is bidirectional and a proof of the existence of the relationship U2-
U1 is obtained from IdP U2, that is, U1 is within U2’s contacts (solid arrow). On
the other hand, given the management of indirect relationships proposed in eU+F,
supposing that U1 has already accessed to U2’s profile (including his direct contacts)
and U1 wants to access U4’s data, the access is granted if there exist bidirectional
relationships between all involved users in the path and it is obtained from IdP U4
a proof of the existence of a relationship between U4-U1. This proof is constructed
step by step. First, IdP U3 certifies the relationship U3-U1 (solid arrow) and then,
after presenting this proof to IdP U4, this IdP certifies the relationship U4-U3 (solid
arrow). Finally, the proof U4-U1 is constructed. Therefore, it is clearly noticed that
access control focuses on the existence of relationships in the opposite direction to
the discovery of contacts. However, it is remarkable that getting the proof is not
enough to get access because it depends on access control policies and thus, not only
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Figure 8.2: Managed relationships
the proof has to be obtained but also policies have to be satisfied. Finally, note that
the set of relationships that are managed in eU+F are the most practical because, for
efficiency reasons, instead of constructing the rt structure, the enforcement process
is performed constructing a path, jumping from a direct contact to another, between
the administrator and the requester and verifying policies accordingly.
8.2 System model
The model involves the specification of the architecture (Section 8.2.1), the system
requirements (Section 8.2.2) and the trust and adversarial model (Sections 8.2.3
and 8.2.4 respectively).
8.2.1 Architecture
The architecture of eU+F, depicted in Figure 8.3, is analogous to that of U+F
(Section 7.2.1) except for the inclusion of a new group of Certification Authorities
(ACs) and the addition of new tasks. Differences between both protocols in respect
to involved entities are the following:
1. User : each user is in charge of creating, at least, a symmetric key used in the
encryption and decryption of resources and an asymmetric key pair (which
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Figure 8.3: eU+F architecture
can correspond to a private key and the associated public key certificate or
to a created key pair) to manage decryptions and interchanges of encrypted
data. These keys are used in the schemes described in Section 8.4 to attain
data exposure minimization.
2. Identity provider (IdP): apart from being repository of FOAF files, in eU+F,
decryption keys are stored.
3. Host : repository of encrypted resources which have to be periodically re-
encrypted, either by the host under the users’ supervision or directly by users
who update the data re-encrypting it with a new key. Note that re-encryptions
require the update of the used key in the appropriate IdP.
4. Authorization Manager (AM): this entity owns a certificate and the associ-
ated private key to sign claims. Then, trustworthiness of requested claims is
guaranteed.
5. Social Network : assuming the need of decrypting identity data and resources,
WBSNs must provide the appropriate procedures to allow decryptions at the
client-side, that is, at users’ browsers.
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6. Certification authorities (CA): a new group of certification authorities (CA),
for AMs, is added (AM CA).
8.2.2 Requirements
Regarding eU+F features, apart from requirements pointed out in U+F (Section
7.2.2), that refer to interoperability and reusability regarding direct relationships,
resources and identity data confidentiality and access control, resources and iden-
tity data integrity, chain of trust and access minimum identity data, the following
requirements are challenges to attain:
1. Interoperability and reusability regarding indirect relationships.
The communication and interchange of data between multiple users enrolled
in different WBSNs has to be attained. Moreover, both features have to be
provided in regard to indirect relationships.
2. Resources and identity data protection against WBSNs. Resources
and identity data have to be adequately protected from WBSNs. It is subdi-
vided in the following requirements:
(a) Resources and identity data exposure minimization. Resources
and identity data have to remain inaccessible to WBSNs, being pro-
tected against inappropriate managements. Furthermore, it is desirable
that Hosts do not get access to stored resources.
(b) Access minimum identity data. As in U+F, accessible identity data
among WBSNs has to be minimized. In particular, indirect relationships
have to remain, as much as possible, unknown for WBSNs.
3. Simple key management. Keys have to be easily managed, which means
that decryption keys are not distributed out of band such as it is done in
[70] or in [62] because, due to the large amount of users, the distribution can
become unmanageable.
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8.2.3 Trust model
The trust model is based on the following assumptions:
 IdPs and AMs are trusted entities. Thus, they do not maliciously manipulate
data and they guarantee no protocol deviation.
 Hosts and WBSNs are untrusted entities. They both, can use resources and
identity data for chosen purposes and produce protocol deviations.
 CAs are in charge of managing trust, that is, they issue certificates to trusted
IdPs, WBSNs and AMs.
8.2.4 Adversarial model
Additionally to U+F whose adversarial model consists of adversaries that can inject,
alter and get data interchanged along the protocol, as well as adversaries that
can impersonate IdPs and WBSNs (Section 7.2.5), in eU+F a harder adversary is
assumed. In particular, in this extended protocol it is considered that adversaries
may try impersonating AMs and can get access to tokens immediately after being
delivered by AMs.
8.3 eU+F protocol description
eU+F is described in terms of messages content (Section 8.3.1) and the execution
process (Section 8.3.2).
8.3.1 Messages content
Messages content is equivalent to U+F but adding cryptographic operations and
modifying the RelationshipA-B structure. Besides, some considerations in regard
to tokens elements should be added.
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8.3.1.1 Operations
Due to the use of cryptography to deal with data exposure minimization, symmetric
and asymmetric algorithms are applied according to the schemes proposed in Section
8.4.
8.3.1.2 Elements
In what concerns tokens, their use and application remains being analogous to
U+F (recall Section 8.3.1.2). Nonetheless, recalling the problem of misusing tokens
to impersonate users, this issue is avoided as data is delivered encrypted. Then,
even if WBSNs get unauthorized access to data, they could not decrypt them and
impersonations would not affect users privacy.
8.3.1.3 Structures
In this extended protocol, the structure RelationshipA-B used in U+F has to be
modified. In particular, RelationshipA-Bi is applied instead and it refers to the
identifiers of the users involved in the relationship, where i refers to the num-
ber of jumps that separate both users. Besides, this structure is defined as first:
hash email Requester, end: hash email Administrator and depth: value. Notice that
depth is used to considering the depth of a relationship in case of indirect relation-
ships and due to theoretical studies [153] that explain that any two people on this
planet can be connected via an average number of six steps, the depth of indirect
relationships is bounded to seven users (six the maximum depth).
Messages interchanged in the eU+F protocol are depicted in Table 8.1 where
symbol Y implies concatenation, S means signature and E means encryption. This
Table presents each message content in regard to operations, elements and struc-
tures previously described in Section 8.3.1.
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Table 8.1: Interchanged messages in eU+F
Id Name Content
M1 Token request Ticket YWBSNR Cert Serial NumberY
Date timeWBSNRsignatureYSkWBSNR Cert(Complete Message)
M2 Token request redirection Ticket YAM location
M3 Token response redirection Ticket YTokenvalueYExpired  inY
AMA Cert Serial NumberYDate timeAMAsignatureY
SkAMA Cert(Complete Message)
M4 Token response Token response redirection YWBSNR Cert Serial NumberY
Date timeWBSNRsignatureYSkWBSNR Cert(Complete Message)
M5 File request R Id YA IdYFile IdYWBSNR Cert Serial NumberY
Date timeWBSNRsignatureYSkWBSNR Cert(Complete Message)
M6 File indirect request R Id YA IdYFile IdYWBSNR Cert Serial NumberY
Date timeWBSNRsignatureYSkWBSNR Cert(Complete Message)
M7 File response R Id YA IdYEkR(file)
M8 Claims request R Id YA IdYEkCertIdPR (Data R request) Y
AMA Cert Serial NumberYDate timeAMAsignatureY
SkCertAMA (Complete Message)
M9 Claims structures response R Id YA IdYAccreditationRY
EkCertAMA (Data R response)YIdPR Cert Serial NumberY
Date timeIdPRsignatureYSkIdPR (Complete Message)
M10 Claims response Claims structures response YRelationshipR A1 Y
IdPA Cert Serial NumberYDate timeIdPAsignatureY
SkIdPA (Relationship R A1) YWBSNR Cert Serial NumberY
Date timeWBSNRsignatureYSkWBSNR Cert(Complete Message)
M11 Certify direct relationship R Id YA IdYAccreditationRY
IdPR Cert Serial NumberYDate timeIdPRsignatureY
SkIdPR (Accreditation R )YRelationshipR A1 Y
WBSNR Cert Serial NumberYDate timeWBSNRsignatureY
SkWBSNR Cert(Complete message)
M12 Certify indirect relationship R Id YA IdYAccreditationRY
IdPR Cert Serial NumberYDate timeIdPRsignatureY
SkIdPR (Accreditation R) YRelationshipR Ai Y
IdPAi Cert Serial NumberYDate timeIdPAisignatureY
SkIdPAi
(Relationship R Ai) YRelationshipR A1 Y
WBSNA Cert Serial NumberYDate timeWBSNAsignatureY
SkWBSNA Cert(Complete message)
M13 Relationship certified R Id YA IdYRelationshipR A1 Y
IdPA Cert Serial NumberYDate timeIdPAsignatureY
SkIdPA (Relationship R A1)
M14 Simple token request Ticket
M15 Simple token response Ticket YTokenvalueYExpired  inY
AMA Cert Serial NumberYDate timeAMAsignatureY
SkAMA Cert(Complete Message)
M16 Simple file request R Id YFile Id
M17 Simple file response R Id YEkR(file)
M18 Simple claim request R Id YA Id
M19 Simple claim response R Id YIdPR Cert Serial NumberYAccreditationRY
Date timeIdPRsignatureYSkIdPR (Accreditation R)
M20 Token validation Ticket YTokenvalue
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8.3.2 Execution procedure
eU+F is divided in four phases: (1) the initialization phase, in which the ini-
tialization of entities is performed; (2) User logs in to a WBSN, in which a
user, in the role of a RP, logins in a WBSN and accesses to his encrypted identity
data and resources, being data locally decrypted; (3) User accesses to data of
a direct contact where a user, also in the role of a RP, tries to access the profile
and resources of a direct contact who is registered in a different WBSN, being data
locally decrypted; and (4) User access data of an indirect contact in which a
user, again in the role of a RP, accesses to data of an indirect user who is registered
in a different WBSN (data is also locally decrypted). It is remarkable that access-
ing a direct or an indirect contact data within the same WBSN follows the same
procedure as accessing data of a user enrolled in a different one.
It should be noticed that phases (2) User logs in to a WBSN and (3) User
accesses to data of a direct contact only differs from U+F in the following pair
of issues and thus, they are not described.
 Identity data and resources, once obtained, have to be decrypted at users’
browsers following one of the schemes described in Section 8.4
 Requested claims and delivered tokens are signed by appropriate AMs and
signatures verify accordingly.
 A new structure is applied in claims management, RelationshipA-Bi, that
involves the element depth to deal with indirect relationships.
By contrast, some tasks are added in the initialization phase (Section 8.3.2.1)
and the User access data of an indirect contact phase is described from scratch
(Section 7.3.2.1).
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8.3.2.1 Initialization
As an additional task, users have to create a set of keys. Moreover, the specification
of lists of trusted WBSN CAs in AMs, trusted AM CAs and WBSN CAs in IdPs
and trusted WBSN CAs in Hosts is required. Furthermore, users have to store
in chosen Hosts his resources, encrypted, and the symmetric keys applied in the
resources encryption in their IdPs.
8.3.2.2 User accesses data of an indirect contact
Considering the existence of indirect relationships, the procedure is rather similar to
access data of a direct contact except for requiring interactions between all WBSNs
involved in the relationship. In particular, WBSN interactions are indispensable to
acquire claims that prove the existence of an indirect relationship between a pair of
users. For instance, given three users such that User1 is directly connected to User2
and User2 to User3, to verify the indirect relationship between User3 and User1 a
proof of the existence of such relationship is requested to IdP User3. Then, the
request sent to IdP User3 attaches a proof of the relationship between User2 and
User1 and IdP User3 verifies if User3 has a relationship with User2 to finally certify
the indirect relationship between User3 and User1. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy
that apart from getting the proof, User3’s access control policies have to be satisfied
to get the requested access.
As in User accesses to a contact’s data (Section 7.3.2.3), the procedures of ac-
quiring identity data and resources are quite analogous and the main difference is
that IdPs provide identity data and Hosts provide resources. Thus, given the pre-
vious example, the following Section describes the acquisition of User3’s FOAF file.
It is depicted in Figure 8.4 and details, in brackets, messages identifiers regarding
Table 7.1.
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Figure 8.4: User accesses to the FOAF file of an indirect contact
FOAF file acquisition The acquisition of a FOAF file requires as many UMA
executions as WBSNs are involved in the relationship minus one. In general, this
procedure focuses on recursively repeating the acquisition of FOAF files from each
of the WBSNs involved the indirect relationship. Indeed, this feature is what points
out that an indirect relationship can be defined as multiple direct ones. According
to the proposed example two execution of UMA are performed, the first one to get
the FOAF file of User2 and the second one to get the FOAF file of User3. The
procedure is depicted in Figure 8.4 and, in brackets, message identifiers in regard
to Table 8.1 are noticed.
More specifically, after having acquired identity data of User2, applying the pro-
cedure described in Section 7.3.2.3, User1 clicks on User2 relationship with User3.
Afterwards, User1 chooses to access User3’s identity data and an the protocol de-
scribed next is carried out. WBSN1 interacts with WBSN3 and it requests to
IdP User3 the User3’s FOAF file (msg. 1, 2 of Figure 8.4). Subsequently, IdP User3
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requests an access token and redirects WBSN1 to AM IdP User3 (msg. 3-6). Then,
AM IdP User3 requests claims (msg. 7, 8) that are analogous to the ones requested
when accessing a direct contact except for P2 which has to proof the existence of
the indirect relationship between User3 and User1. Therefore, P1 is reused and P3
is reused or requested depending on requested claims (msg. 9, 10). By contrast, ob-
taining P2 requires the interaction with WBSN3. Indeed, WBSN1 creates P2* that
corresponds to a non-certified proof of the relationship between User3 and User2
and sends it together with the P2 previously obtained (while accessing to User2’s
data) that certifies the relationship between User2 and User1 to IdP User3 (msg.
11,12). The IdP User3 verifies the existence of the relationship, creates the new P2
and sends it back (msg. 13,14). When WBSN1 gets claims (composed of P1, P2
and P3), sends them to AM IdP User3 and if their verification is successful the ac-
cess token is delivered (msg. 15-18). Lastly, the token is sent to IdP User3 and the
requested file is provided (msg. 19-23). Once again, the IdP delivers an encrypted
reduced FOAF file that has to be decrypted in the user’s browser applying one of
the schemes proposed in Section 8.4.
Finally, as in other phases, each signed message has to be verified. Thus, if
signing entities are within the established lists to abort the protocol otherwise has
to be identified.
8.4 Data exposure minimization management
There are multiple possibilities, making use of cryptography, to prevent WBSNs
from visualizing resources and identity data presented in them. However, regarding
one of the security requirements, decryption keys cannot be distributed off-line
because, as WBSNs are used by a huge quantity of users and lots of them are
not directly known, the procedure would be impractical. Therefore, an hybrid
encryption approach, similar to [167], is applied to resources management and an
asymmetric one to identity data management. In particular, a pair of alternatives
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to manage and distribute keys are described in the following Sections, one of them
focuses on traditional Public Key Cryptography (PKC) and the other one focuses
on PKC based on Identity Based Encryption (IBE). However, the election of a
particular algorithm is an open issue. Moreover, as users’ emails are considered
subjects attributes, Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) could have been applied
instead of IBE.
Furthermore, the analysis of advantages and disadvantages of achieving data
exposure minimization is essential. The main advantage is to prevent WBSNs from
using personal data for their own purposes such as sending spam or building profiles
of users likes and dislikes. Nonetheless, there are some drawbacks to highlight.
Firstly, the time required to perform the protocol increases due to the cryptographic
operations applied. Second, users are in charge of encrypting their resources and
uploading them and the applied key. Third, a particular amount of extra storage
is required to store keys. Finally, several messages are added to the protocol, such
as those for providing the decryption keys. Next, Sections 8.4.1 and 8.4.2 describe
the application of PKC and IBE and Section 8.4.3 presents a comparison of the
application of both schemes in eU+F.
8.4.1 Traditional PKC
This technique is based on the well-known concept of PKC [168]. Each user owns
a key pair (Kpub and Kpv), or multiple ones.
In the Initialization phase each user delivers his Kpub with his FOAF file and
his resources decryption key, DK, to the preferred IdP. Then, acquisition of identity
data focuses on requesting the appropriate Kpub and use it to encrypt and retrieve
the requested FOAF file. On the other hand, resources, encrypted with DK, are
retrieved and decrypted using Kpub to reach DK. The use of this mechanisms in-
volves introducing some new messages apart from those already present in Section
8.3.1. To get a better picture of interchanged messages, Figure 8.5 depicts the ac-
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Figure 8.5: Traditional PKC - Acquiring User2’s resources
quisition of resources, where (E) points out messages that already exist, (I) refers
to messages that are new but can be included within existing ones and (N) points
out new messages that have been created from scratch.
8.4.2 IBE-based PKC
To reduce the burden of key management, recalling Section 2.3, Identity Based En-
cryption (IBE) cryptography is applied [74]. The general approach requires trusted
third parties, called herein IBE authorities, to create keys based on some agreed
variables. However, the use of an algorithm like [169] is recommendable. It focuses
on exclusively creating the public key through public parameters without depending
on an additional number chosen by a user or by an authority.
Assuming that eU+F uses the users’ email as an identity attribute, once the
8.4. Data exposure minimization management 167
Table 8.2: PKC vs IBE-based PKC
Traditional PKC IBE-based PKC
Simple key management
º º
Extra entities
º
Extra storage
º
Impact performance
º
Key escrow problem
º
attached Kpv is provided by an IBE authority, the acquisition of identity data and
resources is analogous to the PKC technique except for not requiring the delivery
of Kpub in IdPs.
8.4.3 Comparison: traditional PKC vs IBE-based PKC
This Section analyses advantages and disadvantages of traditional PKC and IBE-
based PKC schemes. A summary of the analysis is presented in Table 8.2.
Both schemes present a pair of significant common advantages in regard to key
management. Firstly, on-line key interchanges are not required. This is essential in
applications like WBSNs because users share data among multiple contacts and key
distribution may be a burden. Second, keys can be periodically updated preventing
attacks, in the traditional PKC scheme, against the applied encryption algorithm
and in the IBE-based PKC scheme, against the applied IBE algorithm. Indeed, in
this last scheme, the update of keys may involve the change of parameters in the
used IBE key creation algorithm.
Concerning the traditional PKC scheme, it has the advantage of not involving
extra entities in the protocol. Besides, this scheme presents the huge benefit of
not affecting the protocols performance to a great extent, that is, resources are
symmetrically encrypted and just decryption keys management uses asymmetric
cryptography. Moreover, decryption keys are exclusively managed by their creators
and the key escrow problem is avoided. By contrast, the IBE-based PKC scheme
suffers from the key escrow problem. Besides, apart from involving operations with
high computational cost, IBE authorities take part in the protocol. Nonetheless,
these new entities release the necessity of extra storage space for public keys, as
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well as the necessity of being IdPs in charge of their delivery.
8.5 Modifying eU+F to fully support SoNeUCONABC:
a powerful approach
eU+F is based on SoNeUCONABC and access control has to be performed accord-
ingly. In this regard, although the current development of eU+F only considers
indirect relationship, thus managing feature distance, it can be extended to manage
the remaining set of WBSN features, namely, direction, flexible elements in access
control policies, cliques, distance, common-contacts and multi-paths and thus, sup-
porting the definition of any kind of policy applying the SoNeUCONABC policy
language (Section 4.3). Furthermore, eU+F can also be extended to support usage
control.
In the following Sections the extension of eU+F to manage all WBSN features
and usage control is discussed.
8.5.1 SoNeUCONABC features management
According to SoNeUCONABC , the management of all WBSN features involves
the definition and the evaluation of access control policies defined by the proposed
access control policy language (Section 4.3). Access control enforcement can be
generally divided into the construction of rt and the later verification of access
control policy elements on rt (recall Section 4.4). In this extension of eU+F, this
process is carried out by AMs and it is related to claims management.
rt is recursively constructed through the identification of all enriched paths
between the requester and the administrator of the requested object (Section 4.4).
Assuming that a User1 wants to access to a resource of a User20, the construction
of rt should involve all enriched paths between User1 (the requester) and User20
(the administrator). This process is depicted in Figure 8.6, though intermediate
nodes have been omitted for brevity. Once the token request message is received
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Figure 8.6: eU+F rt construction (intermediate nodes omitted for brevity).
by AM Host User20, firstly, this AM requests the IdP User20 all the relationships
(E) and the relationships attributes (ATT E) that User20 owns in his FOAF file
(msg. 2-5 Figure 8.6). Subsequently, AM Host User20 requests to each IdP of each
User20’s contact, the relationships and relationship attributes that each of them
owns in his FOAF file (msg. 6). For example, AM Host User20 starts requesting
these data to IdP User2, being User2 the first contact who User20 owns in his
FOAF file (msg. 7-11). Then, this process is recursively performed (msg. 12) until
the relationship between User20 and each of the users whose relationship data is
requested, has a maximum length of 6 (recall theoretical studies [153]).
After rt is constructed, elements involved in access control policies have to
be evaluated. In this regard, user, object and relationship attributes (ATT S,
ATT O and ATT E respectively) are the elements at stake. It should be consid-
ered that ATT S are included in personal FOAF files and thus, are stored in IdPs.
Similarly, some ATT E such as ROLE or TRUST are also within FOAF files. By
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contrast, other ATT E like DURATION may require accessing a Trusted Third
Party (TTP), e.g. the NIST Time Service, to properly verify a particular element.
On the other hand, ATT O are attached to objects stored in chosen Hosts and
it is possible that AMs store ATT O of all objects to simplify the evaluation of
ATT O. Therefore, the management of all of these attributes, together with the
fact that the policy language proposed in SoNeUCONABC is the one applied herein
(recall Section 4.3.3), is directly related to the management of all features and flex-
ible elements in access control policies in particular. Applying the proposed policy
language all features can be specified in access control policies, being evaluated in
rt.
Thus, the verification of policies elements requires some changes in claims man-
agement, not only accessing to IdPs but also to Hosts and TTPs. Just the following
pair of issues have to noticed:
 Message “Claims request” (message 8 Table 8.1) will be larger in size depend-
ing on the number of ATT S or ATT E considered in defined access control
policies, that is, ρs and ρrt (recall Chapter 4).
 If a policy involves a ρrt that considers time values, a TTP should be con-
tacted, so the appropriate AM must make a request to it (Figure 8.7 ). In a
similar way, in the case that access control policies contain ρo, the AM should
make a request to the adequate Host (Figure 8.7 -A) or, if the AM owns a DB
that stores the required object attributes (ATT O), it may verify ρo against
it (Figure 8.7 -B).
8.5.2 Attributes and policies management
Particularly, usage control, that refers to permanent management of access control
during usage processes, is associated with attributes and access control policies
updates, additions and deletions. Once an attribute update, addition or deletion
is detected, it is notified to the right AM (the one in charge of managing the
8.5. Modifying eU+F to fully support SoNeUCONABC : a powerful
approach 171
Figure 8.7: eU+F extension to evaluation all kind of access control policies.
updated attribute) to enforce the re-evaluation of access control policies. Likewise,
the update, the addition or the deletion of a policy requires the re-evaluation of
policies.
Regarding SoNeUCONABC , UDFs are in charge of detecting changes. In rela-
tion to attributes management, UDFs are compared with IdPs, Hosts and TTPs.
Supposing that User1 is using a requested resource and identity data of User2, the
following changes may happen (Figure 8.8): 1) IdP User2 may change a subject
or a relationship attribute, e.g. the user’s age; 2) an attribute of the requested
resource stored in Host User2 may change, e.g. the resource’s title; 3) in case
claims acquisition requires a TTP, it may inform about a change in an attribute,
e.g. the timetable; and 4) the intermediate IdPs, that is, the IdP of the requester,
may identify a change in an attribute, e.g. a relationship role, and it is informed
too. Afterwards, when notifications reach the appropriate AM (AM User2 in the
example), the process of policy evaluation, including rt construction, is repeated.
On the other hand, in case of policy updates, inclusions or deletions, AMs are
the entities at stake. These entities act as UDFs, either evaluating the updated or
the added policy, or evaluating all access control policies if one of them has been
deleted.
It is noteworthy that the repetition of the access control enforcement process is
really tedious and striking a balance between privacy and usability is indispensable.
For this purpose it could be reasonable to establish a threshold to bound the number
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Figure 8.8: eU+F adjustments to manage changes in attributes
of times, per resource or identity data request, that access control policies can be
evaluated and rt can be constructed.
8.6 Summary of the chapter
This Chapter has presented eU+F Social Network protocol. It is an extension
of U+F to, apart from achieving interoperability and reusability, manage indirect
relationships and protect data against unnoticed deliveries applying a hybrid cryp-
tographic approach. Furthermore, to fully supports SoNeUCONABC , changes to
deal with all WBSN features and usage control are finally discussed.
Part IV
Evaluation and Conclusions

Chapter 9
Evaluation
This Section describes the evaluation of the contributions proposed in this thesis.
A graphical summary is depicted in Figure 9.1.
First of all, the evaluation of SoNeUCONABC shows, theoretically, the signifi-
cant expressive power of this model by analysing the fulfilment of the set of WBSN
features (distance, common-contacts, clique, multi-path, direction and flexible ele-
ments in access control policies) and, empirically, the feasibility of its implemen-
tation by the development of a proof of concept system which allows the analysis
of the access control enforcement process. In addition to SoNeUCONABC , its
administrative model SoNeUCONADM is evaluated by theoretically studying the
satisfaction of identified administrative tasks.
The second contribution has been evaluated in three ways. First, a feasibility
analysis has been performed over SoNeUCONABC . Second, a prototype has been
built to prove the feasibility of implementing CooPeD. Third, a survey has been
conducted to assess the usefulness of the proposal.
Finally, the evaluation of U+F and eU+F protocols is presented. Both pro-
tocols are theoretically and empirically evaluated. The satisfaction of established
requirements and the workload of each protocol’s phase is theoretically studied.
Moreover, a pair of prototypes prove the viability of implementing U+F and eU+F
in a simulated environment. In their regard, the protocol temporal workload has
been measured and compared with a pair of popular WBSNs, Facebook and MyS-
pace. Additionally, both protocols have been jointly compared, theoretically and
empirically.
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Figure 9.1: Evaluations overview
In sum, SoNeUCONABC is evaluated in Section 9.1. Subsequently,
SoNeUCONADM , the administrative model for SoNeUCONABC , is evaluated in
Section 9.2. Section 9.3 presents the evaluation of CooPeD. The evaluation of U+F
is shown in Section 9.4. Similarly, the evaluation of eU+F is presented in Section
9.5. Finally, a comparative assessment of U+F and eU+F is described in Section
9.6.
9.1 Evaluation of SoNeUCONABC
SoNeUCONABC evaluation is performed at two levels, the theoretical (Section
9.1.1) and the empirical one (Section 9.1.2).
9.1.1 Theoretical evaluation
This Section presents the theoretical evaluation. Firstly, if the proposed model man-
ages access control according to the set of identified WBSN features (distance, multi-
path, direction, common-contact, clique, flexible attributes) is analysed in Chapter 2.
Secondly, the expressive power of the proposed policy language is studied (Section
9.1.1.2).
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9.1.1.1 Capability of the model to consider WBSN features
Access control policies are specified in regard to a set of attributes of the requesting
subject, the requested object and the set of relationships between the administrator
and the requester (respectively, ATT(S), ATT(O) and ATT(RT)). Recalling the
definition of SoNeUCONABC and considering that the relationship management is
an essential issue in this model, for a particular request of an action r made by a
requester over an object o of an administrator a, the set of managed relationships,
rt, corresponds to all enriched paths that have as initial node a and terminal node
s. Next, if the six WBSN features described in Section 2.4 can be addressed by the
SoNeUCONABC model is studied.
Distance. It is immediate to show that the model can manage policies that
consider indirect relationships between s and a, as rt contains, in theory, all the
relationships (direct and indirect) between both entities.
Multi-path. Similarly, as rt contains all the relationships between a and s
(in the form of enriched paths), the model allows the definition of access control
policies that consider multiple paths.
Direction. In the same way, as the enriched paths comprising rt contain all
the edges connecting two consecutive nodes in the path, in the forward and back-
ward directions, to define access control policies that consider unidirectional and
bidirectional relationships is possible in the model.
Common-contacts. In a WBSN, assuming the existence of two users, a and s
and a set Vl of common contacts, the existence of common-contacts between a and
s can be considered in two different ways, where “” refers to the existence or not
of additional edges:
1 a has a unidirectional and direct relationship with each vli > Vl and each vli has
a bidirectional relationship with s. This will be represented by the following
enriched path: a, eka,li ,;, vli , eli,s, ; es,li ,, s
2 a and each vli have bidirectional relationships with s. Thus, there are enriched
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paths between a and s such that a, ea,li ,; eli,a,, vli , eli,s,; es,li ,, s
As rt contains all the relationships (enriched paths) between a and s (depth 6 6,
recall [153]), a policy considering the existence of common contacts can be evaluated
within the model.
Clique. A clique in a digraph D (i.e. directed graph) is referred to a complete
digraph between a set of C nodes (including a and s). Then, a clique corresponds
to the existence of different bidirectional relationships between all nodes involved
in it. In particular, assuming that the number of nodes in the clique distinct than
a and s is N   C 2, a clique exists if there are PNK 1 P K,N1 different enriched
paths, such that only N distinct nodes plus a and s are involved in those paths and
there exists a bidirectional direct relationship of the same type between all these
nodes. Note that P K,N refers to the number of K-permutations in a set of N
elements. Then, in case C   2 the number of paths is 1, in case C   3, the required
number of such paths is 2, for C   4, it is 5, and for C   5, 16 paths are required to
exist.
Therefore, given rt, the model allows verifying the existence of a clique of N
nodes, and then, it may support access control policies that consider cliques defined
in such a way.
Flexible elements in access control policies. In this model, ATT S,
ATT O, ATT RT , as well as B and C, are used to define access control policies.
This issue together with the definition of a policy language with operators that
allow the combination of policy elements, facilitates the definition of access control
policies with varied elements and thus, the specification of fine-grained preferences.
Note that although the model allows managing access control in regard to this
set of features, to supplement the model with an expressive policy language that
also supports them is necessary.
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9.1.1.2 Expressive power of the policy language
The pursued goal of SoNeUCONABC is to reach a high level of expressive power,
attesting the management of previous features. To do so and compare the expressive
power of this model against those analysed in Section 2.5.3, the possibilities of
SoNeUCONABC to define policies presented in Section 2.4 is studied. It is assumed
that the granted right over objects entitled “party” is “read” and not a single
condition and/ or obligation has to be satisfied:
P1 Access is granted to users who are friends of neighbours of his/ her relatives if
the relationship between his/ her relatives and his/ her relatives’ neighbours
was established before 2,000. (F1 and F6)
This policy corresponds to an indirect relationship composed of three direct
forward relationships from a to s which involve the use of the attribute role
in each hop and the attribute creationY ear in the second hop.
ρ   g; title   party; role   relative; role   neighbour , creationY ear @ 2000; role  
friend,g,g; read;g; g
P2 Access is granted to users who have three friends in common with the admin-
istrator of the requested object. (F2)
One possible option of being common-contact (F4) refers to the existence of
an enriched path between a and s where the first hop refers to a direct forward
relationship from a to one of his contacts (F3-unidirectional) and the second
hop refers to a forward and a backward relationship between such contact and
s (F3-bidirectional). Besides, as 3 common-contacts are required, a total of 3
analogous enriched paths have to be identified (F2) and thus, $ takes value
3.
ρ   g; title   party; role   friend; role   friend , role   friend, 3, g; read; g; g
P3 Access is granted to users who belong to the clique in which two users and
the administrator of the requested object are involved, having all of them a
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friendship relationship. (F3)
This policy corresponds to the existence of two enriched paths, one between a
and s and one that includes a, s and other user (F5). Then, δ is 3 because 3
users are involved in the clique. Additionally, enriched paths are composed of
a direct forward friendship relationship (F6) and implicitly, a backward one.
ρ   g; title   party; role   friend, g, 3; read;g; g
P4 Access is granted to users who are connected to the administrator by two
different paths composed of unidirectional relationships oriented from the re-
quester to the administrator. Moreover, relationships involved in all paths
have to be highly trusted. (F4 and F6)
This policy refers to the existence of, at least, a pair of paths with a certain
kind of constraints regarding the level of trust of the relationship.
ρ   g; title   party; trust   high, 2, g; read;g; g
P5 Access is granted to users who are friends of the administrator of the requested
object, also having a bidirectional relationship with him/ her. (F5)
This policy refers to the specification of a direct forward and a direct backward
friendship relationship.
ρ   g; title   party; role   friend , role   friend,g, g; read; g; g
P6 Access is granted to users who are friends of the administrator of the requested
object. (F5)
This policy only involves the specification of the role of the relationship.
ρ   g; title   party; role   friend; read; g; g
P7 Access is granted to users if they are females under 30 years old or if they are
females under 40 who have studied computer science or if they are females
who have studied computer science and physics. (F6)
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Table 9.1: WBSNs structure
WBSNs id #ei #vi ei~vi
1 2,980,388 50,000 60
2 5,965,777 50,000 120
3 8,949,375 50,000 185
4 10,929,713 50,000 219
ρ   gender   female , age @ 30 - age @ 40 , studies   c.science - studies   c.science ,
studies   physics; title   party; g; read; g; g
All policies are satisfactorily expressed by SoNeUCONABC . Thus, the suitabil-
ity of the model for the WBSN field is recognized.
9.1.2 Empirical evaluation
The feasibility of implementing SoNeUCONABC is analysed studying the Temporal
Workload (TW) of policy enforcement. This is performed through the development
of a proof of concept system. Firstly, four WBSNs are randomly constructed. Table
9.1 depicts the number of nodes (#vi), the number of relationships (#ei) and the
mean number of relationships per node (ei~vi) that each WBSN involves. Then,
based on developed WBSNs, policy enforcement is studied. It is assumed that the
number of hops between a pair of WBSN users is limited to 6 due to theoretical
studies [153].
The experimental study of policy enforcement is divided in two steps:
1. Analysis of rt construction: For each WBSN, a total of 7 rt structures are
constructed choosing random requesters and administrators. Table 9.2 details
the number of relationships (#ei explo.) and nodes explored (#vi explo.) for
constructing rt, the number of relationships (rt #ei) and nodes (rt #vi) that
each final rt comprises and the TW of constructing rt (rt TW ms). Note
that even all rt are constructed choosing random users, the amount of nodes
and relationships involved in them are considered sufficient to guarantee the
appropriateness of the evaluation process.
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2. Policy evaluation: In each constructed rt, policies proposed in Section 9.1.1.2
are independently evaluated. The TW of performing policy evaluation is
summarized in Table 9.3.
Concerning technical details, the proof of concept system is developed in Java 1.7,
using a MySQL 5.2 database to store nodes and relationships. Moreover, experi-
ments have been executed over a Pentium D 2.3 GHz with a Lion 10.8 operating
system using 500 MB of RAM.
Finally, it should be noticed that the application of graph structures called
small-world networks [170] has been considered. This type of graphs are charac-
terized by the fact that most nodes are not neighbours of each other but they can
be reached by any node in a small number of hops. Studies have experimented
on actual email contacts within an organization or a student social networking site
[171], or have crawled Twitter site to work over the real structure [172]. Nonethe-
less, given the expressive power of SoNeUCONABC , policy enforcement requires
managing features not directly considered within small-world networks and current
WBSNs. In particular, to manage (F3) direction together with (F4) multi-path, the
existence of multiple unidirectional and bidirectional relationships between pairs
of directly connected nodes is essential. Besides, to manage (F6) flexible elements
in access control policies, the involvement of ATT S and ATT E in the graph
creation process is also indispensable. In sum, random networks have been cho-
sen instead of small-world networks because not all identified WBSN features can
be managed without changing the structure of small-world networks. In particu-
lar, four WBSNs have been randomly constructed in such a way that nodes are
connected through multiple input and output unidirectional relationships and each
node and relationship has multiple ATT S and ATT E attached to it.
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9.1.2.1 Analysis of rt construction
The TW of building rt increases exponentially according to the number of explored
nodes, that is, rt is built by visiting, recursively, all contacts of each user (starting
from the administrator) until the requester is reached (or the maximum path length
is reached). Consequently, the TW of constructing rt increases according to the sum
of all visited users at each path length, that is, PKi 1ηi where η refers to the average
number of users’ contacts and K corresponds to the path length. Table 9.2 depicts
the TW of constructing multiple rt in each proposed WBSN. In the worst analysed
situation, rt id   22, the TW exploring 10,929,713 relationships is 105,478 ms. By
contrast, in a better situation, for example, in rt id   12, the TW exploring 119
relationships is 60 ms.
Nonetheless, it should be noticed that, under certain circumstances, some rt
involve more nodes and relationships than those that generally appear in a real
scenario. Taking Facebook as a representative WBSN, assuming that the average
number of Facebook contacts is 190 [173] and the maximum number of hops are
two (friend-of-a-friend), the average maximum number of relationships and nodes
among a pair of users is 1901902= 36,290. Consequently, rt whose creation involves
the exploration of more than 36,290 nodes exceed the average case.
9.1.2.2 Policy evaluation
Proposed access control policies are evaluated and Table 9.3 depicts the TW of
their evaluation. All access control policies, except for P3 that refers to cliques
construction, are quickly evaluated reaching a TW lower than 90 ms. The most
significant rt to analyse, with the highest number of relationships and nodes, are
rt id   1, 8, 15 and 22. They involve 83, 164, 502 and 751 relationships and 49,
80, 170 and 251 nodes respectively. Policy evaluation concerning these rt does not
exceed 100 ms but for P3. Evaluating policy P3 takes 8,489 ms in rt id   1, more
than 100,000 ms in rt id   11 and more than 200,000 ms in rt id   15 and rt id   22.
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Table 9.2: Analysis of rt construction
WBSN id = 1
rt id #ei explo. #vi explo. #ei rt #vi rt rt TW (ms)
1 252,691 505,382 36 24 4,142
2 3,662 7,324 4 4 435
3 81 162 1 2 28
4 79 158 2 2 54
5 69 120 1 2 38
6 65 130 1 2 51
7 1 2 1 2 13
WBSN id = 2
rt id #ei explo. #vi explo. #ei rt #vi rt rt TW (ms)
8 1,958,163 3,916,326 164 80 21,287
9 13,557 27,114 6 5 712
10 139 278 1 2 57
11 126 252 2 2 88
12 119 238 1 2 60
13 115 230 1 2 62
14 1 2 1 2 30
WBSN id = 3
rt id #ei explo. #vi explo. #ei rt #vi rt rt TW (ms)
15 6,163,496 12,326,996 502 170 56,811
16 29,771 49,542 6 5 273
17 201 402 1 2 80
18 187 374 2 2 110
19 174 348 1 2 88
20 174 348 1 2 86
21 37 74 1 2 36
WBSN id = 4
rt id #ei explo. #vi explo. #ei rt #vi rt rt TW (ms)
22 10,929,713 22,231,690 751 251 105,478
23 445,839 91,678 8 6 1,721
24 244 488 1 2 44
25 230 460 2 2 134
26 216 432 1 2 96
27 216 432 1 2 83
28 33 66 1 2 46
In sum, policy evaluation TW is satisfactory and just cliques management has
to be discussed. The attained results may be justified by the fact that the imple-
mented algorithm for searching cliques is not efficient enough and by the fact that
experiments are executed in a computer with limited resources.
9.1.2.3 Summary: policy enforcement
Table 9.4 presents the TW of the policy enforcement process, that is, the sum
between steps Analysis of rt construction and Policy evaluation. The tolerable
waiting time of WBSN users for information retrieval is approximately 2,000 ms
[174]. Thus, results of the implemented proof of concept system are successful in
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Table 9.3: Policies evaluation temporal workload
WBSN id = 1
rt id P1-TW (ms) P2-TW (ms) P3-TW (ms) P4-TW (ms) P5-TW (ms) P6-TW (ms) P7-TW (ms)
1 1 1 8,489 1 1 @1 @1
2 @1 @1 717 @1 @1 @1 @1
3 @1 @1 247 @1 @1 @1 @1
4 @1 1 753 @1 @1 @1 @1
5 @1 @1 559 @1 @1 @1 @1
6 @1 @1 571 @1 @1 @1 @1
7 @1 @1 463 @1 @1 @1 @1
WBSN id = 2
rt id P1-TW (ms) P2-TW (ms) P3-TW (ms) P4-TW (ms) P5-TW (ms) P6-TW (ms) P7-TW (ms)
8 4 17 A100,000 4 2 2 @1
9 @1 @1 1,786 @1 1 @1 @1
10 1 @1 355 @1 @1 1 @1
11 @1 @1 1,138 1 1 @1 @1
12 1 @1 822 @1 @1 1 @1
13 @1 @1 843 1 @1 @1 @1
14 1 @1 729 @1 @1 @1 @1
WBSN id = 3
rt id P1-TW (ms) P2-TW (ms) P3-TW (ms) P4-TW (ms) P5-TW (ms) P6-TW (ms) P7-TW (ms)
15 14 5 A200,000 4 2 9 @1
16 1 @1 3,026 1 @1 @1 @1
17 @1 @1 634 @1 1 @1 @1
18 @1 1 1,634 @1 @1 @1 @1
19 1 @1 1,067 1 @1 @1 @1
20 @1 @1 1,014 @1 @1 1 @1
21 @1 1 959 @1 1 @1 @1
WBSN id = 4
rt id P1-TW (ms) P2-TW (ms) P3-TW (ms) P4-TW (ms) P5-TW (ms) P6-TW (ms) P7-TW (ms)
22 71 67 A200,000 76 80 18 85
23 @1 1 9,076 @1 @1 @1 1
24 @1 1 1,952 @1 @1 @1 1
25 1 @1 3,683 @1 @1 @1 1
26 @1 1 2,198 @1 @1 @1 1
27 @1 @1 2,149 @1 @1 @1 1
28 @1 @1 1,396 @1 @1 @1 1
most cases. Particularly, they are satisfactory enforcing policies without cliques,
if explored nodes do not exceed about 200,000 and 200 relationships per node.
Besides, the enforcement of policies with cliques remains successful if less than
about 30,000 nodes and 200 relationships per node are explored.
Concerning rt id   1, 8, 15, 16, 22, 23 and 25, that exceed 2,000 ms, some points
are discussed to justify such results. Firstly, some rt may involve the exploration of
more quantity of nodes and relationships than those that, on average, take place in
WBSNs like Facebook. Secondly, despite the hard task of cliques evaluation due to
the amount of paths to analyse (recall Section 9.1.1.1), the implemented algorithm
could be enhanced to increase performance and reduce the TW. Lastly, contrary
to the developed proof of concept system, WBSNs like Facebook apply huge and
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Table 9.4: Policy enforcement temporal workload
WBSN id = 1
rt id P1-TW (ms) P2-TW (ms) P3-TW (ms) P4-TW (ms) P5-TW (ms) P6-TW (ms) P7-TW (ms)
1 4,143 4,144 7,458 4,143 4,143 4,142 4,142
2 435 435 1,152 435 435 435 435
3 28 28 275 28 28 28 28
4 54 55 807 54 54 54 54
5 38 38 597 38 38 38 38
6 51 51 622 51 51 51 51
7 13 13 476 13 13 13 13
WBSN id = 2
rt id P1-TW (ms) P2-TW (ms) P3-TW (ms) P4-TW (ms) P5-TW (ms) P6-TW (ms) P7-TW (ms)
8 21,291 21,304 A121,287 21,291 21,289 21,289 21,287
9 712 712 2,498 712 713 712 712
10 58 57 412 57 57 58 57
11 88 88 1,226 89 89 88 88
12 61 60 882 60 60 61 60
13 62 62 905 63 62 62 62
14 31 30 759 30 30 30 30
WBSN id = 3
rt id P1-TW (ms) P2-TW (ms) P3-TW (ms) P4-TW (ms) P5-TW (ms) P6-TW (ms) P7-TW (ms)
15 56,825 56,816 A256,811 56,815 56,813 56,820 56,811
16 274 273 3,299 274 273 273 273
17 80 80 714 80 81 80 80
18 110 111 1,744 110 110 110 110
19 89 88 1,155 89 88 88 88
20 86 86 1,100 86 86 87 86
21 36 37 995 36 37 36 36
WBSN id = 4
rt id P1-TW (ms) P2-TW (ms) P3-TW (ms) P4-TW (ms) P5-TW (ms) P6-TW (ms) P7-TW (ms)
22 105,549 105,545 A305,478 105,554 105,558 105,496 105,563
23 1,721 1,722 10,797 1,721 1,721 1,721 1,722
24 44 45 1,996 44 44 44 45
25 135 134 3,817 134 134 134 135
26 96 97 2,294 96 96 96 97
27 83 83 2,232 83 83 83 84
28 46 46 1,442 46 46 46 47
powerful servers which facilitate the celerity of the policy enforcement process.
One last remark is that despite the conclusions drawn from the previous study,
a lower TW in current WBSNs is expected because they do not support the man-
agement of subject, objects and relationships attributes in the access control en-
forcement process, as well as they do not consider multiple relationships (forward
and/ or backward) between pairs of users.
9.2 Evaluation of SoNeUCONADM
This Section presents the evaluation of SoNeUCONADM , the administrative
model for SoNeUCONABC . It consists of comparing the proposed model with
9.2. Evaluation of SoNeUCONADM 187
the most challenging and related administrative models, RBAC and UCONABC .
SoNeUCONADM is compared with RBAC administrative model, for being one of
the most mature administrative models [175, 110], and with UCONABC adminis-
trative capabilities, for being the model that lays the bases on the proposed one
[44, 106].
Administrative tasks, identified in Chapter 5, are depicted and compared in
Table 9.5, where symbol ‘-’ implies that a particular task is not studied.
Concerning the association of data with preferences and data with data owners,
SoNeUCONADM only requires to associate preferences (access control policies) to
data. Policies are mainly defined over subjects, objects and relationships attributes
instead of being attached to specific objects. By contrast, UCONABC and RBAC
pose more restrictive and tedious tasks from the users point of view. In UCONABC
owners define assertions to associate subjects with objects, as well as to associate
policies (composed of assertions) with objects [106]. However, in RBAC permissions
are assigned to roles and to objects and then, roles are assigned to users.
Delegation is also managed in all compared models, being the SoNeUCONADM
proposal the most flexible one. In SoNeUCONADM delegating R involves the es-
tablishment of access control policies according to subjects, objects and relationship
attributes. Moreover, the delegation of all AR involves the execution of the oper-
ation DELEGATE to guarantee that, from the moment the operation is enforced,
the delegated object becomes property of the delegatee without the possibility of
undoing the operation. Conversely, delegation in UCONABC is limited to R. It is
based on specifying assertions associated with particular requesters which composed
of objects and subjects attributes [106]. On the other hand, RBAC delegates R and
AR through the association of roles to users.
Revocation is another compared task. SoNeUCONADM manages direct and
indirect revocation. The former is performed by owners through the change of
attributes and access control policies. On the contrary, indirect revocation is ex-
188 Chapter 9. Evaluation
Table 9.5: Administrative tasks comparison
Tasks SoNeUCON ADM UCON ABC [44, 106] RBAC [110]
Entities
identification
Creating, updating and delet-
ing access control preferences
Owners. Owners. Owners.
Associating preferences to
data
Not required - Owners
Revocation management Usage reference monitor and
owners
- Owners
Delegation management Owners - Owners
Management
procedures
Association between prefer-
ences with data and data with
data owners
Policies are exclusively associ-
ated to data owners concern-
ing subjects, objects and rela-
tionships attributes.
Assertions associate subjects
and objects
Permissions are associated
with roles and and data and
roles with data owners
Revocation management Weak revocation is managed.
Attributes and access control
policies updates.
Weak revocation is managed.
Time assigned to access con-
trol policies.
Weak and strong revocation
are managed. Owners revoke
users from roles according to
their decisions.
Delegation management Delegation of R and all AR
is available. Owners establish
access control policies and ex-
ecute the delegation operation
for all AR.
Delegation of R. Assertions
associated with particular re-
questers.
Delegation of R and AR is
available. Owners assigned
users to roles to delegate.
clusively related to attributes updates, being particularly related to attributes in-
volving time restrictions. Nonetheless, as this model only delegates R and all AR,
just weak revocation is at stake. Similarly, UCONABC manages weak revocation
assigning time to access control policies. Moreover, though not described in the
original model, Z. Zhang et al. proposed a general procedure to manage weak and
strong revocation in UCONABC [176]. On the other hand, RBAC provides func-
tions to weakly and strongly revoke users from roles by removing the assignment of
users to roles.
In the light of the proposed analysis, SoNeUCONADM supports all identified
tasks. Indeed, SoNeUCONADM has a significant advantage, that is, preferences
(access control policies) are associated to users instead of to objects and the burden
of managing at least as many policies as uploaded objects is avoided. Moreover,
it is noticeable that SoNeUCONADM does not manage strong revocation because
cascading delegations are not required. In other words, this model focuses on own-
ership and then, owners should manage access control in regard to data their posses,
either being an entire piece of data or, when co-ownership management takes place,
a part of it.
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9.3 Evaluation of co-ownership management
CooPeD has been evaluated in three different ways. The TW of policy enforce-
ment is estimated, using the proof of concept system (Section 9.3.1) developed for
the evaluation of SoNeUCONABC , to determine the possibility of implementing
CooPeD over the model. Next, the feasibility of implementing CooPeD is tested
by a prototype development (Section 9.3.2). Lastly, the relevance of co-ownership
management and the usefulness and appealing of the proposal is analysed through
a survey study (Section 9.3.3).
9.3.1 Policy enforcement for co-ownership management
The TW of policy enforcement in CooPeD, according to the extension of
SoNeUCONABC , is evaluated applying a proof of concept system. Indeed, the
same proof of concept as the one developed for the evaluation of policy enforcement
in SoNeUCONABC is applied (Section 9.1.2).
CooPeD requires the enforcement of as many access control policies as owners
and co-owners are attached to a particular object multiplied by the number of
policies established by each of them. Nonetheless, for the sake of simplicity and
based on current WBSNs where users create a policy to be applied to chosen objects
(e.g. a photo is accessible for friends), it is assumed that each owner/ co-owner
establishes a single policy. Moreover, in current WBSNs tagging is the only way to
manage co-ownership. The amount of tags per object can be compared with the
number of existing owner/ co-owners per object and consequently, to the number
of policies to evaluate. According to this issue, it is noticed that popular WBSNs
like Facebook or Flickr allow 50 and 75 tags respectively per object1 2. Then, the
TW of executing the enforcement of 1, 5, 14, 25, 50 and 75 policies is measured.
Recalling policy enforcement in SoNeUCONABC , it is based on the construc-
tion of rt, which consists of the set of relationships between the administrator and
1https://www.facebook.com/help/217258071632275–50, last access May 2014
2http://www.flickr.com/help/tags/, last access May 2014
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Table 9.6: Explored nodes and TW of rt construction.
#vi explo. TW rt
construction
Direct relationships
rt id=3 (WBSN id =1) 126 28
rt id=11(WBSN id=2) 252 88
Average 189 58
Indirect relationships (depth 2)
rt id=9 (WBSN id =2) 27,114 712
rt id=16 (WBSN id=3) 49,542 273
Average 38,328 492.5
the requester, and the later evaluation of access control policies. First, the TW
of constructing rt will be analysed. Considering that current WBSNs allow the
establishment of direct and indirect relationships of length 2 and that 190 is the
average number of contacts per user, the construction of rt exclusively composed
of direct relationships involves 192 (190+2) explored nodes (including the adminis-
trator and the requester) and the construction of rt with only indirect relationships
of length 2 involves 36,292 (190+1902+2) explored nodes. Therefore, for rt with
direct relationships, the TW is calculated based on the average between rt   3 and
rt   11 because the amount of explored nodes (189) is close to 192 (see Table 9.6).
In particular, the TW constructing rt for rt   3 and rt   11 is 28 ms and 88 ms
respectively. Concerning indirect relationships, the average TW in calculated based
on rt   9 and rt   16 as explored nodes are 38,328 and close to the average (see
Table 9.6). Specifically, the TW constructing rt for rt   9 and rt   16 is 712 ms and
273 ms respectively. Note that these rt id are the ones applied in the evaluation of
SoNeUCONABC , Section 9.1.2.
Co-ownership management involves the creation of an rt per owner/ co-owner
and the later evaluation of the policy established by each of them. Once the TW of
constructing rt has been estimated, the policies evaluation will be also considered.
The TW of evaluating 1, 5, 14, 25, 50 and 75 policies per object, can be estimated
multiplying the TW of the enforcement of one policy by the amount of policies to
evaluate. For instance, given that 712 ms is the TW of carrying out the enforcement
of P1 when rt id   9 (see Table 9.4), the TW of executing the enforcement of 5
policies P1 is estimated as 5   712 ms. Note that, herein, average cases in terms of
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rt with direct and indirect relationships are studied and then, the TW constructing
rt is considered the same one for all pairs of users (owners/co-owners - requesters).
The estimation of the the enforcement process TW for rt with direct (rt   3
and rt   11) and indirect (rt   9 and rt   16) relationships is depicted in Table
9.7. Again, based on the fact that the tolerable waiting time of WBSN users
for information retrieval is approximately 2,000 ms, in regard to rt with direct
relationships and excluding P3 (which defines a clique), 34 policies of the same
type (P1, P2, P4, P5, P6 or P7) can be evaluated per object without exceeding
this limit, that is 58 34 for sets of policies P1, P2, P6 or P7 ms and 58.5 34 ms for
sets of policies P4 and P5. On the contrary, when rt with indirect relationships
are applied, 4 policies of the same type can be evaluated per object, except for
P3, without exceeding 2,000 ms, that is 493 4 ms for sets of policies P1, P4 or P5
and 492.5 4 ms for sets of policies P2, P6 or P7. Moreover, regarding P3, in what
concerns rt with direct relationships a pair of policies can be evaluated without
exceeding 2,000, that is 750.5 2. Unfortunately, just the enforcement of a single
policy P3 takes 2,898.5 ms.
Along this Section the TW applied in the enforcement of policies of the same
type has been estimated. However, another issue to study is the estimation of the
TW for set of policies of different types, thus concluding the maximum amount
of policies of different types that can be enforced per object request. Depicted in
Table 9.8, TW of evaluating sets of different types of policies for rt with direct
and indirect relationships do not differ from the evaluation of sets of policies of
the same type. Therefore, it is estimated that, on average, the enforcement of a
policy P1-P7 distinct from P3 takes 58.17 ms for rt with direct relationships amd
the enforcement of 34 policies of any type (no P3) without exceeding 2,000 ms
is possible. For rt with indirect relationships, the enforcement of a policy P1-P7
distinct from P3 takes 492.75 ms and then, 4 policies can be evaluated. On the
other hand, when cliques management comes into play, that is, the evaluation of
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Table 9.7: Average TW policy enforcement for co-ownership management. Analo-
gous types of policies.
rt composed of direct relationships
rt id 1 policy 5 policies 14 policies 25 policies 50 policies 75 policies
P1/ P2/ P6/ P7-TW (ms)
rt id=3 28 140 392 700 1,400 2,100
rt id=11 88 440 1,232 2,200 4,400 6,600
Average 58 290 812 1,450 2,900 4,350
P3-TW (ms)
rt id=3 275 1,375 3,850 6,875 13,750 20,625
rt id=11 1,226 6,130 17,164 30,650 61,300 91,950
Average 750.5 3,752.5 10,507 18,762.5 37,525 56,287.5
P4/ P5-TW (ms)
rt id=3 28 140 392 700 1,400 2,100
rt id=11 89 445 1,246 2,225 4,450 6,675
Average 58.5 292.5 819 1,462.5 2,925 4,387.5
rt composed of indirect relationships (depth 2)
rt id 1 policy 5 policies 14 policies 25 policies 50 policies 75 policies
P1/ P4/ P5-TW (ms)
rt id=9 712 3,560 9,968 17,800 35,600 53,400
rt id=16 274 1,370 3,836 6,850 13,700 20,550
Average 493 2,465 6,902 12,325 24,650 36,975
P3-TW (ms)
rt id=9 2,498 12,490 34,972 62,450 124,900 187,350
rt id=16 3,299 16,495 46,186 82,475 164,950 247,425
Average 2,898.5 14,492.5 40,579 72,462.5 144,925 217,387.5
P2/ P6/ P7-TW (ms)
rt id=9 712 3,560 9,968 17,800 35,600 53,400
rt id=16 273 1,365 3,822 6,825 13,650 20,475
Average 492.5 2,462.5 6,895 12,312.5 24,625 36,937.5
Table 9.8: Average TW policy enforcement for co-ownership management. Different
types of policies.
rt composed of direct relationships
No matter type (P1-P7, no P3) - Avg. TW(ms)
1 policy 5 policies 14 policies 25 policies 50 policies 75 policies
58.17 290.83 814.33 1,454.17 2,908.33 4,362.5
P3 + other types - Avg. TW(ms)
1 policy P3 + 21 of others 2 policy P3 + 8 of others 3 policy P3
1,972 1,966.33 2,251.5
rt composed of indirect relationships (depth 2)
No matter type (P1-P7, no P3) - Avg. TW(ms)
1 policy 5 policies 14 policies 25 policies 50 policies 75 policies
492.75 2,463.75 6,898.5 12,318.75 24,637.5 36,956.25
P3 - TW(ms)
1 policy
2,898.5
P3, the maximum waiting time for information retrieval is not exceeded for rt with
direct relationships applying a policy P3 and 21 policies of other types, as well as
applying a pair of policies P3 and 8 policies of other types.
In sum, as the evaluation of SoNeUCONABC points out, cliques management
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involves a great amount of TW (Section 9.1.2) and the evaluation of P3 (that
considers a clique) exceeds 2,000 ms in the majority of cases. By contrast, the
maximum amount of different policies that can be evaluated (excluding P3) are 34
for rt with direct relationships and 4 for rt with indirect relationships. Concerning
current WBSNs where users create a policy to be applied to chosen objects and
being 14 the average number of tags that users establish per object3 (analogous
to the number of policies to evaluate), the enforcement of 34 policies for rt with
direct relationships is considered satisfactory in an average situation. However,
the enforcement process for rt with indirect relationships should be enhanced. In
any case, in a real world setting, service providers like Facebook or Flickr apply
powerful hardware and software mechanisms that help to speed up the access control
enforcement process. Besides, pointed out in Section 9.1.2.3, results are expected to
be better in current WBSNs because access control enforcement would not involve
such amount of assorted elements, eg. multiple relationships between pairs of users.
9.3.2 CooPeD prototype
A prototype to prove the feasibility of implementing CooPeD has been developed in
C#, applying a MySQL DB and Emuge CV 2.2.1 to facial recognition. It consists of
a web application that allows co-ownership management of photos of people (photos
of cars, animals, etc. are a matter of future work). It is expected that the prototype
could be linked to a popular WBSN like Facebook in the future. However, given
the limitations of the Facebook’s API just the Facebook authentication process
and photos stored in Facebook are applied in this prototype. Therefore, the use
of Facebook simplifies users’ authentication management and avoids the storage of
photos in an additional DB.
After being authenticated by Facebook, four functions are provided. First,
users have to detail some personal attributes and create relationships with other
CooPeD users. Second, based on Section 6.2.2.1, owners and co-owners establish
3http://www.flickr.com/photos/mariannabolognesi/7073104431/, last access May 2014
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access control policies to delegate R. Third, concerning photos (objects) stored
in Facebook users can tagged users in them. Each object oi is decomposed in
oji objects. A facial recognition system identifies faces in oi, thereby recognizing
oji . Then, the owner associates each o
j
i with the appropriate user. Assignations
consist of tagging users in their oji , becoming these users co-owners of o
j
i . Note
that tagging is a form of delegation where owners execute the delegation operation
(DELEGATE(vk,vj ,o,λ)), being vk the owner, vj the chosen user, and λ the value
AR. Lastly, based on Section 6.2.2.2, users request access to photos. It should
be highlighted that policies enforcement involves processing photos to enable only
access to the allowed oji and to restrict access to the remaining ones. This is
performed by applying hidden techniques such that each oji is covered with opaque,
noise or pixelated rectangles from the top to the bottom of the processed oi, using
established tags as reference points.
The prototype architecture, depicted in Figure 9.2, consists of the following
components:
 Data bases (DB): a pair of them is distinguished. FB data DB, refers to
the Facebook DB to authenticate users and manage photos. Additionally, a
Policies&objects parts DB stores policies, as well as the identities of owners,
co-owners and the object parts assigned to each uploaded photo.
 Management module: it performs administrative operations. Based on Face-
book, users log into the application (DB authentication module). Then, a set
of tools allow users to create, upload and delete access control policies (Poli-
cies module) and other sets of tools allows users to upload objects recognizing
objects parts and linking them to appropriate users (Objects module).
 Reference monitor : it verifies access control policies and delivers (if required)
the requested object to the Management module to be appropriately pro-
cessed.
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Figure 9.2: CooPeD prototype architecture
 Objects processing module: it provides tools to hide parts of photos. After
the Reference monitor informs about results of policy evaluation, FB data
DB and Policies&objects parts DB provide the requested object and its parts
respectively. Next, the object is processed and sent to the Reference monitor.
9.3.3 Survey study
A survey is performed to analyse the relevance of co-ownership management and
the usefulness and appealing of the proposal. The following sections present the
applied methodology (Section 9.3.3.1) and achieved results (Section 9.3.3.2).
9.3.3.1 Methodology
First of all, the goal of the survey is determining the usefulness of CooPeD, high-
lighting the circumstances under which its use would be desirable.
According to this goal, a total of 9 questions were elicited (Q1-Q9), being all of
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them pointed out in Figures 9.3-9.4. Note that in current WBSNs, tagging is the
only functionality related to co-ownership management. This is the reason why all
defined questions are mainly focused on the use of tags as a means of identifying
co-owners.
Afterwards, the survey, which consists of a brief introduction to CooPeD and
the proposed questions, was created in Google Drive4.
In last place, a crawler was developed to send the survey URL worldwide. This
program was run for 10 days. After three weeks since the crawler had stopped, 206
people have completed the survey. This amount of people was considered significant
and results were gathered.
9.3.3.2 Results of the study
Figures 9.3 and 9.4 depict results of the analysis in respect to each question indi-
vidually. Firstly, regarding Q1, 97.1% of respondents are WBSN users.
Secondly, the profile of potential users are analysed in Q2-Q5. From Q2 it is
highlighted that the majority of respondents, 78.6%, grant access to their data to
friends. Besides, in relation to Q3, 49% of the respondents affirm that they have
less than 100 photos in their profile and 45.1 % point out that they are tagged in a
reduced set of photos. Furthermore, concerning Q4, 45.1% of respondents have few
photos in which they are tagged, 29.6% are tagged in most of the photos, 23.3%
in about a half and 1.9% in all of them. However, as the plot associated with Q5
depicts, 81.1% of respondents are worried about photos in which they appear but
do not control.
Thirdly, the users expected satisfaction is studied regarding Q6-Q9. Results
from Q6 point out that a 52.4% of respondents have photos that would not like to
be entirely visualized by a person or a group of people. Moreover, concerning Q7,
81.6% of respondents agree with allowing that different users visualize the same
photo differently. Specifically, based on the analysis of Q8, 63.6% of respondents
4http://www.google.com/drive/, last access May 2014
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(a) Q1.Are you a user a social network? (b) Q2.What privacy preferences do
you generally specify in social networks?
(c) Q3.Estimate the number of pho-
tos you have on your profile
(d) Q4.In how many photos in which
you appear (either uploaded by your-
self of by one of your contacts) are you
labelled?
(e) Q5. Are you worried about what
might happen with photos in which
you are tagged even not being their
owner?
Figure 9.3: Survey study (I)
affirm that they would use the system, 10.2% that would not, 23.8% that only for
relevant photos and 2.4% in other cases. Furthermore, the plot related to Q9 shows
that 79.1% of respondents affirm that their interest in using CooPeD would increase
if sophisticated hidden techniques (e.g. replacement) were applied.
A deep analysis of the profile of respondents, who are WBSN users, is depicted in
Table 9.9. In general, respondents choose “Friends” as privacy preferences (Q2) no
matter the amount of photos they have in their profiles (Q3). In particular, 75.47%
of respondents who have less than 100 photos in their profiles, 86.76% of respondents
198 Chapter 9. Evaluation
(a) Q6. Do you have photos you would
not want someone (or group of people )
to see them completely?
(b) Q7. As a photo owner, would you
agree with the fact that different users
visualize the same photo in a different
way?
(c) Q8. Would you use the proposed
system?
(d) Q9. Would your interest in us-
ing the system increase if the hiding
technique was sophisticated?
Figure 9.4: Survey study (II)
who have between 100 and 500 photos in their profiles and 75% of respondents
who have more than 500 photos in their profiles, have established “Friends” as
privacy preferences. Moreover, regardless of the chosen privacy preferences (Q2)
or the amount photos users have in their profiles (Q3), respondents are worried
about photos in which they are tagged (Q5). Indeed, all the respondents who
have established privacy preferences as “Public”, having less than 100 photos and
having between 100 and 500 photos in their profiles, are worried about being tagged.
Therefore, it can be concluded that co-ownership access control management is
worth studying regardless of the kinds of users.
On the other hand, it should be recalled that CooPeD focuses on processing
decomposable objects according to owners and co-owners privacy preferences grant-
ing access to the appropriate objects’ parts. Thus, different users can visualize the
same object in a different way. In this regard, Table 9.10 analyses the amount
of respondents who, being WBSN users, are potential users of CooPeD. 85.40%
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Table 9.9: Analysis of users’ profiles, relative percentages
Q3 Q2 Q5
Estimate the number of photos What privacy preferences Are you worried about
you have on your profile do you generally specify what might happen with photos
in social networks? in which you are tagged even
not being their owner?
Answer # responses (%) Answer # responses (%) Answer # responses (%)
Less than 100
106 (53.27%)
Public 3 (2.83%)
Yes 3 (100%)
No 0 (0%)
Only me 15 (14.15%)
Yes 13 (86.67%)
No 2 (13.33%)
Friends 80 (75.47%)
Yes 65 (81.25%)
No 15 (18.75%)
Friends of friends 2 (1.89%)
Yes 1 (50%)
No 1 (50%)
Groups 6 (5.66%)
Yes 6 (100%)
No 0 (0%)
Between 100 and
500
69 (34.67%)
Public 2 (2.90%)
Yes 0 (0%)
No 2 (100.0%)
Only me 0 (0%)
Yes 0 (0%)
No 0 (0%)
Friends 60 (86.76%)
Yes 54 (90.00%)
No 6 (10.00%)
Friends of friends 5 (7.25%)
Yes 1 (20.00%)
No 4 (80.00%)
Groups 2 (2.90%)
Yes 1 (50.00%)
No 1 (50.00%)
More than 500
24 (12.06%)
Public 1 (4.17%)
Yes 1 (100.0%)
No 0 (0%)
Only me 0 (0%)
Yes 0 (0%)
No 0 (0%)
Friends 18 (75%)
Yes 12 (66.67%)
No 6 (33.33%)
Friends of friends 1 (4.17%)
Yes 0 (0%)
No 1 (100.0%)
Groups 4 (16.67%)
Yes 3 (75.00%)
No 1 (25.00%)
of respondents who have photos which they want to show partially (Q6:yes), allow
different visualizations of a photo by different users (Q7:yes). Likewise, from the set
of respondents who do not have photos to hide partially (Q6:no), 78.35% of them
also allow different users to visualize the same photo in a different way (Q7:yes).
Additionally, the analysis of users who would use the system (Q8) is essen-
tial to identify potential users. From the set of respondents who accept different
visualization of a photo (Q7:yes) and have photos to disclose partially (Q6:yes),
86.68% of them would use the system in any case and 18.18% for relevant photos.
Furthermore, from the set of respondents that allow a different visualization of a
photo (Q7:yes) and assuming that respondents who do not currently have photos
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Table 9.10: Analysis of potential users, relative percentages
Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9
Do you have photos you As a photo owner, would you Would you use the proposed Would your interest in
would not want someone agree with the fact that different system? using the system increase if
(or group of people) to users visualize the same photo the hiding technique
see them completely? in a different way? was sophisticated?
Answer # responses (%) Answer # responses (%) Answer # responses (%) Answer # responses (%)
Yes 103 (51.50%)
Yes 88 (85.40%)
Yes 71 (80.68%)
Yes 63 (88.73%)
No 8 (11.27%)
No 1 (1.14%)
Yes 1 (100.0%)
No 0 (0%)
Only relevant 16 (18.18%)
Yes 14 (87.5%)
No 2 (12.5%)
No 15 (14.56%)
Yes 9 (60.00%)
Yes 7 (77.78%)
No 2 (22.22%)
No 3 (20.00%)
Yes 2 (66.67%)
No 1 (33.33%)
Only relevant 3 (20.00%)
Yes 2 (66.67%)
No 1 (33.33%)
No 97 (48.50%)
Yes 76 (78.35%)
Yes 44 (57.89%)
Yes 37 (84.09%)
No 7 (15.91%)
No 6 (7.89%)
Yes 3 (50.0%)
No 3 (50.0%)
Only relevant 26 (34.21%)
Yes 21 (80.77%)
No 5 (19.23%)
No 21 (21.65%)
Yes 7 (33.33%)
Yes 4 (57.14%)
No 3 (42.86%)
No 10 (47.62%)
Yes 2 (20.0%)
No 8 (80.0%)
Only relevant 4 (19.05%)
Yes 1 (25.0%)
No 3 (75.0%)
*: potential users.
to disclose partially (Q6:no) they may have in the future, 57.89% of them would
use CooPeD in any case and 32.21% for relevant photos. Note that the remaining
set of cases (namely, namely, Q6:yes/no followed by Q7:no) are not relevant for
the analysis because respondents involved in such sets do not allow a photo to be
differently visualized by different users and it is essential to use CooPeD.
In the light of the foregoing results, potential users of CooPeD corresponds to
respondents who having or not photos to partially disclose (Q6:yes or no), allow a
photo to be differently visualized by different users (Q7:yes) and would use the sys-
tem in any case (Q8:yes) or for relevant photos (Q8:only relevant). Thus, identified
in Table 9.10 with symbol , potential users correspond to 78.5% (
71164426 100
200 )
of the set of respondents who are WBSN users and 76.2% (
71164426 100
206 ) in
respect to the total amount of respondents.
As a final remark, from Table 9.10 it is noticed that, in general, the interest of
using the system would increase (Q9:yes) in case of applying hiding sophisticated
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techniques. More specifically, respondents who would use the system in any case or
for relevant photos are the most interested in applying hiding sophisticated tech-
niques. Besides, the interest of respondents who would not use the system would
also increase applying such hiding techniques.
9.4 Evaluation of U+F
This Section presents the evaluation of U+F from a theoretical (Section 9.4.1) and
an experimental (Section 7.2.2) point of view.
9.4.1 Theoretical evaluation
Looking backward at U+F, the goal of this protocol is the development of an ar-
chitecture along with a protocol to achieve interoperability and reusability between
multiple WBSNs. The theoretical evaluation is carried out discussing the satisfac-
tion of established requirements (Section 9.4.1.1) and analysing the performance of
the protocol (Section 9.4.1.2).
9.4.1.1 Requirements evaluation
In this Section the degree of satisfaction of requirements presented in Section 7.2.2
is analysed.
Concerning interoperability and reusability in regard to direct rela-
tionships, it is achieved due to the decentralization of identity data, resources and
access control policies management, being all of them stored in IdPs, Hosts and
AMs respectively. Data can be replaced, moved or updated without affecting any
service of WBSNs. Moreover, different WBSNs can make use of the same resources,
identity data and access control policies if the same IdPs, Host and AMs are linked
to them. More specifically, regarding interoperability, the use of the same identity
data specification, FOAF files in this case, and the use of a concrete application
of UMA, including the specification of claims and the Fat Requester, address this
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issue.
The second requirement is resources and identity data confidentiality and
access control. This protocol is based on UMA and adds a concrete claims man-
agement mechanism. In a nutshell, access control focuses on the satisfaction of
access control policies after proving the appropriate claims, that include a proof of
the existence of a relationship between the administrator of the requested resources
or identity data and the requester. Afterwards, a token, with a particular expiration
time, is delivered according to the satisfied policies and then, access is granted until
the token expires. Indeed, the expiration time is essential to avoid adversaries using
tokens some time after their delivery. Nonetheless, tokens expiration time does not
have to be too long because if tokens are accessed, adversaries could use them.
Besides, when the token is presented to IdPs or Hosts to get the requested
resources or identity data, its verification asserts that the entity which presents the
token is the same one to which the token was initially delivered, thereby preventing
impersonations of IdPs and Hosts.
In addition, WBSNs may act on behalf of users and get access to data while
users are logged. Therefore, to prevent WBSNs from acting on behalf of users when
they are not logged, each user authenticates himself against his Host and IdP in
the log-in and log-out in the WBSN.
Other requirement is resources and identity data integrity. SSL, or other
channel with analogous characteristics, is applied in the protocol to guarantee that
adversaries do not alter messages content, thus reaching integrity of resources and
identity data. Moreover, this channel also prevents adversaries getting access to
interchanged data.
The third requirement is chain of trust. Users establish is their IdPs, Hosts,
AMs and WBSNs the appropriate lists of trusted IdP CAs, WBSN CAs and WB-
SNs. Then, some interchanged messages are signed by issuer entities as well as by
passing-through entities to finally verify that signer entities are within stored lists.
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Thus, being in a list means being trusted. In particular, messages related to the ac-
quisition of claims are properly signed by IdPs and AMs and messages interchanged
between WBSNs are signed by the WBSN at which the user requests access.
As a result, lists of trusted entities and signatures are mechanisms apply to
prevent WBSNs and IdPs impersonations. Indeed, it should be noticed that having
different certificates for signing (delivered by IdP CAs and WBSN CAs) and au-
thenticating (applied in the communication channel using e.g. SSL) helps to make
difficult IdPs and WBSNs impersonations. This is comparable with devices like the
Spanish national identity card (DNIe) which owns both an authentication and a
signature certificate to prevent unauthorized uses.
On the other hand, access the minimum identity data is related to claims
management. For example, the easiest way would be the interchange of complete
FOAF files between WBSNs. Nevertheless, to satisfy the proposed requirement,
identity data interchanged between WBSNs is limited to users identifiers and the
WBSNs in which users are enrolled in.
9.4.1.2 Performance analysis
Trying to attain more specific results and recalling the U+F access control man-
agement is based on SoNeUCON model, this Section analyses the performance
of U+F execution phases and SoNeUCON managed features. In particular, the
number of messages exchanged, the number of entities involved, the number of
performed signatures and the amount of signatures verifications, are analysed.
Protocol phases analysis Table 9.11 presents the performance analysis per each
protocol phase (Ph). Besides, in order to have a general perception of U+F exe-
cutions, phases related to a user logs in to a WBSN (Ph2) and a user accesses a
contact’s data (Ph3) are studied regarding the worst and best case. In relation
to the worst case, it is assumed that all messages of the protocol are interchanged
because no data is stored and reused. On the contrary, according to the best case,
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Table 9.11: U+F theoretical evaluation: protocol phases
Phases Entities Signatues Signatures # Messages
verification
(Ph1)Initialization I+H+A+1 * * 12 I H  2  A
(Ph1.1)Entities registration I+H+A+1 * * 10 I H  2  A
(Ph1.2)Registration of I+H * * 2 I H
resources and identity data
(Ph1.3)Specification of 1+S * * *
information in WBSNs
Worst case
(Ph2)Log-in 6+CI CWBSN 2 2 24
(Ph2.1)Authentication * * * *
(Ph2.2)FOAF file acquisition 3+CI CWBSN 1 1 12
(Ph2.3)Resource acquisition 3+CI CWBSN 1 1 12
(Ph3)Access direct contact 13+CI CWBSN 12 12 50
(Ph3.1)FOAF file acquisition 6+CI CWBSN 6 6 25
(Ph3.2)Resource acquisition 7+CI CWBSN 6 6 25
Best case
(Ph2)Log-in 6+CI CWBSN 2 1 17
(Ph2.1)Authentication * * * *
(Ph2.2)FOAF file acquisition 3+CI CWBSN 1 1 11
(Ph2.3)Resource acquisition 3+CI CWBSN 1 0 5
(Ph3)Access direct contact 13+CI CWBSN 2 4 18
(Ph3.1)FOAF file acquisition 6+CI CWBSN 1 4 9
(Ph3.2)Resource acquisition 7+CI CWBSN 1 0 9
N: (# of users in the relationship)-1, NA1 H: # of Hosts of a user
I: # of IdPs of a user Cx: # of IdP CAs and WBSN CAs, where x is I or WBSN
A: # of AMs of a user regarding the type of CA
: an element/ action not detailed - : an element/ action not required
it is assumed that tokens are stored and reused.
From Table 9.11 some relevant features can be inferred. Regarding the number
of messages exchanged, the quantity of messages in the initialization phase (Ph1) is
significant. In particular, the amount of messages increase concerning the number
of Hosts, IdPs and AMs used in the registration phase (Ph1.1). Similarly, in the
registration of resources and identity data (Ph1.2), messages increase according to
the number of used IdPs and Hosts. Nonetheless, the most significant exchange
of messages corresponds to the acquisition of resources which, in the worst case,
corresponds to 12 in the log-in phase (Ph2.3) and 25 in accessing to a contact’s
data (Ph3.2). Nonetheless, considering the repeated use of claims and tokens, as it
is shown in the best case, the number of messages can be significantly lower, 5 in
the log-in phase (Ph2.3) and 9 accessing to a contact’s data (Ph3.2).
In what concerns entities, the use of multiple AMs, Hosts and IdPs is specially
significant in registration processes (Ph1.1). Nonetheless, the use of a huge quantity
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of these entities is not expected. For example, one IdP per user is expected.
Last but not least, signatures are applied in claims authentication. A total
of 6 signatures and signatures verifications are performed in the worst case when
acquiring a contact’s identity data (Ph2.1) and a contact’s resource (Ph2.2). By
contrast, in the best case, the number of signatures and signatures verifications is
significantly reduced.
9.4.2 Experimental evaluation
To empirically analyse the performance of the protocol and evaluate the applicabil-
ity of U+F, a prototype has been implemented (Section 9.4.2.1) and its temporal
workload has been measured (Section 9.4.2.2). Besides, results have been compared
with two challenging WBSNs, Facebook and MySpace (Section 9.4.2.3).
9.4.2.1 U+F prototype description
This Section presents the development of a prototype to prove the viability of
implementing U+F in a simulated environment. It is composed of two WBSNs,
FriendBook+v0 and MyLeisurev0. The general architecture is depicted in Figure
9.5. A couple of IdPs, a couple of Hosts, a couple of WBSNs and four AMs (one for
each Host and IdP) are the entities at stake. Thus, a total of eight servers are used
and located in different places along a local network. The key point is to verify that
data of MyLeisurev0 remains available to FriendBook+v0 and the other way round.
Users’ identity data (profile and contacts) corresponds to their name, nationality,
age, email, school and contacts relationships.
Firstly, the existence of a pair of users is assumed, Alice and Bob. Alice is
enrolled in FriendBook+v0 and Bob is enrolled in MyLeisurev0. Then, regarding
Figure 9.5, Alice establishes her identity data in IdP1, resources in Host1 and her
access control policies in AM IdP1 and AM Host1. By contrast, Bob establishes
his identity data in IdP2 and resources in Host2 and also uses a couple of AMs,
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Figure 9.5: Designed U+F prototype architecture
Figure 9.6: Alice access Bob’s data
AM IdP2 and AM Host2, to establish and manage access control policies. Af-
terwards, once Alice enrols in FriendBook+v0, IdP1 and Host1 are linked to it.
Likewise, when Bob enrols in MyLeisurev0, he specifies where his identity data and
resources are stored, that is, in IdP2 and Host2 respectively. The experimental
evaluation verifies that Alice from FriendBook+v0 is able to access Bob identity
data and resources in MyLeisurev0 as Figure 9.6 depicts.
Different technologies have been applied in the prototype development. J2EE
and J2SE 1.6 has been used for implementing the pair of proposed WBSNs,
FriendBook+v0 and MyLeisurev0. Glassfish 3.0.1 has been applied to manage IdPs,
Hosts and AMs and MySQL 5.2.27 to store data. Additionally, to measure network
communications, Firebug5 1.7.3 (a Firefox extension) has also been used. On the
5http://getfirebug.com/
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Table 9.12: Analysing the reuse of data in U+F
Worst Best % reuse Avg. Reuse fmaxReuse
case case %
# Messages (Ph1) Log-in 24 17 29,17
46.59
44.12 0,56 (1-44%)
(Ph2)Access a contact’s data 50 18 64
Signatures (Ph1) Log-in 2 2 0
41.66
(Ph2)Access a contact’s data 12 2 83.33
other hand, photos managed in this implementation have a size between 200kb and
300kb. This size is chosen as an average considering [177]. Moreover, the prototype
has been tested in a processor of 3.00GHz (2 CPUs) with 4096MB of RAM.
9.4.2.2 U+F temporal workload
The performance of the protocol is evaluated analysing the TW through the mea-
surement of the cost of accessing to the personal profile and personal photos pre-
sented in FriendBook+v0 (WBSN1) and the cost of accessing to a contact’s profile
and photos shown in MyLeisurev0 (WBSN2) (CdataAccess). Mentioned along the
protocol description, some elements (mainly tokens) can be reused and thus, except
in the acquisition of personal identity data which is the first data obtained, work-
load is multiplied by the amount of elements not reused, f. Depicted in Table 9.12
and based on the worst case (no elements are reused) and the best case (all possible
elements are reused) of the amount of performed signatures and interchanged mes-
sages when a user logs in to a WBSN (Ph2) and a user accesses a contact’s data
(Ph3) (recall Table 9.11), the average percentage of elements that can be reused is
44.12% at most, 46.59% regarding interchanged messages and 41.66% in regard to
signatures. Due to this analysis, f is 1 when elements are not reused, 0.78 if 50% of
elements are reused and 0.56 is case of reusing all possible elements, that is 44.12%.
As a result, the temporal workload TW is calculated as Equation 9.1 presents.
TW   CdataAccess  f (9.1)
The workload has been analysed computing the average of 10 executions without
the reuse of elements, that is, f   1. Plot depicted in Figure 9.7 presents the
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Figure 9.7: U+F temporal workload
Figure 9.8: U+F temporal workload reused
workload achieved in the protocol’s phases (Ph). In particular, 1,176 ms are required
to access the profile (FOAF file) in WBSN1 (Ph2.2), 1,174 ms to access to a photo
(resource) in WBSN1 (Ph2.3), 1,969 ms to access to a profile in WBSN2 (Ph3.1)
and 1,489 ms to access to a photo in WBSN2 (Ph3.2). As expected, it increases
when obtaining data of other WBSN, that is, accessing data of a direct contact.
The difference of accessing to data in WBSN in relation to WBSN2 is 793 ms for
profiles and 315 ms for photos. These results are reasonable because photos are
immediately delivered once the access token is presented and in the other case the
requested FOAF file has to be processed. In other words, instead of delivering the
whole FOAF file, a reduced one is created according to established access control
policies.
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On the other hand, Figure 9.8 presents the TW according to established values
of f. From the analysis the importance of reusing is noticeable. In particular, if
elements are not reused (f   1) 1,173 ms, 915 ms and 657 ms are the TW accessing
to a photo in WBSN1 (Ph2.3), to a profile in WBSN2 (Ph3.1) and to a photo
in WBSN2 (Ph3.2) respectively. On the contrary, considering an average reuse
(f   0.78), the workload is 1,969 ms, 1,536 ms and 1,103 ms and in case of the
maximum reuse (f   0.56) the workload is 1,489 ms, 1,161 ms and 834 ms.
9.4.2.3 Temporal workload comparison
U+F has been compared with a pair of currently successful WBSNs, Facebook and
MySpace. To perform the comparison a pair of accounts have been created in both
WBSNs (two users per WBSN) and they have been connected such that each user
has a contact. Moreover, the same set of photos uploaded to FriendBook+v0 and
MyLeisurev0 has been uploaded to the created accounts. Afterwards, using Firebug
1.7.3 (a Firefox extension), the TW of getting the personal profile (obtained when
logging) and a personal photo and the workload of getting the profile and a photo of
a contact has been measured. Note that although the prototype does not implement
the authentication, that is included in the login phase, the prototype workload of
accessing to the personal profile of a user can be compared with the one measured
in Facebookv0 and MySpacev0 because authentication techniques of WBSNs like
these are based on passwords and thus, the workload of such technique can be
disregarded.
Results are depicted in Figure 9.9. The TW regarding the access to the personal
profile (Ph2.2), to a personal photo (Ph2.3), to other user’s profile (Ph3.1) and to
other user’s photo (Ph3.2) is, in Facebook, 4,052 ms, 766 ms, 2,556 ms and 624 ms,
in MySpace, 4,423 ms, 626 ms, 1,438 ms and 842 ms and, in the prototype, 1,175
ms, 1,173 ms, 1,964 ms and 1,489 ms, respectively. Results show that accessing
to the personal profile in MySpace produces the highest workload. This issue is
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Figure 9.9: Temporal workload comparison
caused by the fact that MySpace profiles include photos and videos. Indeed, it
is expected that MySpace or Facebook profiles produce higher workload than the
prototype because they are much more richer. By contrast, the prototype produces
the highest workload accessing to photos. As expected, the workload is specially
significant when accessing data of a user enrolled in other WBSN, differing 547 ms
and 647 ms from MySpace and 407 and 865 ms from Facebook when accessing a
personal photo(Ph2.3) and a photo of other user (Ph3.2) respectively.
Summing up, there are a couple of points to highlight against and in favour
of the developed prototype. On the negative side, in the executions performed
for this experimental evaluation, entities (IdPs, Host,...) run in a local network
and CdataAccess may be higher in a real environment, e.g. network delays. On
the positive side, contrary to the prototype, it is presumable that big companies,
which develop WBSNs like Facebook and MySpace and LinkedIn, own robust and
efficient infrastructures and mechanisms, for instance cache servers, which help to
speed users’ requests, thereby achieving successful CdataAccess times. This is not
the case of the developed prototype. In conclusion, from the authors’ point of
view, taking into account the challenge of dealing with indirect relationships in an
interoperable environment, the workload of eU+F can be considered reasonable.
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9.5 Evaluation of eU+F
Following the same evaluation procedure as for U+F, the extended protocol is
evaluated theoretically (Section 9.5.1) and empirically (Section 9.5.2).
9.5.1 Theoretical evaluation
Firstly, the satisfaction of eU+F requirements is analysed (Section 9.5.1.1). Sec-
ondly, a performance analysis is carried out (Section 9.5.1.2).
9.5.1.1 Requirements evaluation
eU+F has to fulfil all proposed requirements (Section 8.2.2). In this regard, in the
following paragraphs each of them is analysed, identifying their level of satisfaction.
Interoperability and reusability in respect to direct and indirect re-
lationships is the first noticeable requirement. Alike U+F, both features are
achieved decentralizing identity data, resources and access control policies manage-
ment. More specifically, indirect relationships are managed through the inclusion of
element depth within claims and the management of relationship proofs concerning
users involved in them.
The following requirement is data privacy preservation against WBSNs
and it is divided in two. On the one hand, WBSNs can not access users’ data because
data as well as decryption keys are encrypted and their decryption is performed
at users’ browsers, achieving data exposure minimization. Indeed, resources are
stored encrypted and identity data and decryption keys are encrypted once being
delivered. Then, even an adversary with a valid access token could get access to
data. Similarly, AMs impersonations are avoided by signatures of claims requests,
together with the encryption of resources and identity data because, neither IdPs
would deliver claims to AMs if claims signature verifications fail, nor a single entity
even owning a token deliver by a malicious AM would get access to encrypted
resources and identity data.
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Furthermore, it should be noticed that the local decryption must be performed
under security constraints, that is, decrypted data cannot leave the user’s browser.
Furthermore, the fact that Hosts store encrypted resources and, analogous to WB-
SNs, they cannot access data is remarkable.
On the other hand, as in U+F, access the minimum data is related to claims
management. In case of indirect relationships, data interchanged among WBSNs is
restricted to proofs that certify the relationship between the administrator of the
requested data and the requester. Therefore, this requirement is satisfied to a very
large extent, though leaving as an open issue that WBSNs know the relationships
proofs.
To conclude, simple key management is the last requirement. The proposed
cryptographic schemes suppose the creation of as many asymmetric key pairs and
symmetric keys as desired. However, assuming that keys are indispensable in any
cryptographic approach, in the proposed schemes they are not interchanged out of
band. Then, key management is simplified. Indeed, removing out of band inter-
changes of keys prevents from possible management confusions either intentionally
or not. Besides, considering the large quantity of WBSNs and the amount of estab-
lished relationships, out of band interchanges may become unmanageable.
9.5.1.2 Performance analysis
This evaluation analyses the performance of every eU+F execution phase, eU+F
access control management features according to SoNeUCONABC model and pro-
posed cryptographic schemes. Specifically, the number of entities involved, the
number of encryptions and decryptions carried out, the number of signatures and
signatures verification performed and the number of messages interchanged are eval-
uated.
Protocol phases analysis Table 9.13 analyses each protocol phase (Ph) in the
worst and best case, that is when elements are not reused and when all possible
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elements are reused. Note that data exposure minimization techniques are studied
in the following Section.
Table 9.13: eU+F theoretical evaluation: protocol phases
Phases Entities Encryptions Decryptions Signatures Signatures # Messages
verification
(Ph1)Initialization 2 I  2  H R * * * 12 I H
A+S +2 2 A
(Ph1.1)Entities I+H+A+ * * * * 10 I H
registration 1 2 A
(Ph1.2)Registration of I+H R * * * 2 I H
resources and identity
data
(Ph1.3)Specification of 1+S * * * * *
information in WBSNs
Worst case
(Ph2)Login 6+2  CI+ - 1 4 4 24
2  CWBSN+ 2  CA
(Ph2.1)Authentication * * * * * *
(Ph2.2)FOAF file 3+CI+CWBSN+ - - 2 2 12
acquisition CA
(Ph2.3)Resource 3+CI+CWBSN+ - 1 2 2 12
acquisition CA
(Ph3)Access to 13+2  CI+ 2  CWBSN+ 4 4 16 16 50
direct contact 2  CA
(Ph3.1)FOAF file 6+CI+CWBSN+ 2 2 8 8 25
acquisition CA
(Ph3.2)Resource 7+CI+CWBSN+ 2 2 8 8 25
acquisition CA
(Ph4)Access to 6 + 7  N  2  CI+ 4  N  1 4  N  1 16  N  1 16  N  1 50  N  1
indirect contact 2  CWBSN+2  CA
(Ph4.1)FOAF file 3  N  1 CI+ 2  N  1 2  N  1 8  N  1 8  N  1 25  N  1
acquisition CWBSN+CA
(Ph4.2)Resource 3 + 4  N CI+ 2  N  1 2  N  1 8  N  1 8  N  1 25  N  1
acquisition CWBSN+CA
Best case
(Ph2)Login 6+2  CI+ - 1 2 2 18
2  CWBSN+ 2  CA
(Ph2.1)Authentication * * * * * *
(Ph2.2)FOAF file 3+CI+CWBSN+ - - 2 2 12
acquisition CA
(Ph2.3)Resource 3+CI+CWBSN+ - 1 - - 6
acquisition CA
(Ph3)Access to 13+2  CI+ 4 4 2 2 18
direct contact 2  CWBSN+2  CA
(Ph3.1)FOAF file 6+CI+CWBSN+ 2 2 1 1 9
acquisition CA
(Ph3.2)Resource 7+CI+CWBSN+ 2 2 1 1 9
acquisition CA
(Ph4)Access to 6 + 7  N  2  CI+ 4 N  1 4 N  1 2 N  1 2 N  1 18  N  1
indirect contact 2  CWBSN+2  CA
(Ph4.1)FOAF file 3  N  1 +CI+ 2  N  1 2  N  1 1  N  1 1  N  1 9  N  1
acquisition CWBSN+CA
(Ph4.2)Resource 3 + 4  N + CI+ 2  N  1 2  N  1 1  N  1 1  N  1 9  N  1
acquisition CWBSN+CA
N: relationship length, NA1 H: # of Hosts of a user
I: # of IdPs of a user R: # of resources of a user
A: # of AMs of a user or A regarding the type of CA
: an element/ action not detailed - : an element/ action not required
Cx: # of IdP CAs, AM CAs and WBSN CAs, where x is I, WBSN
Regarding the amount of entities the protocol involves, the use of IdPs, Hosts
and AMs is particularly noticeable in the initialization (Ph1) because relationships
between all entities that interact along the protocol are established in this phase.
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Besides, a significant amount of entities come into play when accessing data of an
indirect contact (Ph4), that is, the longer the relationship being processed, the
higher the number of involved entities.
Encryption is applied for a couple of issues. On the one hand, in the initialization
(Ph1) resources are encrypted and uploaded to chosen Hosts. On the other hand,
encryption protects the delivery of claims. AMs encrypt data involved in requested
claims and IdPs encrypt such requested data to be sent to AMs. Besides, it should
be noticed that the number of encryptions increases when accessing data of an
indirect contact (Ph4) because more claims are requested.
Related to encryption, decryptions are executed at claims management and at
resources acquisition. In the end of this Section and associated with data exposure
minimization, cryptographic operations are deeply analysed.
Signatures are other elements at stake. They are applied to verify the chain of
trust which is created between entities that interchange messages. Signatures are
performed by AMs when requesting claims, by IdPs when delivering claims and by
WBSNs when sending messages to other WBSNs. Again, the number of signatures
increases when accessing data of an indirect contact (Ph4) because more claims and
interactions among WBSNs are carried out. Nonetheless, the number of signatures
when accessing data of a direct (Ph3) or of an indirect contact (Ph4) in the best
case is significantly lower than in the worst case, namely, 2 and 2 N  1 in the
best case and 16 and 16 N  1 in the worst case respectively.
Following expectations, the number of signatures verification is equivalent to
the number of signatures. In general, IdPs, AMs and WBSNs create signatures and
IdPs and AMs verify them.
Last but not least, the amount of messages involved in eU+F is remarkable.
The number of interchanged messages when accessing data of an indirect contact
(Ph4) is specially significant. However, it can decrease when tokens and claims are
reused because the reuse avoids requesting tokens to AMs and claims to IdPs. In
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particular, 50 N  1 messages are interchanged in the worst case and 18 N  1
in the best case when accessing an indirect contact located at length N.
Analysing the management of SoNeUCONABC features and usage control
eU+F can be extended to manage all WBSN features, namely, direction, flexible
elements is access control policies, cliques, distance, common-contacts and multi-
paths, and usage control (recall Section 8.5).
On the one hand, the management of all WBSN features involves the defini-
tion and evaluation of access control policies according to SoNeUCONABC policy
language (Section 4.3). Then, the construction of rt and the latter verification of
access control policies are the points of analysis. However, the evaluation of access
control policies can be compared with the study presented in Section 9.1.2.2 and
then, the construction of rt in a decentralized architecture like the one proposed in
eU+F, is the subject to study.
The TW constructing rt increases according to the sum of all visited users at
each path length, that is, PKi 1ηi where η refers to the average number of users’
contacts and K corresponds to the path length from 1 to 6 (recall Section 9.1.2.1).
The analysis of rt construction is depicted in Table 9.14. From this table, it is
noticed that constructing rt requires a significant number of entities, 2 PKi 1ηi)+1
in particular. It involves an IdP and a WBSN per users’ contact, as well as the
AM of the administrator (the owner of the requested resource or identity data) to
evaluate access control policies. Then, the number of encryptions corresponds to
the number of users’ contacts, such that all IdPs encrypt claims and the AM of the
administrator verifies them. Likewise, the number of interchanged messages is also
remarkable, that is 4 + 6 PKi 1ηi-1. They are interchanged among the AM of the
administrator and all appropriate WBSNs and IdPs of users’ contacts.
As a result, although eU+F may allow the construction of rt, its application
would be impractical in the majority of cases, because the amount of entities and
messages that this process involves, would result in an intolerable waiting time for
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Table 9.14: eU+F theoretical evaluation: full support of SoNeUCONABC
Phases Entities Encryptions Decryptions Signatures Signatures # Messages
verification
rt 2  PKi 1ηi  1 PKi 1ηi PKi 1ηi 2  PKi 1ηi  1  1 2  PKi 1ηi  1  1 4  6  PKi 1ηi  1
construction
Attributes I+2 I SI STTP I S TTP I S TTP I S TTP I S TTP I+2 I SI STTP
management
I: # of IdPs of a user K: path length 6 6 TTP: # of TTPs of a user
S : connector OR η: average number of contacts per user
information retrieval, that is greater than 2,000 ms (Section 9.1.2.3). For instance,
regarding rt id   9, which is composed of 27,114 explored nodes and depicted in
Table 9.4 (Section 9.1.2.3), the TW of performing the enforcement of P1 is 712 ms
(712 ms the construction of rt and @1 ms the evaluation of P1 in rt). As explored
nodes are 27,114, the amount of interchanged messages would be 162,682. There-
fore, even assuming that the minimum TW for interchanging a message between a
pair of entities is 0.1 ms, the TW of performing the enforcement of P1 would take
16,268 ms and it highly exceeds the tolerable waiting time for information retrieval.
On the other hand, the analysis of attributes updates, additions or deletions,
related to usage control, is also depicted in Table 9.14. Contrary to the construction
of rt, attributes updates can be easily managed in eU+F. In case of ATT S or
ATT E updates, IdPs, TTPs and IdPs and a pair of WBSNs per IdP become
involved. Likewise, Hosts notify ATT O updates.
Note that policies updates, additions or deletions are not analysed because the
process only involves an AM which, after identifying changes, re-evaluate policies
accordingly (recall Section 8.5).
Data exposure minimization analysis An analysis of the cryptographic al-
ternatives described in Section 8.4 is performed distinguishing the acquisition of
identity data and the acquisition of resources. Results are presented in Table 9.15.
Note that this study focuses on cryptographic matters and it is not attached to the
rest of eU+F messages.
Regarding entities involved in Traditional PKC and IBE-based PKC, the latter
technique applies a new group of entities called IBE authorities.
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Table 9.15: eU+F theoretical evaluation: data exposure minimization
Phases Entities Encryptions Decryptions Signatures Signatures # Messages
verification
Traditional PKC - 2 3 2 2 3
FOAF file acquisition - 1 1 1 1 -
Resources acquisition - 1 2 1 1 3
IBE-based PKC C19C2 2 3 - - 3
FOAF file acquisition C1 1 1 - - -
Resources acquisition C2 1 2 - - 3
Cx: set x of # of IBE authorities - : an element/ action not required
According to encryption, both techniques require the same number of opera-
tions. IdPs create FOAF files and encrypt them once delivered. Likewise, resources
acquisition involves the encryption of resources decryption keys.
On the other hand, the number of decryptions acquiring FOAF files and re-
sources differs. FOAF files acquisition simply focuses on decrypting requested files.
By contrast, resources decryption requires, first, decrypting the resources decryp-
tion key and subsequently, applying this key to decrypt the resources.
In relation to signatures, they are only applied in Traditional PKC when ac-
quiring requesters’ public keys. These keys are signed and delivered by requesters’
IdPs to be properly verified by administrators’ IdPs.
Finally, both techniques involve the interchange of three new messages. These
messages are used to get resources decryption keys.
9.5.2 Experimental evaluation
The experimental evaluation corresponds to the analysis of eU+F through the ex-
tension of the prototype developed to evaluate U+F (Section 9.4.2.1). First, Section
9.5.2.1 briefly describes the developed prototype. Second, Section 9.5.2.2 presents
the experimental results regarding the measurement of the protocol temporal work-
load and its comparison with Facebook and MySpace.
9.5.2.1 eU+F prototype description
The prototype developed to evaluate eU+F is an extension of the one devel-
oped to evaluate U+F. Consequently, WBSNs are referred as FriendBook+v1 and
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Figure 9.10: Designed eU+F prototype architecture
MyLeisurev1, being verified that a user enrolled in FriendBook+v1 can access data
in MyLeisurev1. For simplicity reasons, the prototype only works with direct rela-
tionships, and obtained performance results allow to get estimated figures of perfor-
mance of the protocol for indirect relationships. Indeed, noticed in Section 8.3.2.2,
an indirect relationship can be defined as multiple direct ones.
Concerning the prototype architecture, depicted in Figure 9.10, apart from es-
tablishing access control policies, Alice and Bob establish resources decryption keys
in IdP1 and IdP2 and encrypt resources in Host1 and Host2 respectively.
Analogous to U+F evaluation, applied technologies are J2EE and J2SE 1.6,
Glassfish 3.0.1, MySQL 5.2.27 and Firebug 1.7.3. Likewise, photos have a size be-
tween 200kb and 300kb. On the other hand, in respect to cryptographic algorithms,
the Traditional PKC scheme is implemented (Section 8.4.1). In relation to sym-
metric cryptography, AES 128 is used to encrypt/ decrypt resources (photos). By
contrast, RSA 2048 is the applied asymmetric cryptography algorithm. Besides, it
is assumed that each user owns a certificate and a private key of length 2048 bytes.
9.5.2.2 eU+F temporal workload
The temporal workload of the protocol is measured in this Section. More specifically,
the access to personal identity data (profile), the access to a personal resource
(photo), the access to a direct contact identity data (profile) and the access to
a direct contact resource (photo) are analysed. With these results, the workload
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Table 9.16: Analysing the reuse of data in eU+F
Worst Best % reuse Avg. Reuse fmaxReuse
case case %
# Messages (Ph2)Log-in 24 18 25
51
59.87 0,41 (1-59%)
(Ph3)Access direct contact 50 18 64
(Ph4)Access indirect contact 50 18 64
Signatures (Ph2)Log-in 4 2 50
68.75(Ph3)Access direct contact 16 2 87.5
(Ph4)Access indirect contact 16 2 87.5
of accessing an indirect contact identity data and an indirect contact resource is
estimated and analysed.
The total workload of performing any kind of access is measured as the cost
of interchanging protocol messages until reached the requested data (CdataAccess)
multiplied by a parameter f (recall it refers to not reused information) plus the cost
of performing the required decryptions (CdataDecryption), Equation 9.2. Moreover,
as in U+F, an analysis regarding possible values of f is performed by comparing
the number of signatures carried out and the number of messages interchanged in
the worst case (no elements are reused) and in the best case (all possible elements
are reused) when a user logs in to a WBSN (Ph2), a user accesses a direct contact’s
data (Ph3) and a user accesses an indirect contact’s data (Ph4) (recall Table 9.13).
Considering that reusing is unachievable regarding the acquisition of the personal
identity data because it is the first requested data, the performed analysis, presented
in Table 9.16, shows that 68.75% of signatures and 51% of messages are reused,
concluding that, on average, the maximum level of reuse is 59.87%. Consequently,
three values of f are considered, f is 1 when not a single piece of data is reused,
0.70 when 50% of data is reused and 0.41 when all data is reused, that is 59.87%.
The workload has been measured as the average of 10 executions and executions
have been carried out without supposing the reuse of any element (f=1).
Ctotal   CdataAccess  f CdataDecryption (9.2)
According to these features, plot presented in Figure 9.11 depicts the total
workload of accessing to the profile and to a photo of a user registered in WBSN1
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Figure 9.11: Temporal costs comparison
(FriendBook+v1) and to the profile and to a photo of a direct contact enrolled in
WBSN2 (MyLeisurev1). Furthermore, the workload regarding the individual costs
of CdataAccess and CdataDecryption in the worst case, that is, f=1, is also presented.
It is identified that CdataAccess implies a high workload while, CdataDecryption is
rather small. Although cryptographic operations depend on the applied algorithm,
the decryption scheme draws satisfactory results. Decryptions take 86.83 ms on
average, 83.83 ms for profiles and 89.83 ms for photos. Recalling that profiles are
encrypted with an asymmetric algorithm and photos with a symmetric one, and
considering the fact that asymmetric algorithms are generally slower than symmet-
ric algorithms, results may be cause because photos are bigger in size than profiles
and then, the workload is rather similar.
Analysing the same features as in the previous plot, except for the access to the
profile of a user registered in WBSN1 (because reuse is not possible), Figure 9.12
presents workloads in regard to different f values. It is remarkable that to achieve
successful results, reuse is a matter of concern. Besides, as expected, interoperabil-
ity between WBSN1 and WBSN2 increases the workload. The difference between
accessing to a particular data in WBSN1 and accessing to WBSN2 is 1,191.90 ms
when f=1, 834.33 ms when f=0.70 and 488.68 ms when f=0.41.
On the other hand, the establishment of indirect relationships is a challenging
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Figure 9.12: General temporal workload
goal achieved in eU+F but not implemented in the prototype. Nonetheless, as-
suming that an indirect relationship is composed of direct ones, the workload is
estimated as the cost of data acquisition multiplied by f and by the length of indi-
rect relationships (n) plus the cost of data decryption (see Equation 9.3). Therefore,
plots presented in Figures 9.13(a) and 9.13(b) show the estimated workload in re-
spect to different values of f and n, given that n is bounded to 6 due to theoretical
studies pointed out in Section 7.3.1.3.
Ctotal   CdataAccess  f   n CdataDecryption (9.3)
From the analysis it is identified that according to the longest indirect relation-
ship (n=6) in the worst case, f=1, about 20,851 ms are needed to access a chosen
profile and about 17,744 ms to a chosen photo. On the contrary, in the best case,
f=0.41 for n=6, about 8,549 ms and 7,275 ms are taken to access a profile and to
a photo respectively. Nevertheless, the reuse of data, for instance a user’s creden-
tial, is highly probable and the average workload can be taken as a representative
measure. In particular, for f=0.7, workload is 2,432 ms for n=1 and 14,596 ms for
n=6 to access a profile and 4,140 ms for n=1 and 12,421 ms for n=6 to access a
photo.
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(a) Access a profile
(b) Access a photo
Figure 9.13: Estimation of temporal workload for indirect relationships
A final remark is that parallelization is not an issue to consider because the
operation flow needs to be sequential, i.e. to get a resource you firstly need a
token. By contrast, precomputation, referred to as the process of getting tokens or
claims in advance, could be feasible. Nonetheless, obtaining claims may involve a
significant amount of work and then, the request of tokens and claims on demand
is expected to be a better alternative. Indeed, as pointed out in this evaluation, the
reuse of tokens and claims is the best choice to improve the TW.
9.5.2.3 Temporal workload comparison
The prototype (FriendBook+v1 and MyLeisurev1) workload is compared against
Facebook and MySpace. The same set of photos uploaded to this pair of WBSNs
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Figure 9.14: Prototype, Facebook and MySpace total cost comparison
is uploaded to FriendBook+v1 and MyLeisurev1. Then, the workload of accessing
the personal profile and a personal photo of a user enrolled in FriendBook+v1 or in
MyLeisurev1 and the workload of accessing the profile and a photo of a user enrolled
in the opposite WBSN, are measured.
Based on the workload of Facebook and MySpace, applied in U+F evaluation
(Section 9.4.2.1), and the measured workload of FriendBook+v1 and MyLeisurev1,
the comparison is presented in Figure 9.14. According to Equation 9.2, as in current
WBSNs cryptographic techniques are not applied, the analysed workload is bounded
to CdataAccess.
According to the protocol phases, this study compares temporal costs for ac-
cessing to the profile of a user when he logins in a WBSN (Ph2.2), to one of his
photos (Ph2.3) and to the profile and to a photo of a direct contact (Ph3.1 and
Ph3.2 respectively). These costs are respectively 3,529 ms, 1,878 ms, 3,432 ms and
2,913 ms for the prototype, whereas they are 4,423 ms, 626 ms, 1,438 ms and 842
ms in the case of MySpace and 4,052 ms, 766 ms, 2,556 ms and 624 ms in the case
of Fakebook. It is noticed that, as in U+F, accessing to a MySpace personal profile
produces the highest workload. However, either Facebook or MySpace workload
accessing to personal photos and to the profile and photos of a direct contact is
lower than in the proposed prototype. This issue is not surprising because reach-
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(a) Access a profile in Facebook (b) Access a photo in Facebook
(c) Access a profile in MySpace (d) Access a photo in MySpace
Figure 9.15: Facebook and MySpace indirect relationships comparison
ing interoperability is a challenging issue which expectedly produces a workload
increase. Moreover, already mentioned, the implementation is a prototype which is
far from being developed by powerful software and deployed on optimized hardware
mechanisms.
On the other hand, the relevance of indirect relationship management requires
its analysis. First of all, to establish comparable parameters and even not being cur-
rently possible, it is assumed that Facebook and MySpace allow the establishment
of indirect relationships of a maximum length of six. Then, given Equation 9.3,
the workload is calculated considering CdataAccess multiplied by each relationship
length. Besides, note that Facebook and MySpace, as far as we know, do not reuse
data because elements like tokens or claims are not used. Concerning this feature,
Figure 9.15 presents achieved results. On the whole, it is remarkable that Facebook
indirect relationship workload is similar to the developed prototype accessing to
a profile when 50% of elements are reused (f=0.7) and lower than the prototype
when accessing to a photo. By contrast, results show that, when accessing to a
profile MySpace workload is close to f = 0.41 in the prototype. However, the TW
9.6. Evaluation of U+F vs eU+F 225
accessing to a photo in MySpace is also lower than in the prototype although all
possible elements are reused, that is f = 0.41.
The final point to highlight is that, also analogous to U+F, the proposed pro-
totype has been executed on a local network, thereby being possible a workload
increase in a real scenario. However, their execution and implementation are not
supported by powerful techniques and mechanisms.
9.6 Evaluation of U+F vs eU+F
Apart form evaluating U+F and eU+F independently, the performance of a com-
parative assessment is worth studying. Both protocols have been evaluated under
the same bases and their comparison can be easily performed, either theoretically
or empirically as Sections 9.6.1 and 9.6.2 respectively present.
9.6.1 Performance analysis comparison
UMA and the FOAF project lay the bases of U+F and eU+F. In consequence, both
protocols share a significant set of elements. Table 9.17 compares the number of
involved entities, signatures, signatures verifications and messages interchanged in
each protocol. Identified from the table, in eU+F more signatures are required, a
new group of entities is added (AM Certification Authorities, AM CAs), CA, and
a new execution phase for indirect relationships management is developed.
Nonetheless, despite the amount of similarities between eU+F and U+F, mes-
sages content differs to a great extent. Comparing interchanged messages in eU+F
with those interchanged in U+F, the following features are distinguished:
 Tokens and claims requests are signed by the appropriate AMs.
 Requested claims are encrypted by AMs and decripted by IdPs. Conversely,
IdPs encrypt requested claims and AMs decrypt them.
 Messages signed by AMs include the AM certificate serial number.
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Table 9.17: Theoretical comparison U+F vs eU+F
Phases Entities Signatures Signatures verification # Messages
Login
FOAF file acquisition U+F 3+CI CWBSN 1 1 12
eU+F 3+CI CWBSN CA 2 2 12
Resource acquisition
U+F 3+CI CWBSN 1 1 12
eU+F 3+CI CWBSN CA 2 2 12
Access to direct contact
FOAF file acquisition U+F 6+CI CWBSN 6 6 25
eU+F 6+CI CWBSN CA 8 8 25
Resource acquisition
U+F 7+CI CWBSN 6 6 25
eU+F 7+CI CWBSN CA 8 8 25
Access to indirect contact
FOAF file acquisition U+F - - - -
eU+F 3 N  1 CI CWBSN CA 8 N  1 8 N  1 25 N  1
Resource acquisition
U+F - - - -
eU+F 3+4 N CI CWBSN CA 8 N  1 8 N  1 25 N  1
N: (# of users in the relationship)-1, NA1
Cx: # of IdP CAs, AM CAs and WBSN CAs, where x is I, WBSN or A regarding the type of CA
- : an element/ action not required
 Depending on the applied cryptographic approach (recall Section 8.4), the
interchanged of the decryption key in the Traditional PKC scheme or the
decryption key creation in the IBE-based PKC scheme, is required.
 Resources and identity data are delivered encrypted to be decrypted at users’
browsers.
9.6.2 Temporal workload comparison
Recalling the empirical evaluation of U+F and eU+F, this Section compares their
workload and reused elements.
On the one hand, Figure 9.16(a) depicts temporal workload of U+F and eU+F.
As expected, temporal workload of eU+F is higher than that of U+F, even deter-
mining that identity data and resources decryption slightly impacts on the general
workload (44 ms more on average). Comparing eU+F CdataAcquisition with U+F, ac-
cessing to a profile and a photo in a WBSN, WBSN1, and accessing to a profile and
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(a) Execution phases
(b) Elements reuse
Figure 9.16: Comparing U+F vs eU+F
a photo in other WBSN, that is, WBSN2, differ between 2,311 ms, 759 ms, 1,420
ms and 1,378 ms respectively. According to previous theoretical study, workload
results are produced by eU+F claims management and the applied cryptographic
scheme. On the one hand, claims are encrypted by AMs and IdPs. On the other
hand, the implemented Tradictional PKC scheme (recall Section 8.4.1) involves
the signature and the interchange of the requester’s DK key and the encryption of
requested identity data and of resources decryption keys.
On the other hand, the reuse of elements is also compared. Interestingly, the
maximum percentage of reuse in eU+F (59%, f=0.41) is higher than that of U+F
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(44%, f=0.56), being this issue related to indirect relationships management. Re-
questing data in indirect relationships involves the interchanged of many messages,
being multiple of them reused and thus, the workload reduced. For this reason,
eU+F workload is the highest one when f=1. However, the reuse of all possible
elements in eU+F (f=0.41) can be compared with the average rate of reuse in U+F
(f=0.78), differing 104 ms, 128 ms and 33 ms accessing to a photo in a WBSN,
WBSN1, and to a profile and a photo in other WBSN, WBSN2, respectively. Simi-
larly, when the reuse is maximum in both protocols (f=0.41 in eU+F and f=0.56
in U+F), temporal workload in eU+F differs from U+F on 154 ms, 304 ms and 360
ms in each case.
9.6.3 Protocols adequacy analysis
The performance and workload studies previously presented, point out the simplic-
ity and speed of U+F and the security features of eU+F. Bearing in mind that
Hosts and WBSNs are considered trusted entities in U+F but not in eU+F, the
appropriateness of these protocols depends on each particular context.
Concerning the use of U+F, its use is specially adequate when managed data
is not confidential and direct relationships are enough to meet expectations. For
instance, in WBSNs like LinkedIn, a professional WBSN where users present their
working experience and may use it for seeking employment, the preservation of users
privacy is not the main requirement and the establishment of direct relationships
is desirable in most of cases. Then, in these situations, when data wants to be also
applied in other WBSN, i.e. Facebook, U+F would be the best choice.
On the other hand, personal data should be protected by the use of eU+F.
WBSNs like Facebook or Badoo, in which, for instance, many personal photos or
even personal embarrassing photos are uploaded, should apply eU+F. This protocol
provides interoperability, indirect relationships management and protection against
honest-but-curious servers, thereby developed on the bases of users privacy protec-
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tion. Therefore, the increase of temporal workload produced by eU+F should be
considered balanced by provided features.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions
This Chapter contains the thesis conclusions and final remarks, and summarizes
the achieved contributions (Section 10.1). A critical discussion on the developed
work is also presented (Section 10.2). Additionally, future research directions that
derive from the thesis results are proposed (Section 10.3).
10.1 Conclusions and summary of contributions
This thesis focuses on providing fine-grained access control management between
different WBSNs in a privacy preserving way. Improving access control facilitates
and protects users data management. It reduces threats caused mainly by three is-
sues. First, limited access control procedures prevent users from expressing all their
preferences and controlling co-owned data. Second, the burden of managing access
control in all WBSNs in which users are enrolled may become tedious and cumber-
some. Lastly, WBSN provides stored data and they can use them for unnoticed or
unauthorized purposes.
There are a lot of previous approaches concerning access control management
in WBSNs, as well as some mechanisms candidates for achieving interoperability
among different WBSNs. However, existing proposals neither are focused on expres-
sive access control management, nor on interoperability, reusability and prevention
of unauthorized data exposures. To address these issues, this thesis proposes an
expressive usage-based Access Control Model (ACM), together with its adminis-
trative functions, that lay the bases of a co-ownership mechanism and a pair of
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protocols to attain interoperability and reusability between WBSNs.
The first contribution of this thesis consists of the definition of the mentioned
ACM (Chapter 4) and the attached administrative model (Chapter 5), called
SoNeUCONABC and SoNeUCONADM respectively. SoNeUCONABC is an ex-
pressive usage control model for the social networking field. It allows managing a
total of six WBSN features (distance, common-contacts, clique, multi-path, direc-
tion and flexible attributes) along the whole usage process. It has been theoretically
identified that all features are addressed and empirically, that the model’s implemen-
tation is feasible and applicable to the majority of cases. A proof of concept system
has been developed in this regard. Considering 2,000 ms the tolerable waiting time
of WBSN users for information retrieval, results show that the enforcement of poli-
cies without cliques is satisfactory if explored nodes do not exceed about 200,000
having 200 relationships per node. Besides, the enforcement of policies with cliques
remains successful if less than about 30,000 nodes and 200 relationships per node
are explored. As a result, the appropriateness of the model for the WBSN context
is highlighted.
In addition, SoNeUCONADM , the administrative model for SoNeUCONABC ,
supports administrative tasks concerning the identification of who is involved
in administrative issues and how they are performed. SoNeUCONADM has
been assessed against a pair of administrative access control models (RBAC and
UCONABC) to ensure that it successfully addresses all identified administrative
tasks.
Looking for co-ownership management and based on SoNeUCONABC and
SoNeUCONADM , the second contribution of this thesis is a mechanism called Co-
owned Personal Data, CooPeD (Chapter 6). It is a novel mechanism based on man-
aging decomposable objects according to owners and co-owners privacy preferences,
such that all these preferences are completely satisfied and thus, all users’ privacy is
preserved. Using the same proof of concept as the one applied in SoNeUCONABC ,
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the access control enforcement process in CooPeD is analysed. It is concluded that
if a pair of users is related to an structure rt with direct relationships, a maximum
of 34 policies can be evaluated per object without exceeding the tolerable waiting
time of WBSN users for information retrieval. By contrast, if an rt with indirect
relationships is at stake, a maximum of 4 policies can be evaluated per object. Fur-
thermore, the developed survey study, fulfilled by 206 people worldwide, shows that
co-ownership is worth studying and that 76.2% of respondents are potential users
of CooPeD.
Apart from previous issues, the amount of WBSNs and the management of
data in all of them may lead to privacy problems. Users have to manage data
in all WBSNs in which they are enrolled. Thus, based on a simplified version of
SoNeUCONABC , a couple of protocols to manage interoperability and reusability
in WBSNs comprise the last contribution. One of the protocols, called UMA+FOAF
social network protocol (U+F), provides interoperability and reusability of identity
data, resources and access control policies between different WBSNs among users
directly connected (Chapter 7). Extending this protocol, Extended UMA+FOAF
social network protocol (eU+F) is proposed to protect WBSN data against service
providers and to facilitate indirect relationship management (Chapter 8). Both
protocol have been theoretically and empirically evaluated. The satisfaction of
all established requirements has been theoretically studied, as well as the effect of
reusing tokens and claims in every protocol’s phase. Besides, a prototype, composed
of the WBSNs FriendBook+ and MyLeisure, shows the feasibility of implementing
U+F and eU+F, as well as it helps to measure the Temporal Workload (TW) of
each protocol’s phase in comparison with Facebook and MySpace. Results show
that, accessing to a contact’s photo or a contact’s profile in Facebook or MyS-
pace produces lower TW that accessing a photo or a profile of MyLeisure from
FriendBook+. Nonetheless, the TW accessing a photo or a profile in Facebook and
MySpace is comparable with the prototype when some elements (tokens and claims
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in particular) are reused. Indeed, interoperability and decentralization, that is, the
fact of locating resources in host, identity data in IdPs, etc., produce benefits in
exchange for TW.
Proposed contributions have been published or submitted to several conferences
and journals. Table 10.1 presents the relationship between contributions and pub-
lications. Note that references of Table 10.1 refer to the list of publications shown
in Appendix B
Table 10.1: Administrative tasks comparison
Contributions Publications
C1: An expressive usage control model for WB-
SNs and its administrative model.
[2], [3], [5], [7]
C2: A mechanism to manage co-ownership of
decomposable objects in WBSNs.
[8]
C3: A mechanism to reach interoperability and
reusability among different WBSNs that also
minimizes unauthorized data exposures.
[1], [4], [6]
10.2 Critical analysis on the developed work
SoNeUCONABC usage control model lays the foundations of all contributions of
this thesis and it focuses on providing expressive access control management in the
social networking field. Nonetheless, the adequacy of the proposed policy language
in regard to WBSN users’ expectations and likes should be assessed.
A question arises over using UCONABC to create SoNeUCONABC instead of
other model directly developed for the WBSN field (see Section 2.2). At first sight,
the relevance of relationships management supports the need of RelBAC models.
By contrast, although relationships are key elements of WBSNs, studies reveal that
other elements like users attributes or object attributes are essential too (Section
2.5). Therefore, paying attention to WBSN demands, attributes management be-
comes essential and UCONABC is a challenging model in this regard. Furthermore,
the application of an usage control model like this is an interesting issue because ac-
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cording to current trends, the management of access control along the whole usage
process is a desirable requirement [20].
With regard to the proposed administrative model, SoNeUCONADM , its imple-
mentation either in a real or in a simulated environment is expected in future work.
Specifically, the presented theoretical evaluation does not study users satisfaction.
CooPeD, the proposed co-ownership management mechanism, works over de-
composable objects whose management involves a pair of limitations. On the one
hand, being decomposable requires the recognition of objects parts. Thus, restric-
tions of recognition tools should be overcome. Owners can manually decompose
objects but automatic tools are preferable. For example, users who are dancing
and embracing to each other are hard to be appropriately decomposed. On the
other hand, the management of objects parts that belong to multiple users, even
being out of the scope of this proposal and a matter of future work, has to be
considered. For instance, assuming an image of a married couple in front of their
car, the image is decomposed in three parts, namely, two parts in regard to the
couple and other in regard to the car. In this scenario who and how access control
preferences over the car part are managed should be distinguished.
Concerning the achievement of interoperability and reusability among different
WBSNs, U+F is developed and extended in eU+F to reach data exposure min-
imization and indirect relationships management. Both protocols are based on a
simplified version of SoNeUCONABC which avoids the construction of rt. However,
how eU+F can be extended to fully support SoNeUCONABC has been discussed,
namely, managing usage control and all features SoNeUCONABC deals with (re-
call Section 8.5). In particular, related to usage control, when attributes or policies
updates, additions or deletions are detected, the access control enforcement process
is repeated accordingly. Nonetheless, repeating this process may affect the protocol
performance, thereby being indispensable a more rigorous analysis in terms of us-
age control management. On the other hand, eU+F may allow the management of
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all features SoNeUCONABC deals with when rt is constructed and policies evalu-
ated over it. However, the construction of rt is quite complex and a careful study
regarding the best way to enforce its construct is needed.
In addition, a pair of prototypes (one based on the other) have been developed
for the evaluation of U+F and eU+F. They allow the access to data of a WBSN from
another, keeping identity data, resources and access control policies decentralized.
The prototypes try to reproduce real WBSNs but they are not deployed in a real
environment which may affect the results’ accuracy.
In what concerns trust management, U+F and eU+F assume that it is per-
formed in a successful and reliable manner. Certification Authorities (CAs) are
assumed to issue certificates to trusted entities (either IdPs, WBSNs or AMs) with-
out being established the meaning of “trusted entity”.
Regarding trust models, the one proposed in U+F is rather restrictive and it is
successfully improved in eU+F. First of all, eU+F assumes trusted IdPs. Entities
in charge of storing personal data are presumably trusted and users privacy may be
violated otherwise. Specifically, IdPs store identity data and resource decryption
keys and then, if they act maliciously data of all WBSN users may become compro-
mised. Similarly, other assumption is that AMs are also trusted. This assumption
also helps to protect users’ privacy. Information received by AMs is used to evaluate
access control policies and get tokens. However, tokens have to be signed by the
appropriate WBSN to be presented to the right Host or IdP and to lastly achieve
requested data. In the opposite situation, that is, in case untrusted AMs come into
play, they may deliver tokens to WBSNs and these entities would be in the position
of, again, acquiring data illegitimately.
Also related to eU+F, impersonations may exist because OAuth, which is the
underlying protocol, does not prevent them (recall Section 8.3.1.2). To manage
this issue this protocol delivers encrypted data and then, impersonations cannot
affect users privacy. However, this kind of attack may impact on the protocol, e.g.
10.3. Challenges and future research lines 237
performance, and much more work should be performed in this regard.
As a final point of analysis, the management of data after their delivery is
worth mentioning. This matter, referred to as sticky policies in regard to Gates
et al. requirements, is addressed in this thesis by constructing SoNeUCONABC
on the bases of UCONABC usage control model. Nonetheless, although this model
involves usage control, it still remains much to be done until the practical realization
of this requirement.
10.3 Challenges and future research lines
Proposals presented in this thesis are opened to new research developments which
may contribute to complement this work, as well as to provide a wide view about
access control in WBSNs.
Regarding SoNeUCONABC , implementing a more efficient cliques evaluation
algorithm would be desirable, as well as a large-scale scalability analysis. Further-
more, the identification of a holistic extensible and unified catalogue of ATT S,
ATT O and ATT E used in current WBSNs would be attractive.
Besides, the analysis of the complexity and the amount of user actions involved
in access control policies construction is other future research line. Related to this
issue, proposed features have been identified from literature and, though researchers
seem to be far from reality, studies support the appeal of fine-grained access control
systems [178, 179]. Nevertheless, it still remains as an open research issue the
usability of the policy construction based on these features. Indeed, an interesting
approach would be the development of automatic tools to establish access control
policies on the bases of SoNeUCONABC , thus easing the complexity of policies
management. The study of recommender systems like [180] would be the first
step. This recommender makes suggestions according to attributes of the object
to recommend, attributes of the requester and the “ratings” over the object that
direct contacts have performed.
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One last point related to SoNeUCONABC is that despite being a privacy-
preserving model, the protection of user relationships requires much more work
[181]. Although users attributes are unknown, the network structure in terms of
attributes can be currently inferred.
In what concerns SoNeUCONADM , the main future step is the manage-
ment of temporal delegations. Additionally, related to SoNeUCONABC and
SoNeUCONADM , both models could be extended to allow the modification of
ATT O of uploaded objects either by owners or by co-owners.
The study of users curiosity and suspiciousness in CooPeD is other research line.
Particularly, unless using sophisticated techniques to hide objects parts, questions
such as who/what is under the hidden part on the object? or how can I get to
know him/her/it? may arise. Besides, the management of objects like documents,
music, videos with audio, etc. is significantly complex and the identification of co-
owners should be carefully analysed, starting by an in-depth study of decomposition
techniques.
Another future issue is the enhancement of the implemented prototype. So-
phisticated techniques to accurately detect users silhouettes should be developed,
thereby hiding users with higher precision. Besides, the prototype can be extended
to detect not only users but also animals, vehicles, etc., as well as to manage of
usage control. Also, the search of concrete scenarios where CooPeD may contribute
significantly, e.g. to protect children privacy, is a challenging issue.
Concerning U+F and eU+F protocols, given that the latter is based on the
former, open challenges are associated with eU+F. It can be extended in several
ways. First and foremost, the developed prototype has to be improved to be de-
ployed in a real environment, including the management of indirect relationships
and access control along the whole usage process. Additionally, eU+F has to work
over SoNeUCONADM , managing all administrative tasks this model involves.
Continuing with eU+F future challenges, cryptography is a matter of study.
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Data exposure minimization is managed through the application of cryptography
and, as a preliminary step, the analysis of cryptographic algorithms efficiency is
indispensable. To do so, a comparative study of multiple algorithms needs to be
performed.
Moreover, the specification of constraints and rules to specify what it is con-
sidered a trusted IdP, WBSN and AM is an open issue. The idea is similar to the
one proposed by J. Kang et al. in [182]. They present the creation of guardians,
people with a new profession, to protect personal data and it includes a detailed de-
scription of legal relations between guardians and clients. Other relevant matter is
that, currently, protocols abort if a particular AM, IdP or WBSN is not considered
trusted (Sections 7.3.2 and 8.3.2). Thus, a dynamic specification of trusted entities
is desirable, e.g. requesting the appropriate administrator about the consideration
of a new entity as a trusted one.
Besides, although in U+F and in eU+F impersonations attacks are avoided, the
modification of tokens to prevent impersonations should be considered, not due to
their intended purposes but due to their side effects such as denial of service.
Related to the whole set of proposals, a further step is to work towards reaching
a complete protection of users privacy by preventing WBSNs from inferring user
relationships. Currently, social relationships can be inferred and though not directly
affecting users privacy because subject attributes are protected, countermeasures
against this issue are demanding necessities. The work proposed by Carminati et al.
in [148] which uses certificates to protect relationships, can be taken as a starting
point.
Furthermore, as J. Park et al. identifies, the distinction between users and
sessions is an appealing matter associated with all contributions of this thesis [183].
Policies may be defined in regard to users sessions. For instance, a user opens
different sessions from different computers, which means from different IP addresses,
and access control mechanisms should provide him with different permissions per
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session. Thus, future work runs towards the study of novel approaches to include
this issue in the proposed models and mechanisms.
Last but not least, the specification of techniques and mechanisms to control
data after their delivery is a tough challenge to deal with. This matter can be
somehow addressed by the use of an usage control model. Nevertheless, even some
proposals work in this direction [101, 72] and this thesis provides some guidelines,
more details are required. Related to this issue, the change of users behaviour, from
trusted to untrusted, is an interesting topic. A significant starting point focuses on
studying approaches like [43], which presents a technique to monitor users once
logged in WBSNs. According to the contributions of this thesis, a behavioural
change can be compared with an attribute update and the necessity of revoking
granted rights.
Part V
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Appendix A
Acronyms and abbreviations
The following tables present acronyms and abbreviations listed in alphabetical or-
der:
Acronym Term
A Authorizations.
ABAC Attribute Based Access Control.
ABE Attribute Based Encryption.
ACM Access Control Model.
ACP Access Control Policies in a system.
ADF Access Control Decision Function.
AEF Access Control Enforcement Function.
AM Authorization Manager
AO Administrative Objects.
AR Administrative Rights.
ATT Attributes.
AU Authorizing User.
CA Certification Authority.
CP-ABE Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption.
Dk Decryption with key k.
DAC Discretionary Access Control.
DB Data Base.
DoS Denial of Service.
E Direct relationships.
Ek Encryption with key k.
FOAF Friend-Of-A-Friend.
HTML HyperText Markup Language.
IBE Identity Based Encryption.
IdP Identity Provider.
KP-ABE Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption.
MAC Mandatory Access Control.
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology.
O Objects.
OBAC Ontology Based Access Control.
PDP Policy Decision Point.
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Acronym Term
PEP Policy Enforcement Point.
P2P Peer to Peer.
TBAC Trust Based Access Control.
TTP Trusted Third Party.
TW Temporal Workload.
R Use Rights.
RBAC Role Based Access Control.
RelBAC Relationship Based Access Control.
RP Requesting Party.
RT Relationships.
S Subjects.
UDF Usage Decision Facility.
UEF Usage Enforcement Facility.
UMA User-Managed Access.
URL Uniform Resource Locator.
WBSN Web Based Social Network.
XML eXtensible Markup Language.
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Appendix C
Expressive power analysis of
ACMs for WBSNs
The appendix presents the analysis of the expressive power of ACMs for WBSNs
in terms of the definition of policies presented in Section 2.5.2. First, inducting
reasoning is applied to generalize the policies (Section C.1). Afterwards, a set of 24
ACMs for WBSNs are analysed (Section C.2).
C.1 Generalizing access control policies
In order to determine the expressive power of ACMs, analysing that a concrete
policy, related to a feature, can be expressed by a specific model and not by another
one is not enough. The chief question that comes up is, whether it is possible to
assert that any model that expresses a policy associated with a feature is able to
define any other policy related to this feature. Inductive reasoning can be applied
to address this issue and reach a general rule after having reasoned from a set of
cases [184]. By applying inductive reasoning it is established that if a particular
policy (P), based on a concrete feature (F), can be expressed by a specific model
(M), then to generalize that M can express any kind of P based on F is possible.
In other words, using this technique it is generalized the number of P that can be
created in a particular M.
In this work inductive reasoning is applied to features distance (F1), common-
contacts (F2), clique (F3) and multi-path (F4). On the contrary, it cannot be ap-
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plied to direction (F5) and it would be extremely tedious in respect to fine-grained
(F6) due to several reasons. Regarding F5, this feature exclusively requires the cre-
ation of directional and bidirectional relationships and consequently, generalization
does not have to be applied. By contrast, according to F6, the amount of attributes
that can be managed is extremely assorted and their generalization is unattainable.
Table C.1: Inductive reasoning
Distance (F1)
C1A DaÐ  B , B DbÐ  C ,C DcÐ D  D Ð DAT A
C2A DaÐ  B , B DbÐ  C ,C DcÐ  E ,E DcÐ D  D Ð DAT A
————————-
GX DxÐ  Y1 , Y1
Dy1
ÐÐ  Y2 , ...  Yn1 Ð DAT X
Given that this feature can be generalized for n > 3 where n corresponds to the number of hops,
P1 is proposed assuming n   3.
Common contacts (F2)
C1A Da1ÐÐ  B , C Da1ÐÐ  B  C Ð DAT A
C2A Da1ÐÐ  B , C Da1ÐÐ  B , A Da1ÐÐ D , C Da1ÐÐ D  C Ð DAT A
C3A Da1ÐÐ  B , C Da1ÐÐ  B , A Da1ÐÐ D , C Da1ÐÐ D , A Da1ÐÐ  E , B Da1ÐÐ  E  C Ð DAT A
————————-
X
Dx1
ÐÐ  Y1 , ... , X
Dxn
ÐÐ  Yn , Z
Dx1
ÐÐ  Y1 , ... , Z
Dxn
ÐÐ  Yn  Z Ð DAT X
Given that this feature can be generalized for n > 1 where n corresponds to the number of common contacts,
P2 is proposed assuming n   3.
Clique (F3)
C1A  B , A  C , B   C  AÐ DAT B, C , B Ð DAT A, C , C Ð DAT A, B
C2A  B , A  C , A D , B  D , B   C , C  D  AÐ DAT B, C, D
, B Ð DAT A, C, D , C Ð DAT A, B, D , D Ð DAT A, B, C
————————–
GX   Y1... , X   Yn , Y1   Y2... , Y1   Yn , ... , Yn1   Yn  X Ð DAT Y1, ..., Yn
, Y1 Ð DAT X,Y2, ..., Yn... , Yn Ð DAT X,Y1, ..., Yn1
Given that this feature can be generalized for n > 2 where n  1 corresponds to the number of contacts in the clique,
P3 is proposed assuming n   2.
Multi-path (F4)
C1A D~Ib1ÐÐÐ  B , A D~Ib2ÐÐÐ  B , b1 x b2  B Ð DAT A
C2A D~Ib1ÐÐÐ  B , A D~Ib2ÐÐÐ  B , A D~Ib3ÐÐÐ  B , b1 x b2 , b1 x b3 , b2 x b3  B Ð DAT A
————————–
GX D~Iy1ÐÐÐ  Y , ...X D~IynÐÐÐ  Y , y1 x ....yn  Y Ð DAT X
Given that this feature can be generalized for n > 2 where n corresponds to the number of different paths that
connect the administrator and the requester, P4 is proposed assuming n   2.
Applied predicates
 X is direct or indirectly connected with Y by the relationship z: X
D~Iz
ÐÐ  Y
 X accesses to data, DAT, of contact Y: X Ð  DAT(Y)
 X accesses to data, DAT, of contacts {Y1, Y2,...,Yn}: X Ð  DAT(Y1, Y2,...,Yn)
 X and Y are bidirectional contacts: X   Y
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Table C.1 presents the application of inductive reasoning to F1, F2, F3 and F4.
For each feature, a set of cases CZ (being Z > ¯) is established to reach a general rule
(G), considering that both, CZ and G, describe particular and general access control
policies respectively. An access control policy is structured following the pattern
X  Y , where X refers to the set of conditions to satisfy in order that Y happens,
that is, certain rights are granted to the requester by the administrator. Cases are
incremental - the higher cases include the previous ones. In other words, given C1,
C2 and C3, expressing C3 means that C2 and C1 are satisfactorily expressed too
because they are included in C3. Then, it is expected, given the general nature of
ACMs, that ACMs that express C3 are expressive enough to define any policy from
G.
Regarding feature F1 distance, the proposed policy for case C1 establishes that
access is granted to users (D) who are at a distance of three hops from the ad-
ministrator (A). Similarly, C2 presents a policy which grants access to users (D)
who are at a distance of four hops from the administrator (A). Then, following this
reasoning, the specification of C1 and C2 can be generalized as an access control
policy (G) that involves users connected by a number n of hops, n > 3. Then, P1,
the policy that will be used to analyse the expressive power of ACMs, is proposed
considering n   3.
In what concerns feature F2 common-contacts, the proposed policy for case C1
corresponds to a policy in which access is granted to users (C) who have a contact
(B) in common with the administrator (A). Similarly, C2 corresponds to a policy
which grants access to users (B) who have a pair of contacts (B and D) in common
with the administrator (A). Following an analogous reasoning, in the general case
G access is granted to users who have a number n of common contacts with the
administrator. Thus, P2, the policy that will be used to analyse the expressive
power of ACMs, is proposed considering n   3.
On the other hand, according to feature F3 clique, case C1 presents a policy
274 Appendix C. Expressive power analysis of ACMs for WBSNs
that grants access to users that belong to a clique composed of three users (A, B
and C, where A is the administrator and B or C the requester). Analogously, C2
corresponds to a policy that grants access to four users involved in a clique (A, B,
C and D, where A is the administrator and B, C or D the requester). Therefore,
generalized case G refers to a policy that grants access to users who belong to
a clique composed of n  1 users, being n the number of users involved different
from the administrator with n > 2. Specifically, it refers to the establishment of as
many bidirectional relationships as existing edges in a complete graph composed of
n1 nodes and, consequently, the number of created bidirectional relationships are
n1n
2 . Then, P3, the policy that will be used to analyse the expressive power of
ACMs, is proposed assuming n   2.
Finally, in relation to feature F4 multi-path, case C1 presents a policy that
grants access to users (B) with whom the administrator (A) is directly or indirectly
connected by a pair of different paths. Likewise, C2 refers to a policy that grants
access to users (B) that are connected to the administrator (A) by three different
paths. Following such reasoning, generalized case G presents a policy that grants
access to users connected to the administrator by a number n of different paths.
Therefore, P4, the policy that will be used to analyse the expressive power of ACMs,
is proposed assuming n   2.
C.2 Analysis of the expressive power of ACMs for WB-
SNs
In order to evaluate the expressive power of ACMs for WBSNs, a total of 24 propos-
als of ACMs suitable for that context have been selected and if the policy language
linked to each ACM is expressive enough to specify the set of access control policies
defined in Section 2.5.2 has been evaluated.
In the following Sections, the 24 proposals classified as RBAC, RelBAC, ABAC,
TBAC and OBAC models, are briefly introduced and the results of the evaluation
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are presented. In some cases the specification of policies includes the creation of
additional elements, such as predicates, attributes or relationship types, which are
created according to each proposal specifications. Besides, some policies cannot be
specified because the model has not got the appropriate level of expressive power.
In particular, partially specified policies are marked with parenthesis, such as (Pi)
and the policies that cannot be specified are not mentioned.
C.2.1 Role based access control (RBAC) models
[ACM 1] Role based access control for Social Networks [24] This approach
bases on relationship management. Relationships are represented as the connection
between a pair of users taking each of them one specific role.
A WBSN involves the management of multiple elements, for instance user at-
tributes. Nonetheless, this model exclusively includes relationship management
offering quite restrictive procedures. Relationship types are the only relationship
property that the model considers.
Before defining access control policies, a set of roles and permissions have to be
specified:
 Roles R={friend}
 Permissions P={read}
 R  P  the defined permission is assigned to all roles
According to [24], access control policies are identified as social relations (SRs)
that a particular user (s) owns. They consist of three elements, {User1, User2,
@User1’s role, User2’s roleA}, where User1 and User2 corresponds to the couple of
users involved in the relationship. Assuming that a is the administrator and s the
requester, the set of access control policies proposed in Section 2.5.2 are defined as
follows:
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P5 SRa   a, s, @ friend, friend A
SRs   s, a, @ friend, friend A
P6 SRa   a, s, @ friend, friend A
Due to the simplicity of the model just a couple of policies can be specified.
Regarding P5, it is satisfactorily defined through a pair of social relations. It
is assumed, but not explicitly mentioned, that an access control policy can be
composed of more that a single SR. Analogously, P6 is properly defined.
[ACM 2] Tie-RBAC [54] A relation is defined as a set of ties of the same type
between senders and receivers. Each relation involves the sender’s assignation of
the receiver to a role with permissions. Besides, ties are non-reciprocal, that is,
they are unidirectional and having a tie with a particular user does not imply the
existence of a tie on the other way round.
The specification of policies is quite limited. Concerning access control policies
proposed in Section 2.5.2, just a pair of them can be created. The administrator
is a, s is the requester and the tie used is “Friend” which has the read permission
linked to an object:
P5 Tie1   Friend from a to s and Tie2   Friend from s to a
P6 Tie1   Friend from a to s
Therefore, P5 and P6 are satisfactorily expressed.
[ACM 3] Distributed access control [89] Looking for the decentralization of
access control in WBSNs, this model bases on sharing resources regarding relation-
ship type or closeness. Besides, roles (called Local Roles, LR), permissions (called
Attestation Certificates, AC) and objects that belong to users (called Namespace,
NS) are managed.
This model manages users, relationships and objects but not in a fine-grained
way because just a single policy from Section 2.5.2, P6, can be specified.
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The following elements are required:
 LR={friend}
 AC={r is granted to all roles in LR}
 NS={o and other data the administrator has}
In what concerns previous elements, considering i a particular domain (e.g. a
particular set of photos), τ a set of security labels attached to objects and OC
an object group (e.g. privacy labels), policy P6, called conditions (con), can be
specified as follows:
P6 cons, o, i   isactives, NS , hasLRs, i , hasOCo, i, τ ,
hasACAC, LR
C.2.2 Trust based access control (TBAC) models
[ACM 4] Social access control (SAC) [57] SAC bases access control man-
agement on exploiting trust relationships between users. Policies are established
regarding the trust placed in users (τ) and the confidentiality attached to each
object (tco), such that if τ A tco the access is granted and denied otherwise.
SAC allows the definition of policies P4 and P5, but partially:
(P4) τ   high
(P5) τ   high
In this model trust is placed in users instead of relationships. Nonetheless, it is
assumed that if a user gets access to an object with a certain kind of trust attached,
it can be compared with the establishment of a trust relationship with this user.
As a result, P4 is defined to some extent. In addition, relationships are inherently
bidirectional and then, P5 is implicitly defined.
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[ACM 5] Rule based access control [28] Carminati et al. propose a rule-
based access control model to allow users the specification of access rules for their
contents. Policies are expressed as constraints on the type, depth, and trust level of
existing relationships. Moreover, certificates are applied to attest the authenticity
of the relationships.
Relationships are unidirectional and, even considering a bidirectional relation-
ship as a pair of unidirectional ones, provided specifications do not detail how to
manage bidirectional relationships in access control policies.
In order to define access control policies proposed in Section 2.5.2, the following
relationships types are required:
 Relationship Types={FriendOf, RelativeOf}
The last type of the pair has been created to meet the goals of the analysis pre-
sented herein. Types are non-fixed and can be deliberately defined in the approach.
According to the model, access control rules are composed of the oid which is the
identifier of the requester resource and a set of predicates. Each predicate is com-
posed of four relationship elements: {Node, Relationship Type, Jumps, Trust level},
where “Node” refers to the administrator (a), that is, the owner of the requested
data.
Policies are defined as follows:
(P1) oid, a,RelativeOf,3,
(P4) oid, a,FriendOf,1,10
P6 oid, a,FriendOf,1,
Only three policies can be specified and just P6 is satisfactorily defined. On the
one hand, regarding P1, the indirect relationship is not completely expressed. An
indirect relationship composed of three hops can be defined but neither different
roles in each hop nor particular relationship preferences can be pointed out. On
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the other hand, P4 expresses the fact that the relationship is completely trusted
(considering a level of trust from 0 to 10) but it does not specify multiple paths.
[ACM 6] Reachability-based access control model [94] This model ex-
presses access control rules as reachability constraints which encode the path be-
tween the requester and the administrator of the requested object. More specifi-
cally, similar to [28], this model bases on the specification of access control policies
regarding the trust and distance of WBSN users.
Regarding elements managed in a WBSN, this model focuses on relationships
and users. Nonetheless, relationships management is quite limited. Trust and
distance are the only managed attributes and there are not tools to deal with
features such as common friends, cliques or multiple paths (used in P2, P3 and P4
respectively).
In this analysis, the following relationships and user properties, all of them
described in [94], are applied:
 Relationship={Friend}
 User properties={age, gender, studies}
Specifically, access control policies consist of a tuple of three elements,
{Requested object, Relationships path, Trust threshold}. Furthermore, “Relation-
ships path” consists, at the same time, of four elements, {Starting user, Relationship
(with a ‘+’ or a ‘-’ referring ‘+’ to outgoing relationships and ‘-’ to incoming), Re-
lationship depth, User properties}. Also, “Trust threshold” is 0 when it is not
considered in a particular rule.
The set of policies from Section 2.5.2 that can be specified in this model, is
constructed as follows, considering that a is the administrator:
(P1) o, a, Friend 1,2,3, 0
(P4) o, a, Friend 1, 10
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(P5) o, a, Friend 1, o,Friend 1, 0
P6 o, a, Friend 1, 0
(P7) o, a, Friend 1 age   30 gender   female, 0
o, a, Friend 1 age   40 gender   female studies   c.science, 0
o, a, Friend 1 studies   c.science, 0
A great set of policies can be expressed using this model, though completely
successful results are not reached. Indeed, P6 is the only policy properly speci-
fied. By contrast, P1 is defined to some extent. It grants access to users, located
at three hops without pointing out relationship preferences. Similarly, P4 speci-
fies the existence of a highly trusted relationship but without specifying multiple
paths. Likewise, differing from the proposed P5, the created policy is simultane-
ously satisfied by unidirectional and bidirectional relationships. Similarly, P7 is not
satisfactorily specified and it requires the definition of a set of three policies. In
particular, the only operator applied in the specification of attributes values is “ ”
and thus, the definition of granting access to users under a certain age is unattain-
able. Analogously, according to the model specifications, attributes are uni-valued
and it cannot be defined granting access to users who have multiple degrees, e.g. a
degree in computer science and other in physics.
[ACM 7] Personal Data Access Control (PDAC) [56] This model manages
access by computing the trusted distance (dtrust) between users. A particular level
of trust is linked to each user and each user is located at a certain distance in
the social network graph. Subsequently, once data is requested, dtrust is calculated
regarding the trust and distance of the requester to the administrator.
Specifically, assuming that a is the administrator and o the requested object,
policies can be identified as the establishment of a trust interval such that (accept
limit, reject limit). The accept limit (Caa, d) refers to the largest trusted distance
that will be considered to grant the access and the reject limit corresponds to the
C.2. Analysis of the expressive power of ACMs for WBSNs 281
smallest trusted distance (Cra, d). As a result, access is granted if the calculated
dtrust is within the established interval. It is considered that trust distance for a
friend is 1, for a friend-of-friend is 2 and for friend-of-friend-of-friend is 3 and so
on. Intermediate trust levels are also managed and, for instance, 0.8 refers to a very
good friend and 0.9 to a good friend.
Concerning above specifications, the set of access control policies proposed in
Section 2.5.2 that can be defined in this ACM is the following one:
(P1) (3,3)
(P4) (0,0.5)
P6 (0,1)
PDAC achieves the complete definition of P6, establishing that access is granted
if requesters are friends with any level of trust between 0 and 1, that is, if they are
good, very good, extremely good friends, etc. Nonetheless, P1 and P4 are partially
expressed. P1 defines that only those users who are located at a distance three
from the administrator get access, leaving aside the specification of relationship
types and the relationship creation time. Likewise, P4 specifies granting access to
users who are highly trusted but the definition of multiple paths is not achieved.
[ACM 8] Trust in Collaborative Open Social Networks [91] Wang et al.
present a fine-grained access control scheme for WBSNs that manages access control
through a purpose-based approach. Data is linked to a set of purposes that form a
hierarchy and can change dynamically.
Access control policies are constructed as rules composed of seven elements:
Data which identifies the requested data; Sub that refers to requesters to whom the
access is granted; RelT which corresponds to the type of the relationship between
the requester and the data owner; Purp that corresponds to the right that users
request; Dmax which corresponds to the maximal relationship depth; Tmin that
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refers to the minimal trust; and Obli that refers to requirements that have to be
satisfied before granting access. As a result, a policy rule is defined as: (Data, Sub,
RelT, Purp, Dmax, Tmin, Obli).
Considering that o is the requested object, r is the requester, relationship types
are friend, relative and neighbour, read is the purpose, trust rates from 0 to 10
and there are not obligations (g), the definition of policies from Section 2.5.2 is the
following one:
(P1) (o, s, relative, read, 3, 5, g)
(P4) (o, s, friend, read, 1, 10, g)
P6 (o, s, friend, read, 1, 5, g)
This approach allows the definition of three policies but just P6 is completely
defined. P1 is partially defined as roles at each distance can be different and the
specification of relationship attributes is possible. Similarly, P4 is partially defined
because this proposal only allows the establishment of high trust relationships but
not multiple paths.
C.2.3 Relationship based access control (RelBAC) models
[ACM 9] Privacy preservation model [97] This model bases on the general-
ization of Facebook access control mechanism. It demonstrates that the expression
of several policies not currently supported by Facebook can be carried out, such as
the sharing of data between common friends or friends involved in a clique.
In this ACM, users and relationships are the main managed elements. Similar to
previous proposals, it does not deal with attributes management and policies such
as P7 cannot be defined. Furthermore, as it is based on Facebook, the establishment
of unidirectional relationships like the one proposed in P6 is unreachable.
Assuming that u and v refer to a pair of WBSN users, s is the requester, G
is the complete social network represented as a graph and γ refers to a particular
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communication state that describes the communication history between the admin-
istrator (a) and s, the set of access control policies proposed in Section 2.5.2 that
can be defined by this model is the following one:
(P1) only-me   γu, a, G, γ.u   a
only-friends   only-me - γu, v, G, γ.u, v > EG
friends-of -friends   only-friends - γv, s, G, γ.§v > Subs, v >
EG , v, v > EG
P2 common friends3   only-friends - γs, a, G, γ.SNGs 9 NGaS > 3
P3 clique3   only-friends - γs, a, G, γ.§G.G b G , G  K3 , s, a b
V G
(P4) path2   friends-of -friends , friends-of -friends   only-friends   only-
me - γu, v, G, γ.u, v > EG , only-friends   only-me -
γz, x, G, γ.z, x > EG
P5 only-friends   only-me - γu, v, G, γ.u, v > EG
Due to the similarity with Facebook, results are quite interesting. Regarding
P1, it is partially expressed because indirect relationships have a maximum depth
of two and fine-grained management of relationships is not considered either. An
interesting policy is P4 which, considering the possibilities offered by this model, is
defined through the combination of existing access control policies. Then, even not
currently supported by Facebook, the establishment of policies that involve multiple
paths is supported. However, contrary to the proposed P4, the created one requires
the specification of each path length and also, the definition of being different paths
is missing. By contrast, P2, P3 and P5 are satisfactorily defined.
[ACM 10] Relation based access control [27, 19] This model focuses on
capturing the idea that an authorization decision, a policy, bases exclusively on
the relationship between the administrator and the requester. The main issue runs
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towards the specification of policies capable of expressing WBSN features such as
having common friends or the establishment of cliques.
This ACM, as its name suggests, focuses on relationship without considering
attributes management, either relationships, objects or users attributes. Then, P7,
which is particularly focused on user attributes, cannot be defined.
Regarding policies from Section 2.5.2, the following set of relationships identifiers
are applied:
 I={friend, neighbour, relative}
Considering that the administrator (a) is identified by the prepositional symbol
@p [19], v and u refer to WBSN users, and s refers to the requester, access control
policies are defined as follows:
(P1) @p.`relativee u ,  v , `neighbourev u ,  v ,  s , `friendes
P2 s - `friendes - `friende`friende`friendes `
`friende`friende`friendes
P3 s -  s , `friendes , @p.`friende p ,  s , `friendes
(P4) `friende s , `neighboures , `friende v , `neighbourev
P5 `friendes , `friendes
P6 `friendes
This model is one of the most expressive models attaining the successful defini-
tion of four policies, P2, P3, P5 and P6. However, in respect to P1, given that this
model is not focused on attributes management, the specification of the proposed
relationship creation time is infeasible. On the other hand, according to P4, it
specifies the existence of a pair of different paths of two hops.
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[ACM 11] Relation based access control through hybrid logic [98] This
proposal presents a RelBAC model that uses hybrid logic to express access control
policies. Indeed, as mentioned above, this is one of the first contributions which
particularly mention and work to achieve expressive power. The model is similar
to the one proposed in [19] but applying other type of logic.
In general, binary relationships are managed, tagged with a set of labels in I, be-
ing S the set of principals, subjects, involved in them. Moreover, it is distinguished
own to refer to the owner, the administrator, and req to refer to the requester, and
the symbol @ is used to define a policy in regard to both principals. Specifically,
labels applied herein are the following ones:
 I={friend, neighbour, relative}
As a result, policies from Section 2.5.2 are defined as follows:
(P1) @own`relativeereq , `neighbourereq , req , `friendereq
P2 @ownreq - `friendereq , `friende3`friendereq
(P4) @own`friendereq , `neighbourereq
P5 @own`friendereq ,@req`friendeown
P6 @own`friendereq
This analysis shows the possibilities offered by hybrid logic. Nevertheless, the
difficult task of expressing cliques is pointed out [98], as well as it is just briefly
mentioned the management of user attributes. These attributes are applied in terms
of types (called labels). They are quite similar to relationships attributes and thus,
P1 is partially expressed. Similarly, P4 defines a pair of different paths but their
length has to be pre-defined. On the contrary, P2, P5 and P6 are successfully
defined.
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[ACM 12] User relationship-based access control (UURAC) model [83]
UURAC is an online social network model focused on existing WBSN relationships
and the establishment of policies through regular expressions. Its main challenge
goes towards the definition of policies that involve direct and indirect relationships
with different types in each hop.
This novel model specially bases on direct and indirect relationships manage-
ment. Consequently, P1, P5 and P6 are the policies that can be specified by UU-
RAC.
In this ACM, P corresponds to the set of managed relationship types and action
refers to the set of actions that can be requested:
 P={f , n, r} where f corresponds to friend, n to neighbour and r to relative.
 action={rd} where rd refers to the read permission.
This model proposes a non-fixed set of P. Thus, relationships types neighbour n
and relative r have been created. Furthermore, there are different types of policies
in UURAC. In this regard, as the analysis performed herein focuses on policies
specified by an administrator in regard to a resource (o), policies called target
resources policies are the ones applied. These policies consist of three elements
@action, resource, (starting node, path rule)A, where path rule corresponds to a set
of predicates connected by disjunctions and conjunctions. Besides, each predicate
is composed of (relationship path, hopcount) where hopcount refers to the maximum
number of edges on the relationship path.
The set of policies from Section 2.5.2 that can be defined in this ACM is the
following one:
(P1) r, o, r,1 , n,2 , f,3
P5 r, o, f,1
Alluding to this model’s name, relationships are the main managed elements.
On the one hand, P1 is partially defined because the lack of attributes management
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prevents from detailing the proposed relationship creation time. On the other hand,
P5 is properly defined. Indeed, UURAC explicitly mentions that relationships are
unidirectional and their bidirectional nature exists simultaneously.
[ACM 13] Multiparty Access Control (MPAC) for Online Social Net-
works [32] MPAC focuses on capturing multiparty authorization requirements.
It makes possible the collaborative management of shared data in WBSNs.
Access control policies are composed of five elements: controller, who is the
user who manages access control; ctype, that refers to the type of the controller;
accessor, who is the user to whom the access is granted and it may consist of the
user name, the relationship type and the group name; data, which corresponds to
the identifier of the requested data and the level of data sensitivity; and effect refers
to the permission granted, that is, permit or deny. Therefore, assuming that the
administrator a permits access to an object o with a sensitivity level sl, policies
from Section 2.5.2 are defined in this ACM as follows:
(P1) @ a, OW, @ friend  of  friend, RN A,@ o, sl A, permit A
P5 @ a, OW, @ friend  of, RN A,@ o, sl A, permit A
Applying this model just a couple of policies can be defined, being P5 the
only one completely specified. Also, it should be noticed that relationships have a
maximum length of two and they are inherently considered bidirectional.
[ACM 14] A reachability-based approach [95] This novel ACM bases on
connection characteristics between WBSN users. It tries to generalize access control
policies in terms of users properties, indirect relationships and complex relationship
composed of direct relationships of different types.
Access control policies, called access rules, consist of the tuple (rid,ACS) where
rid is the identifier of the requested resource and ACS refers to the set of access
conditions (ac) to satisfy. Besides, each ac is composed of o, p where o is the
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starting node, that is, the resource administrator, and p refers to a path of ordered
steps. Each step is also composed of four elements r, dir, I,C where r is the type
of the relationships, dir is the orientation of the relationship edge (, or  in case
of bidirectionality), I is the set of authorized distances and C the set of conditions
regarding user properties. Then, the existence of following elements is assumed:
 Relationship types= {Relative, Neighbour, Friend}
 User properties= {age, gender, trust}
As a result, assuming that the administrator is a and the requested resource is
ro, the set of access control policies proposed in Section 2.5.2 are defined as follows:
(P1) ro, a, Relative, ,1, Neighbour, ,1, Friend, ,1
(P4) ro, a, Friend, ,1, trust   1
P5 ro, a, Friend, ,1
P6 ro, a, Friend, ,1
(P7) ro, a, Friend, ,1, gender   female, age @ 30
This ACM is significantly expressive as it allows the partial specification of five
policies from the set proposed in Section 2.5.2. P1 is partially defined since the
relationship creation time is not specified. Similarly, P4 is defined to some extent.
A trust relationship is specified but not the existence of multiple paths. Likewise,
even being possible the definition of user attributes, disjunctions cannot be specified
in P7. By contrast, unidirectional and bidirectional relationships are appropriately
expressed.
[ACM 15] Primates [96] The ACM proposed in this approach is quite simi-
lar to the one presented in [95]. Access control is managed through reachability
constraints based on paths between WBSNs users and user properties.
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Concerning policies, called access rules, they consist of four elements such that
u, r,P,C where u is the resource owner, r the requester resource, P the path and
C the set of constraints on the attributes of the requester. Besides P consists of
constraints on the path that connects the resource owner and the requester, and
each constraint is, simultaneously, composed of the tuple l, dir, I where l is the
type of the relationships, dir the direction of the relationships ( ,  or ) and
I the minimum and maximum depth of the path. Therefore, assuming the same
relationship types and user attributes as those defined in [95] and considering a
to be the administrator and o the requested object, policies from Section 2.5.2 are
defined in this proposal as follows:
(P1) a, o, ‘Relative, , 1,1, ‘Neighbour, , 1,1, ‘Friend, , 1,1,
(P4) a, o, ‘Friend, , 1,1,  trust   1
P5 a, o, ‘Friend,, 1,1,
P6 a, o, ‘Friend, , 1,1,
(P7) a, o, ‘Friend, , 1,1,  gender   female, age @ 30
Due to the similarity with [95], conclusions are equivalent. The definition of P5
and P6 is complete and the definition of P1, P4 and P7 is partial.
C.2.4 Attribute based access control (ABAC) models
[ACM 16] UCONABC for social networks [93] UCONABC for social networks
bases on UCONABC [44, 106] usage control model. It is developed under the
perspective of Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) models [185]. The definition
of policies bases on subjects, objects and the environment, as well as subjects and
objects attributes (ATT(S) and ATT(O) respectively). Besides, this model can be
used to model MAC, DAC and RBAC access control policies, as well as certain
authorization processes of Digital Rights Management (DRM).
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P3 and P4 cannot be defined because they base on complex relationships man-
agement that is is not included in this model. Furthermore, it is noticeable that
access control policies are defined by data owners, referred to as administrators.
Then, in this model, according to [106], it is assumed that the administrator, who
is considered a subject, is the user who administrates requested objects and thus,
manages ATT(O).
Specifically, access control focuses on the specification and management of pred-
icates that express relationships between subjects and objects [186, 106]. According
to access control policies proposed in Section 2.5.2, the following ATT(S), ATT(O)
and predicates are defined. Notice that except for the predicates permit and in,
which are presented in [186], the rest of predicates and attributes have been created
herein following the model specifications.
Attributes:
 ATT S={Age, Gender, Studies, Friends, Neighbours, Relatives} where
Friends, Neighbours and Relatives are the lists of friends, neighbours and
relatives, respectively, that the user has. Moreover, each list is composed of
a set of attributes:
– Friends={User1Id, relationshipTrust, ...
– Neighbours={User1Id, relationshipTrust, ...
– Relatives={User1Id, relationshipTrust, ...
 ATT O={Object1Id, ...}
Predicates:
 permit(s > S, o > O, r): it grants access permission (r) over an object (o) to
a particular subject (s).
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 in(s > S, Friends~Neighbours~Relatives of v > S): it returns the existence of
not of a friendship/neighbour/relative relationship between a pair of users (s
and v). Notice that s has to be within the list of friends/neighbours/relatives
of v.
 commonFriends(Friends of s > S, Friends of v > S, n): it returns a positive
or negative value regarding if the list of friends of a subject (s) has n subjects
in common with the list of friends of another subject (v), being n > ¯.
Policies have been constructed following the process described in [186]. More-
over, the administrator of the requested object o is referred to as a and s corresponds
to the requester. Given that in this work policies are inherently unidirectional, ac-
cess control policies established by a are described below:
(P1) ina, s.Neighbours , a.Neighbours s.creationT ime @ 2001 Ð 
permits, a.o, r
P2 commonFriendsa.Friends, s.Friends, 3Ð  permits, a.o, r
P5 ina, s.Friends , ins, a.FriendsÐ  permits, a.o, r
P6 ins, a.FriendsÐ  permits, a.o, r
P7 s.gender   female , s.age @ 30 - s.gender   female , s.age @
40 , s.studies   C.Science - s.studies   C.Science , s.studies  
PhysicsÐ  permits, a.o, r
A great set of access control policies from Section 2.5.2 are satisfactorily defined.
Conversely, in respect to P1, the relationship creation time is specified but the
proposed indirect relationship (related to P3 and P4) is not because, as mentioned
above, this model does not focus on relationships management. By contrast, the
rest of policies are satisfactorily expressed.
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[ACM 17] ACON: Activity-Centric Access Control for Social Computing
[30] ACON focuses on managing sessions and activities and it is also developed on
the bases of UCONABC [44, 106] usage control model. Thus, it allows the definition
the same policies as UCONABC for social networks, namely, P2, P5, P6 and P7
and P1 to some extent.
[ACM 18] Content-based access control for social networks [55] This
proposal presents an automatic ACM that selects a particular policy for a post of
an added message according to its content. Then, the main characteristic of this
ACM is the identification of the content of each particular object.
Concerning policies, they are composed of five elements: priority which corre-
sponds to the relevance of the policy; name which refers to an unique identifier;
explanation that points out how the system has concluded; attributes which refer
to the list of managed attributes; and rules, that indicate how elements match in
the destination profile. In sum, they are expressed as:
Priority — Name — Explanation — Attributes — rules
Supposing that priority is p, name is id and explanation refers to the description
of each policy expPX with X in1  7, the set of access control policies proposed
in Section 2.5.2 are defined as follows:
P6 p — id — expP6 — - — is-friend
P7 p — id — expP6 — gender, age, studies —  genderfemaleANDage @
30 OR
 genderfemaleANDage @ 40ANDstudiesC.ScienceOR  genderfemaleAND
studiesC.ScienceANDstudiesPhysics
Therefore, a pair policies, P6 and P7, are successfully expressed.
[ACM 19] Persona [70] This proposal bases on Attribute Based Encryption
(ABE) cryptography and consequently, the ACM which lays the bases of this work
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is ABAC. Specifically, Persona applies CP-ABE (recall Section 2.3). Thus, users
creates keys regarding a set of attributes, encrypt data using encryption keys and
distribute decryption keys among their contacts.
The strength of this approach focuses on dealing with untrusted service storages.
Nevertheless, the specification of expressive policies is not one of the main goals
of [70]. In this work, “friend” is the only attribute used within policies, though
disjunctive and conjunctive operators can be applied. Consequently, access control
policies proposed in Section 2.5.2 are specified in this proposal as follows:
P6 friend
The set of access control policies that Persona allows to create is not flexible
enough. Policy elements are limited to attributes connected by disjunctive and
conjunctive operators, that is, it can be compared with the management of groups.
Moreover, the necessity of delivering decryption keys to chosen users supportss the
unidirectional nature of relationships and thus, P6 is properly defined.
[ACM 20] EASiER [71] Similar to Persona [70], this proposal focuses on ABE
and, specially on CP-ABE. Therefore, policies are constructed through attributes
combined with disjunctive and conjunctive operators.
According to policies from Section 2.5.2, the attribute applied is “friend” and
they are defined as follows:
P6 friend
This approach, as Persona, does not focus on the establishment of expressive
policies. Besides, assuming that decryption keys are delivered from data owners to
the requester, established relationships are unidirectional and P6 is satisfactorily
defined.
[ACM 21] Secure and Policy-Private Resource Sharing [73] This proposal
presents an ABE solution, thereby based on an ABAC model, that achieves the defi-
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nition of expressive policies regarding the social network graph (users represented as
nodes and edges as relationships). Specially, Distance-Based Revokable Attribute
Encryption (DBRA) is applied. Links are established between users to exchange
decryption keys and the specification of access control policies bases on resource
attributes and the distance between the resource owner and the administrator.
Regarding access control policies, they are composed of a set of access rules
(ar) composed of conditions (cond), such that `ar1e, `ar2e, ..., `arne where ar  
cond1, cond2, ...condm. A particular condition is distu, d being u the requester
and d the maximum distance between the requester and the administrator. Assum-
ing the existence of resource attributes “relatives”, “neighbours” and “friends”, the
set of policies from Section 2.5.2 that can be defined in this proposal is the following
one:
(P1) {`RelativeType= “relatives”.distu,1e, `NeighbourType=
“neighbours”.distu,2e, `FriendType= “friends”.distu,3e}
P6 {`FriendType= “friends”.distu,3e}
A relevant point of this approach is the management of resource attributes. It
allows the definition of the policies P1 and P6. In what concerns P1, the indirect
relationship is defined to some extent because the relationship creation time cannot
be managed. Conversely, P6 is properly defined following the same bases as in
Persona [70] and EASier [71].
C.2.5 Ontology based access control (OBAC)models
[ACM 22] An Ontology-based Access Control Model for Social Network-
ing Systems (OSNAC) [29] OSNAC focuses on the management of a semantic
ontology for WBSNs. It captures the WBSN semantic and constructs a model to
manage it. In particular, it is described as a rule-based access control policy model
in which rules are specified at user and at system level. The former refers to per-
C.2. Analysis of the expressive power of ACMs for WBSNs 295
sonal authorization rules established by users regarding protected resources and the
latter corresponds to rules that govern the overall privacy policy of the system.
This model focuses on managing users, data, relationships and user attributes.
By contrast, relationship attributes are left aside and together with the restrictive
possibilities for creating rules, access control is not managed in a fine-grained way.
To express user policies the following properties are required, where sn and ac
allude to relationships and actions respectively:
 Properties={sn:isFriendOf, sn:isNeighbourOf, sn:isRelativeOf,
sn:hasGender, sn:isYoungerThan, ac:canRead}
This model provides an interesting set of properties opened to the inclusion of
new ones. Except for isFriendOf and canRead, presented properties have being cre-
ated according to the model specifications. In fact, isRelativeOf and isNeighbourOf
follow the same bases as isFriendOf.
Considering that v, u and t refer to WBSN users, s corresponds to the requester
and a is the administrator access control policies proposed in Section 2.5.2 are
constructed as follows:
(P1) sn  isRelativeOfa, u , sn  isNeighbourOfu, v , sn 
isFriendOfv, s , ac  canReads, o
P2 sn  isFriendOfa, t , sn  isFriendOfa, u , sn  isFriendOfa, v ,
sn  isFriendOfs, t , sn  isFriendOfs, u , sn  isFriendOfs, v , ac 
canReads, o
P3 sn  isFriendOfa, s , sn  isFriendOfa, u , sn  isFriendOfs, a ,
sn  isFriendOfs, u , sn  isFriendOfu, a , sn  isFriendOfu, s ,
ac  canReads, o
(P4) sn  isFriendOfa, v , sn  isFriendOfv, s , sn  isFriendOfa, u ,
sn  isFriendOfu, s , ac  canReads, o
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P5 sn  isFriendOfa, s , sn  isFriendOfs, a , ac  canReads, o
P6 sn  isFriendOfa, s ,  r  ac  canReads, o
(P7) sn  hasGenders, Female , sn  isY oungerThans, 30 , ac 
canReads, o
sn  hasGenders, Female , sn  isY oungerThans, 40 , sn 
hasStudieds, C.Science , ac  canReads, o
sn  hasStudieds, C.Science , ac  canReads, o
Applying this model all policies from Section 2.5.2 can be defined to some extent.
In particular, P2, P3, P5 and P6 are satisfactorily expressed. On the contrary, even
defining the indirect relationship proposed in P1 and given the lack of relationship
attributes management, the existence of a relationship established before 2,000 is
not specified. Likewise, P4 is partially defined. Multiple paths can be established
but all of them with a particular length. Thus, the P4 gives access to users connected
to the administrator by a pair of paths of two hops. Furthermore, the fact that paths
are different is unspecified too. Finally, P7 is quite successfully defined through the
establishment of as many access control policies as conjunctions. Nevertheless, the
model does not manage multi-valued properties and granting access to a user who
has studied computer science and physics becomes infeasible.
[ACM 23] Semantic web based framework [58] The general idea is to define
a WBSN in terms of an ontology based on users’ profiles, resources, relationships
between users and between users and resources. Using this ontology the social net-
work is modelled as a Social Network Knowledge Base (SNKB). Specifically, three
types of policies are distinguished: authorization policies that consist of granting
users permissions to execute privileges on objects; admin policies that state users
who may specify access control policies for a certain privilege on an object; and
filtering policies that establish prohibitions. Relationships have a particular trust
assigned to them and policies are established accordingly. Besides, relationships
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are unidirectional and the bidirectional nature is created as a pair of unidirectional
ones.
Concerning policies, SWRL language is used to specified access control policies.
Nonetheless, it cannot be used to deal with bidirectional relationships and they
have to be managed out of SWRL. In general, in SWRL, access control policies
are represented as antecedents, that encode conditions included in policies, and
consequents, that encode authorizations and prohibitions. Considering the ontology
applied in this ACM, the following instances are applied:
 Instances: Relative, Neighbour, Friend and Data
Assuming that the administrator a grants read access to an object o to the
requester r, access control policies proposed in Section 2.5.2 are defined as follows:
(P1) Read  Relativea, ?targetSubject1,Neighbour?targetSubject1, ?targetSubject2,
Friend?targetSubject2, ?targetSubject3 ,Data?o Read?r, ?o
P6 Read  Relativea, ?targetSubject1 ,Data?o Read?r, ?o
As a result, a pair of policies can be defined, being P6 the only one completely
specified. On the other hand, P1 lacks the definition of the duration of the rela-
tionship.
[ACM 24] Online social networks using MKNF+ [99] A prioritized ontol-
ogy based on an ACM for protecting users’ data is proposed in [99]. It consists of
a Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure (MKNF) formalism that combines
Decryption Logic (DL) and rules created by Answer Set Programming (ASP). Fur-
thermore, this model includes priority as an access control policy element to prevent
conflicts caused by contradictions between each user’s access control policies.
Concerning policies, they are composed of two types of predicates, DL-predicates
and non-DL-predicates. The former bases on DL language and the latter focuses on
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unary or binary predicates. Specifically, the following predicates, already defined
in [99], are the ones applied herein:
 DL-Relationships={ISFRIENDOF Person, Person, ELEMENT Object}
where ELEMENT may refer to a photo, a message or any other element in
a WBSN.
 Non-DL-Concepts={oObject, sPerson}
Assuming that src refers to the requested resource, sbj corresponds to the re-
quester, a refers to the data owner and p refers to a certain type of priority, the
following policy is defined:
P6 K ?src, K s?sbj, K IS  FRIEND 
OF a, ?sbj, K ELEMENT ?src K permita, ?sbj,READ, ?src, p
In sum, relationships are pointed out as directed label edges and then, P6 is
properly defined.
Appendix D
SoNeUCONABC enforcement
functions
The notation used to define each function corresponds to the name of the function,
the input parameters (arguments), a set of predicates that refers to the establish-
ment of variables or conditions and the returned value if required. It is based on
[154] and it is formally represented as follows: Function  NameArgumentsC
Predicate1 Predicate2 ...  Return  V alueB
Moreover, symbol . is used to access to the content of an element. For instance,
given a user (s), s.age is used to access to the user’s age. Besides, the expression
list pos refers to the access to an element located in position pos within the list
list. For example, given the list i =v, t, y, i 1 corresponds to t. Finally, it shlould
be noticed that functions MatchC and MatchO, that refer to the verification of
conditions and obligations respectively, have to be implemented according to each
particular case.
In the following Sections the enforcement functions for SoNeUCONABC (Sec-
tion D.1) and the enforcement functions for the extension of SoNeUCONABC to
manage co-ownership (Section D.2) are described. They are alphabetically ordered
by name.
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D.1 Enforcement functions for SoNeUCONABC
The access control enforcement functions applied to SoNeUCONABC are the fol-
lowing:
CalculateCliquePaths The goal of this function is to identify the number of
paths of different lengths that the construction of a clique of a certain number of
users (δ) requires. Positions of the returned list correspond to path lengths and
values of the returned list refer to the number of paths of each length. A list is
returned if the calculus can be performed and “null” otherwise.
CalculateCliquePathsδ; out result  ListINTEGERC
result   ifδ   2 ListClique 0   1 - ifδ A 2
 PδK 1ListClique K   P K,N  1B
ContinuityCheckAccess This function is rather similar to CheckAccess, be-
ing distinguished a pair of issues. First, rt is already computed and then, just policy
elements have to be verified. Second, this function is called once attributes have
changed or the usage process has concluded the evaluation of ρongoing.
ContinuityCheckAccesss, o, r, ρ, ∂b, ∂c, rt; out result  BOOLEAN C ρs >
ρ;ρo > ρ;ρrt > ρ; subAtt   GetSubAtts, ρs;
objAtt   getObjAtto, , ρo;a   GetAdmino
result   ¦ρifρs NOT g  MatchsubAtt, ρs , ifρo NOT g 
MatchobjAtt, ρo , ifρrt NOT g
MatchRT ρrt, rt , r   ρ.r ,MatchBs, o1, r, ρ, ∂b
,MatchCs, o, r, ρ, ∂cB
CreateRT This is a recursive function that focuses on creating rt from the
WBSN graph, G, given the administrator (a) and the requester (s) of a particular
request. Departing from the administrator node a, the process starts by visiting
each of the contacts of a [GetNumContacts/ GetConnectedUser]. When the algo-
rithm visits node v, the contacts of v are also visited [CreateRT ] recursively until
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the length of the path between a and the node being currently visited reaches 6 or
node s is found. Then, if the path length reaches 6, the algorithm continues visiting
the remaining contacts of the previous node in the path if any. If node s is reached,
then the corresponding enriched path is stored (with all its forward and backward
relationships and their attributes).
CreateRT v, s, hop; out result  rtC
result   ¦hop @ 6 Ð  nC   GetNumContactsv , ¦i @ nC Ð  c  
getConnectedUserv, i , Storeforward and backward
relationships and length , ifc   s  Path completed -
ifc NOT v  CreateRT c, s, hop  1 - ifc   v 
Path brokenB
FindSubjectPolicies This function returns policies defined by a particular
user.
FindSubjectPoliciess; out result  P C
result   policies of sB
GetAdmin This function, taking as input an object (o), returns the user who
is its administrator. If the administrator of o is not found, “null” is returned.
GetAdmino; out result  SUBJECT C
result   administrator of oB
GetConditions/ GetObligations This function returns, if exits, conditions
or obligations within a given policy.
GetConditions~GetObligationsρ; out result  partialb~partialcC
result   conditions or obligations within ρB
GetConnectedUser This function returns the id of a user directly connected
to a given one. It is considered that contacts are stored ordered and then, they are
returned according to a given position (pos). An id is returned if exists or “null”
otherwise.
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GetConnectedUsers, pos result  STRINGC
result   id of a user in position, pos, connected to sB
GetDirectRelAtt The goal of this function is, given a ψ which corresponds
to the set of conditions of a path (pathCond), to create a list τ which consists
of conditions of direct forward and backward relationships found at a particular
position (pLength) of pathCon. The process bases on identifying the set of forward
and backward relationships between a semicolon (“;”) found at pLength  1 and
a semicolon found at pLength. Recall that operator semicolon, “;”, is applied to
distinguish hops of a path.
GetDirectRelAttpathCon, pLength; out result  ListEC
cont   1
result   ¦i @ pathCon.lengthÐ  ifpathCon i   ”; ” ,
cont   pLength Store relationships between the previous
identified ”; ” and this ”; ” - cont  1B
GetEnrichedPathsWithLength The goal of this function is to get a list of
enriched paths of a particular length (length) from rt. A list of paths is returned
and “null” if no path of such length exists.
GetEnrichedPathsWithLengthlength, rt; out result  EnrichedPaths C
result   ¦i @ rt.paths Ð  ifrt.paths i.length   length  true -
falseB
GetErtDivision The goal of this function is, given τ which is a set of forward
and backward relationships at a particular position in a policy (rels), to process
rels separating and storing conditions of each direct relationship fert and/or bert
in a list, as well as storing operators that join these relationships conditions in
another list. Then, both lists are returned and “null” otherwise. Analogous to
GetPathsPolicies, the order is a key matter and thus, returned lists have to be
built keeping the order of rels.
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GetErtDivisionrels; out result  ListE,ListOpeC
result   rels are processed storing rels.ferti and rels.berti
in ListOfErtand operators that linked each rels.ferti
and rels.berti in ListOfOperatorsB
GetFirstNode/GetLastNode The goal of these functions refers, respectively,
to return the id of the first and last node of a particular path. A node id is returned
if exists and “null” otherwise.
GetF irstNode~GetLastNodepath; out result  STRINGC
result   return the first~ last nodeB
GetLengthPath The goal of this function is to identify the length of a given
path (path). Then, given the operator “;” to differentiate hops in each path, the
length path is obtained by counting all semicolons plus one.
GetLengthPathpath; out result  INTEGERC
cont   1
result   ¦i @ path.lengthÐ  ifepath i   ”; ” cont  1B
GetNode The goal of this function is to identify the node in a path (path)
located at a certain position (pos). A node id is returned and “null” otherwise.
GetNodepath, pos; out result  STRINGC
result   return node located at posB
GetNumContacts This function returns the number of contacts of a given
user (s).
GetNumContactss result  INTEGERC
result   s.contacts.lengthB
GetPathsPolicies The goal of this function is, given a set of conditions that
enriched paths in rt must satisfy (σ), to separate the conditions in predicates (ψi)
304 Appendix D. SoNeUCONABC enforcement functions
that different and independent enriched paths must satisfy, as well as creating a list
of operators that join every ψi. Then, both lists are returned and “null” if an error
occurs. Note that a key point is the order because the position of each operator
refers to the enriched path to which it applies.
GetPathsPolicieslength, rt; out result  EnrichedPaths,ListOpeC
result   σ is processed storing σ.ψi in EnrichedPaths and operators
that linked each σ.ψi in ListOpe ,MatchPathPolicyσ.ψi, rt,1B
GetSubAtt/GetObjAtt These functions refer to “get” functions that return
user attributes and object attributes respectively. They return attributes or “null”
otherwise. Notice that input parameters depend on each function.
GetSubAtt~GetObjAtt; out result  S~O~RTATTRIBUTESC
result   s~o~rt attributesB
Match The goal of this function is to verify the match between each value
of a set of ω attributes (ATT ω) and ω attributes involved in a particular pol-
icy (ρω) [V erifyDAttTypes/ V erifyFV AttTypes/ V erifyBAttTypes]. It returns
“true” if all attribute predicates are satisfied and “false” otherwise. Notice that ω
corresponds only to the evaluation of a subject or an object.
MatchATT ω, ρω; out result  BOOLEANC
attωi > ATT ω
result   ¦attωi  if attωi.type   FV
V erifyFV AttTypesγj
attωi
, ρω - ifattωi.type   D
V erifyDAttTypesγj
attωi
, ρω - ifattωi.type   B
V erifyBattTypesγj
attωi
, ρωB
MatchB/MatchC The goal of these functions focuses on verifying the satis-
faction of conditions and obligations but they are very assorted and their imple-
mentation is left to systems’ developers.
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MatchB~MatchCs1, o1, r, ρ, ∂b~∂c; out result  BOOLEANC
result   B
MatchDirectPaths The goal of this function is to verify that a set of direct
forward and backward relationships found at a particular position of an enriched
path of rt (listPathsOfRT ) match those conditions τ of a policy (pathsPolicy)
[GetErtDivision]. If conditions are met the result is “true”, or “false” otherwise.
MatchDirectPathslistPathsOfRT, pathsPolicy; out result 
BOOLEANCListPOPolicy   GetErtDivisionpathsPolicy
result   ¦i @ ListPOPolicy.pathsÐ  ¦j @ listPathsOfRT Ð 
resultMatch   MatchlistPathsOfRT  j, ListPOPolicy.paths i ,
ifresultMatch   true ListSatisfaction i   true
, ¦i @ ListSatisfaction Ð  ifListSatisfaction i   true true
- falseB
MatchPathPolicy The goal of this function is to verify if an enriched path
in rt matches a particular ψ which corresponds to the set of conditions of a path
(pathCond). The general process consists of four steps. First, the length of the
path required in pathCond (pLength) [GetLengthPath] is calculated. Second,
enriched paths of rt with the same length as pLength are collected (rtPathsL)
[GetEnrichedPathsWithLength]. Thirdly, paths in rtPathsL are processed, get-
ting the value of the attributes of the direct forward and backward relationships at
every hop. Lastly, if the value of attributes of these paths match with those required
in pathCond [MatchDirectPaths/ GetDirectRelAtt] is verified. Once the verifi-
cation is completely and successfully performed, the result is “true” is a pathCond
is met, and “false” otherwise.
MatchPathPolicypathCond, rt,$; out result  BOOLEANC
pLength   GetLengthPathpathCond;
rtPathsL   GetEnrichedPathsWithLengthpLength, rt; cont   0
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result   ¦i @ rtPathsLÐ  ¦j @ pLengthÐ 
ifMatchDirectPathsGetDirectRelAttrtPathsL i, j,
GetDirectRelAttpathCond, j  cont  1 , ifcont > $  true -
falseB
MatchR The goal of this function is to verify the match between the requested
right rReq and the right involved in an access control policy (rρ). It returns “true”
if rights match and “false” otherwise. Notice that ω corresponds to the evaluation
of a subject or an object.
MatchRrReq, rρ; out result  BOOLEANC result   rReq   rρB
MatchRT The goal of this function is to verify the satisfaction of ρrt given
that rt is already built. The process consists of verifying the use of parameters
$ and δ (in ρrt, that is ρrt.$ and ρrt.δ) and performing verifications accordingly.
First, if ρrt.δ is not g, the existence of a clique is required and it has to be verified
[V erifyClique]. Second, if ρrt.$ is not g, it is studied if there exist a number ρrt.$
of enriched paths satisfying all of them the conditions established the predicate
ψ specified in ρrt.δ [MatchPathPolicy]. Finally, if ρrt.δ and ρrt.$ are g, it is
analysed if there exist a set of enriched paths satisfying the conditions established
in the predicate . ρrt.σ [GetPathsPolicies/ MatchPathPolicy/ V erifyPolicy].
Once the verification is successfully performed, the result is “true”, and “false”
otherwise.
MatchRT ρrt, rt; out result  BOOLEANC
result   ifρrt.σ   g , ρrt.$   g , ρrt.δ   g  true ,
ifρrt.δ NOT g  V erifyCliqueρrt, rt , ifρrt.δ NOT g 
ifMatchPathPolicyρrt.σ, rt, ρrt.$
 true - false , ifρrt.δ NOT g , ρrt.$ NOT g
 pathsDivided   GetPathsPoliciesρrt.σ , ¦i @ pathsDivided.paths
Ð  pathsSatisfaction  MatchPathPolicypathsDivided.paths i, rt, ρrt.$
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, ifV erifyPolicypathsSatisfaction, pathsDivided.listOp
 true - falseB
VerifyBAttTypes This function verifies the satisfaction of a particular at-
tribute value (γjatti), being the attribute type B, regarding particular policy predi-
cates (policyAttPred). If conditions are met it returns “true”, or “false” otherwise.
V erifyBAttTypesγjatti , policyAttPred; out result  BOOLEANC
result   γjatti is verified against policyAttPred B
VerifyClique The goal of this function is to verify the existence of a clique.
The process involves a set of four steps. First, the number of paths of each particu-
lar length (listlengthEP ) that are involved in a clique of a certain number of users
(δ) [CalculateCliquePaths] is calculated. Second, rt is analysed, storing all paths
whose length matches those stored in listlengthEP (pathsClique) [pathsDivided/
GetEnrichedPathsWithLength]. Thirdly, pathsClique is processed to verify en-
riched paths whose direct forward and backward relationships match ρrt (σ). If
they match, they are stored (acceptedPaths) [MatchDirectPaths/
GetDirectRelAtt/ GetF irstNode/ GetLastNode]. Lastly, the result is “true” if
nodes involved in acceptedPaths do not exceed δ [GetNode] and “false” otherwise.
V erifyCliquert, δ, σ; out result  BOOLEANC
listlengthEP   CalculateCliquePathsδ;
pathsDivided   GetErtDivisionσ
result   ¦i @ listlengthEP Ð  rtpaths i  
GetEnrichedPathsWithLengthi, rt ,
ifrtpaths i.length > listlengthEP  i
pathsClique.ADDrtpaths i - false ,
¦i @ pathsClique.lengthÐ  ¦j @ pathsClique i.length
Ð  ifMatchDirectPathsGetDirectRelAtt
pathsClique i, j, pathsDivided
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acceptedPaths.ADDpathsClique i - false ,
listNodes.ADDGetF irstNodert i j ,
listNodes.ADDGetLastNodert i j , ¦i @
acceptedPaths.lengthÐ  ¦j @ acceptedPaths i.length
Ð  node   GetNodeacceptedPaths i, j ,
ifnode NOT IN listNodes listNodes.ADDnode
, ifListNodes.length   δ true - falseB
VerifyDAttTypes This function verifies the satisfaction of a particular at-
tribute value (γjatti), being the attribute type D, regarding particular policy predi-
cates (policyAttPred). If conditions are met it returns “true”, or “false” otherwise.
V erifyDAttTypesγjatti , policyAttPred; out result  BOOLEANC
result   γjatti is verified against policyAttPred given all applied X operatorsB
VerifyFVAttTypes This function verifies the satisfaction of a particular at-
tribute value (γjatti), being the attribute type FV, i.e., M or S, regarding particular
policy predicates (policyAttPred). If conditions are met it returns “true”, or “false”
otherwise.
V erifyFV AttTypesγjatti , policyAttPred; out result  BOOLEANC
result   γjatti is verified against policyAttPred given all applied
F and L operatorsB
VerifyPolicy The goal of this function is, given a list of the result of evaluat-
ing each path ψ involved in σ (list of boolean values, listPathsEval) and a list of
operators (, and/ or -) that connect each ψ in σ (listOpe), it is evaluated that
listPathsEval matches with operators in listOpe. It should be noticed that ele-
ments of both list have to be evaluated against elements in the same position. Once
the verification is completely performed the result is “true” if conditions are met,
or “false” otherwise.
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V erifyPolicylistPathsEval, listOpe; out result  BOOLEANC
result   V erify listPathsEvalagainst listOpeB
D.2 Enforcement functions for the extension of
SoNeUCONABC
The access control enforcement functions applied to the extension of
SoNeUCONABC are the following:
FindCoOwners This function returns the list of the identifiers of co-owners of
a given object o.
FindCoOwnerso; out result  LIST OF STRINGC
result   co  owners of oB
FindObjects This function returns all object parts oj identifiers of an object
o attached to a given user s.
FindObjectso, s; out result  LIST OF STRINGC
result   oj of o linked to sB
ProcessObject This function processes the requested object (o) according to
objects parts (listOij) and evaluated access control policies (listPoliciesResult).
Then, the objects is processed hidden objects parts accordingly.
ProcessObjecto, listOij, listPoliciesResult; out result 
LIST OF STRINGC
result   ¦listPoliciesResult Ð  iflistPoliciesResult listOijk  
true listOijk grant access , iflistPoliciesResult listOijk   true
listOijk hiddenB
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1. Introducción
Nos encontramos en la era de la dependencia a la tecnología y a la hiper−
conectividad [1] y las Redes Sociales (RSs) son grandes desarrollos en este
contexto. La cantidad de RSs está aumentando en gran medida [2, 3] y des-
de el comienzo de Friendster en 2002, considerada la primera RS, hasta la
actualidad, muchas han sido las RSs que se han desarollado, por ejemplo
Facebook, MySpace, etc. Sin embargo, a pesar de los incuestionables bene-
ficios que proporcionan estas aplicaciones, ej. la comunicación a lo largo y
ancho del mundo, la seguridad y en concreto la privacidad, son importantes
retos a los que hay que enfrentarse.
La privacidad se define como  la condición de no tener conocimiento de infor-
mación personal sobre aquello que es poseido por otras personas (1983)"[4].
Las RSs almacenan gran cantidad de datos, muchos de ellos personales y
estos deben ser cuidadosamente protegidos y gestionados, con independen-
cia de que sea un tema de poco interés para los usuarios de las RSs [5] y a
veces, incluso confuso [6]. En esencial, se consideran dos puntos de vista, el
de los usuarios y el de los investigadores. Aunque los usuarios no consideran
la privacidad como un requisito primordial, los investigadores promueven la
creación de sistemas que, además de satisfacer las expectativas de los usua-
rios, protejan su seguridad.
En relación con la perspectiva de los usuarios, muchos autores han contribui-
do en este análisis. Becker et al. concluyó que el total de los usuarios de
Facebook nunca habían usado ninguno de los mecanismos proporcionados
para proteger la privacidad [7]. Asimismo, Acquisti et al. analizó que incluso
los usuarios de Facebook que eran conscientes de los problemas de privaci-
dad existentes continúan utilizándola.[5]. Este hecho puede relacionarse con
la gran cantidad de beneficios que aparentemente proporcionan las RSs, así
como por el hecho de que los usuarios pueden ser conscientes sobre la seguri-
dad de Internet pero no de las amenazas a las que están expuestos [8]. Por
el contrario, más recientemente, algunos estudios revelan que los usuarios
se están preocupando cada vez más por la privacidad y por ello, cada vez
relevan menos datos [9, 6].
Independientemente de los intereses y de las motivaciones de los usuarios
de las RSs, estudiado por los investigadores y señalado por las autoridades,
la privacidad es relevante en la vida de todas las personas. Por ejemplo, en
la Declaración de los Derechos Humanos, el artículo 12 establece el derecho
a no tener injerencias arbitrarias en la vida privada de ninguna persona 1.
1http://www.un.org/en/index.shtml , last access Feb. 2014
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Del mismo modo, en base a la Directiva 95/46/EC del Parlamento Europeo
del 24 de Octubre de 1995, el artículo 8 establece Los Estados miembros
prohibirán el tratamiento de datos personales que revelen el origen racial
o étnico, las opiniones políticas, las convicciones religiosas o filosóficas, la
pertenencia a sindicatos, así como el tratamiento de los datos relativos a
la salud o a la sexualidad"[10]. A este respecto se han aplicado distintas
técnicas y mecanismos para permitir a los usuarios controlar el acceso sobre
sus datos. De hecho, la característica ser privado"puede convertirse en una
ilusión que ciega a los usuarios y les previene de identificar qué datos están
realmente disponibles al público y qué datos están realmente protegidos [6].
En consecuencia, investigadores y profesionales trabajan en el desarrollo de
medidas para la protección de los datos, pretendiendo conseguir el mismo
nivel de privacidad que se puede encontrar fuera de la red [11].
Considerando la importancia y la necesidad de proteger la privacidad, junto
con el aumento de las RSs, surge la siguiente pregunta: ¾Las RSs propor-
cionan los suficientes mecanismos para preservar la privacidad? Aunque se
han realizado numerosos desarrollos, como son las herramientas que permiten
aceptar o rechazar estar etiquetado en una foto, el control de acceso es un
punto clave de investigación donde esta tesis contribuye.
Definido por el NIST el control de acceso se basa en determinar las activi-
dades que son permitadas para los usuarios legítimos, analizando cada intento
de acceso de un usuario para acceder a un recurso del sistema [12]. En el
campo de las RSs se distinguen dos cuestiones asociadas con el control de
acceso, una de ellas en relación con la protección frente a usuarios de las RSs
[13] y otra de ellas relacionada con la protección frente a los proveedores de
servicio de las RSs [14].
Por una parte, los desarrollos de control de accesos más comunes se basan en
la creación de medidas de seguridad que permiten a los usuarios especificar
quién accede a sus datos. Por ejemplo, si a unos determinados recursos, como
son las fotos, se restringe el acceso a los amigos, intentos de acceso por parte
de amigos de amigos deberían denegarse. Sin embargo, lo esencial es propor-
cionar control de acceso con alta granularidad, permitiendo que los usuarios
puedan expresar todas sus preferencias con todo tipo de detalle, es decir, el
gran reto es conseguir gestionar el control de acceso de forma expresiva [15].
Por ejemplo, las fotos relacionadas con el tema Fiesta de verano"podrían es-
tar disponibles para amigos desde Junio a Septiembre de 2014 y restringidas
para amigos que también se consideren familiares. Otra cuestión a conside-
rar es que, según modelos tradicionales, el control de acceso se gestiona con
anterioridad a la entrega del dato. Por el contrario, algunos desarrollos más
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actuales demandan nuevos requisitos que requieren gestionar el control de
acceso a lo largo de todo el proceso de uso [16]. Por ejemplo, cuando las fotos
tituladas Fiesta son accedidas, su descarga podría ser rechazada.
Además, dado que las RSs gestionan datos de gran cantidad de usuarios
y muchos de estos datos pueden pertenecer a más de usuario distinto del
propietario (que es el usuario que sube el dato a la RS), la gestión de la
copropiedad es otro tema a considerar. Por ejemplo, en una foto de una banda
de música pueden aparecer múltiples personas además del propietario de la
misma, las cuales se convierten en copropietarias. Por tanto, el control acceso
debe realizarse en base a las preferencias de todos los usuarios, propietarios
y copropietarios.
Asimismo, considerando la gran cantidad y variedad de RSs, con distintos
propósitos pero utilizando datos similares, la gestión del control de acceso
es un proceso muy costoso [17]. Por ejemplo, el objetivo principal de Face-
book es compartir fotos y comentarios entre amigos y amigos de amigos. De
forma similar, pero directamente enfocado en conocer gente, Badoo permite
compartir fotos y hacer comentarios. Los usuarios tienen que subir y ges-
tionar el control de acceso en todas las RSs en las que tienen una cuenta, con
independencia de que se utilicen los mismos datos en muchas de ellas.
Por otro lado, los proveedores de servicio de las RSs pueden ser una ame-
naza de la que hay que protegerse [14]. En la mayoría de las RSs los usuarios
establecen qué usuarios pueden acceder a sus datos. Sin embargo, los provee-
dores de servicio tienen el control sobre todo aquello que tienen almacenado,
pudiendo hacer uso de ello para sus propios intereses sin, en muchos casos,
contar con la opinión y/ o el consentimiento de los usuarios.
2. Motivación
En general, el objetivo de la tesis es la mejora del control de acceso en las
RSs, haciendo especial énfasis en permitir que los usuarios puedan expresar
sus preferencias con alta granularidad. La cuestión es imitar la vida real [18].
Los investigadores de las RSs tienen que imitar las interacciones y compor-
tamientos que las personas tienen en su vida cotidiana. En relación con esto,
se debe facilitar la interacción entre distintos usuarios independientemente
del tipo y propósito de la RS.
No obstante, debe recordarse que la privacidad ha de estar por encima de
todo y además de imitar la vida real, la preservación de la privacidad es un
requisito esencial [19].
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3. Metodología de investigación
La metodología de investigación que se ha seguido para el desarrollo de esta
tesis se describe en esta sección.
En primer lugar se ha llevado a cabo un profundo estudio del estado del arte
en relación a la materia y objeto de estudio de la tesis. Se han estudiado las
diferentes áreas relacionadas con el control de acceso y en concreto, con el
control de acceso en RSs
El análisis del estado del arte ha permitido detectar los problemas o caren-
cias y por tanto estipular los objetivos de investigación para esta tesis. En
concreto, en esta tesis se abordan los siguientes cuatro problemas:
P1. Falta de granularidad en los sistemas de control de acceso para
conseguir que los usuarios puedan controlar completamente sus
datos.
Las RSs consisten en una gran cantidad de usuarios que disponen de gran
cantidad de datos y que interactúan entre ellos mediante el establecimien-
to de relaciones. En consecuencia, hay que proporcionar los procedimientos
adecuados que permitan a los usuarios la gestión de sus datos satisfacien-
do todas sus necesidades y, a su vez, preservando su privacidad. Desde el
desarrollo de los modelos de control de accesos tradicionales, generalmente
asociados con los modelos de control de acceso Mandatorio, Discrecional y
basado en Roles (MAC, DAC y RBAC respectivamente), muchos modelos
se han desarrollado en el contexto de las RSs. Algunos de ellos se basan en
la mejora o el refinamiento de los modelos tradicionales, como RBAC, para
adaptarlos a las demandas de las RSs [20, 21]. Por otra parte, se han desa-
rrollado nuevos modelos de control de acceso para satisfacer las necesidades
impuestas por las RSs [22, 23, 24, 25]. Además, los modelos de control de uso
son desarrollos a subrayar. Estos modelos se basan en la gestión del acceso
con anterioridad o mientras se está haciendo uso del dato solicitado [26, 27].
El persistente control de los datos es una característica deseable en las RSs y
los modelos de control de uso son destacables en este respecto. No obstante,
los mecanismos y modelos de control de acceso para las RSs tienen un par
de deficiencias. Primero, no son lo suficientemente expresivos como para per-
mitir que los usuarios especifiquen todas sus preferencias y por ello, no se
proporciona granularidad en la gestión del control de acceso, ej. la especifi-
cación de una relación con una determinada duración y la necesidad de tener
un par de contactos comunes. Segundo, los modelos de control de acceso en
las RSs no están enfocados en el control de uso.
P2. Falta de mecanismos para la gestión de la copropiedad que
6
satisfagan las preferencias de todos los usuarios sin restricciones.
Habitualmente los datos subidos a las RSs pertenecen a múltiples usuarios,
en particular, al propietario, que es el usuario que carga los datos en las
RSs, y a los copropietarios, que son los usuarios relacionados con los datos
cargados. Por ello, el control de acceso tiene que considerar la gestión de
las preferencias de ambos tipos de usuarios, propietarios y copropietarios.
Asimismo, se han de satisfacer las preferencias de todos los usuarios para
prevenir las violaciones de privacidad. Muchas propuestas utilizan mecanis-
mos para gestionar la copropiedad basados en esquemas de votos en base a
lo que diga la mayoría"[28, 29]. Sin embargo, la privacidad de los usuarios
que hayan escogido las preferencias más restrictivas se podría ver compro-
metida. En cambio, propuestas como la desarrollada por K. Thomas et al.
[30] establecen que las políticas de control de acceso sólo se establecerán si se
llega a un consenso entre todos los usuarios. Asímismo, esta solución es muy
limitada porque, en muchos casos, los acuerdos pueden no llegar a encon-
trarse. Por tanto, la gestión de la copropiedad debe preservar la privacidad
de los propietarios y de los copropietarios pero proporcionando flexibilidad
en dicha gestión.
P3. Incapacidad para reutilizar y gestionar datos entre distintas
RSs.
Existen gran varidad de RSs con múltiples propósitos y servicios. Por ejem-
plo, LinkedIn se enforca en el entorno profesional y Facebook está dirigida
al público en general. Dada la falta de interoperabilidad, los usuarios tienen
que crear muchas cuentas, una en cada RS en la que quieran participar. Por
ello, la gestión de los datos puede convertirse en un proceso muy tedioso.
Los datos se almacenan en cada una de las RSs en las que son cargados,
ej. perfiles, fotos, etc., y deben gestionarse independientemente en cada RS.
También hay que considerar que muchos de los datos utilizados en una RS son
análogos a los utilizados en otra, no existiendo posibilidad de reutilización,
ej. algunas de las fotos cargadas en Facebook pueden ser las mismas que
las cargadas en MySpace. En relación con este problema se han desarrolla-
do algunas propuestas. El estándar OpenID2 es un ejemplo, el cual facilita
la interoperabilidad de los datos de identidad. Otro ejemplo es el protocolo
User−Managed Access (UMA) [31, 32]. Entre otras cuestiones, UMA pro-
porciona a los usuarios el control sobre datos compartidos, lo cual es esencial
para conseguir interoperabilidad en relación con los recursos y con las políti-
cas de control de acceso. De hecho, en la práctica no existe ninguna propuesta
que proporcione el acceso a los datos, ej. fotos, o la reutilización de los datos,
2http://openid.net/ , last access Feb. 2014
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ej. políticas de control de acceso, desde una RS a otra.
P4. El desvelado de datos puede dar lugar a la violación de la
privacidad de los usuarios.
Comúnmente conocido, muchas de las noticias que diariamente se nos pre-
sentan informan del continuo desvelado de datos almacenados en las RSs,
bien develados por un proveedor de servicio3 o bien por un atacante4. Los
proveedores de las RSs disponen de los datos que los usuarios cargan en ellas
y, una vez aceptados los Términos de uso del servicio en la fase de registro,
los datos pueden ser utilizados lícitamente para distintos propósitos, ej. mar-
keting. Por otro lado, los proveedores de servicio, además de utilizar los datos
de forma lícita (lo cual puede llegar a violar la privacidad de los usuarios),
indican la utilización de medidas de seguridad para prevenir el desvelado o la
entrega de datos de forma desautorizada. Sin embargo, múltiples ataques se
han producido en RSs muy populares5, llegándose a comprometer los datos
de los usuarios. Por ello, los datos tienen que ser protegidos contra atacantes
internos o externos, es decir, contra el uso lícito de los datos por parte de
los proveedores de servicio y contra el uso ilícito de los datos por parte de
los atacantes. Independientemente de lo indicado por Términos de uso del
servicio, la privacidad debe preservarse. Para abordar este problema la crip-
tografía ha sido una de las técnicas más utilizadas en la literatura [33, 34].
Los datos se almacenan cifrados y las claves de descifrado se distribuyen en-
tre los usuarios autorizados. El problema principal de las RSs es que cada
usuario está relacionado con un conjunto de usuarios con el que habría que
distribuir las claves y, por ello, la gestión de las mismas es una tarea costosa
a la que hay que buscar solución.
Considerendo los problemas anteriores, el objetivo de esta tesis es facilitar
la gestión del acceso con alta granularidad, entre distintas RSs, a lo largo de
todo el proceso de uso, y preservando la privacidad.
Por tanto, dada la necesidad de proporcionar dicho control, las necesidades
a abordar en esta tesis se identifican en los siguientes objetivos:
O1. El desarrollo de un modelo expresivo que permita que los usuarios
puedan expresar todas sus preferencias, asi como elmodelo administrativo
asociado.
3http://www.digitaleyemedia.com/blog/boxes−you−want−to−uncheck−on−linkedin,
last access Feb. 2014
4http://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook−security/protecting−people−on−facebook
/10151249208250766, last access Feb. 2014
5http://allfacebook.com/camera−bug−security−loophole−version−1−1−2_b107435,
last access Feb. 2014
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O2. El desarrollo de un mecanismo para la gestión de la copropiedad
que permita gestionar las preferencias de los propietarios y de los
copropietarios, satisfaciendo las preferencias de privacidad de todos ellos.
O3. El desarrollo de un mecanismo para conseguir interoperabilidad
y reusabilidad entre distintas RSs, reduciendo la necesidad de tener
distintas cuentas en distintas RSs.
O4. El desarrollo de unmecanismo para proteger el acceso a los datos
de forma no autorizada, protegiéndose así la privacidad de los usuario y
además, considerando una fácil gestión de las claves utilizadas.
4. Contribuciones
Las contibuciones de esta tesis son las siguientes:
C1. Modelo expresivo de control de uso para RSs, junto con el mo-
delo administrativo complementario, que faciliten la gestión del control
de acceso con alta granularidad. Dibujando a la RS como un grafo en el
que los usuarios son los nodos y las relaciones son las aristas, se proponen
SoNeUCONABC y SoNeUCONADM . SoNeUCONABC es una extensión del
modelo UCONABC que consigue expresividad en base a un total de seis ca-
racterísticas asociadas a las RSs. UCONABC es un modelo de control de uso
basado en la gestión de atributos. Este modelo es extendido para gestionar
los atributos de los usuarios, de los datos y de las relaciones. La gestión del
control de acceso se realiza preservando la privacidad, de modo que además
de los atributos del administrador y del solicitante de un dato en particular,
los atributos del resto de nodos asociados a la relación entre ambos, per-
manecen ocultos. Adicionalmente, se propone SoNeUCONADM , el modelo
administrativo de SoNeUCONABC , el cual define la gestión de la revocación,
la delegación y otras tareas administrativas. La adecuación de ambos mode-
los es evaluada. En SoNeUCONABC se estudia, teóricamente, la posibili-
dad de gestionar todas las características identificadas. Además, el tiempo
de ejecución de la verificación de las políticas es empíricamente analizado,
concluyéndose así la posibilidad de implementar el modelo. Por otro lado, la
evaluación de SoNeUCONADM requiere analizar la completitud de las tareas
administrativas proporcionadas.
C2. Mecanismo para la gestión de la copropiedad basado en obje-
tos que pueden descomponerse, preservándose la privacidad de los pro-
pietarios y de los copropietarios. Los datos manejados en las RSs pueden
no estar relacionados con un único usuario, sino con un conjunto de co-
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propietarios, siendo éste el motivo por que el se ha desarrollado Co−owned
Personal Data management (CooPeD). CooPeD presenta una novedosa téc-
nica para preservar la privacidad de todos los usuarios, satisfaciendo to-
das las preferencias de los usuarios sin restricciones. Inspirado en [35], los
objetos se descomponen en partes y a cada una de ellas se le asigna un
usuario. Posteriormente, cada usuario, bien un propietario o un copropieta-
rio, gestiona el control de acceso sobre su parte considerando sus preferen-
cias de privacidad. De igual modo, CooPeD se desarrolla sobre los modelos
SoNeUCONABC y SoNeUCONADM , extendiendo ambos para poder ges-
tionar la copropiedad. CooPeD se evalúa analizando la posibilidad de im-
plementarlo sobre SoNeUCONABC , desarrollando una implementación del
mismo y realizando una encuesta para determinar su usabilidad.
C3. Mecanismos para conseguir interoperabilidad y reusabilidad
entre distintas RSs incluyendo la minimización sobre los datos ex-
puestos. Se han propuesto un par de protocolos desarrollados sobre una
versión simplificada de SoNeUCONABC . Como primer paso, basado en el
protocolo UMA [31] y en el proyecto FOAF [36], se presenta el protocolo para
RSs UMA+FOAF (U+F). Este protocolo proporciona interoperabilidad en
base a recursos, datos de identidad y políticas de control de acceso entre dis-
tintas RSs, donde los recursos se corresponden principalmente con las fotos,
los videos o los comentarios, y los datos de identidad se corresponden con los
perfiles y los datos de los contactos. Este protocolo gestiona relaciones direc-
tas. Seguidamente, se propone el protocolo extendido UMA+FOAF (eU+F),
incluyendo la protección de los datos contra los proveedores de servicio de
las RSs y la gestión de las relaciones indirectas, dado que esta última ca-
racterística es esencial para gestionar el acceso con alta granularidad. Las
relaciones indirectas facilitan la gestión de las características que las RSs
deben gestionar, como son los múltiples caminos [13]. Esta contribución se
ha evaluado calculando los tiempos de ejecución en las distintas fases de los
protocolos, asi como realizando una comparación de los mismos con dos popu-
lares RSs, Facebook y MySpace. De igual modo, se compara conjuntamente
U+F y eU+F.
En la Tabla 1, se puede identificar la relación entre los problemas identifica-
dos, los objetivos planteados y las contribuciones realizadas
Todas las cuestiones planteadas son, en nuestra opición, un paso para la
mejora en la gestión del control de acceso en las RSs. Todas las contribuciones
de esta tesis se resumen en la Figura 1. El proceso comienza cargando y
gestionando los datos en las RSs, junto con el establecimiento de las políticas
de control de acceso (mensaje 1 de la Figura 1). Posteriormente, los usuarios
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Problema Objectivo Contribución
P1: Falta de granulari-
dad en los sistemas de
control de acceso.
O1: Modelo de uso ex-
presivo y el adminis-
trativo asociado.
C1: Un modelo de uso
expresivo para RSs y
el complementario ad-
ministrativo.
P2: Falta de mecanis-
mos para la gestión
de la copropiedad que
satisfagan las prefe-
rencias de todos los
usuarios.
O2: Mecanismo
para gestionar la
copropiedad satisfa-
ciendo las preferencias
de propietario y
copropietarios.
C2: Un mecanismo
para gestionar la co-
propiedad en objetos
que pueden descom-
ponerse.
P3: Incapacidad para
reutilizar y gestionar
datos entre distintas
RSs.
O3: Interoperabilidad
y reusabilidad entre
distintas RSs.
C3: Mecanismo para
alcanzar interoperabili-
dad y reusabilidad en-
tre distintas RSs tam-
P4: El desvelado de
datos puede dar lugar
a la violación de la pri-
vacidad.
O4: Mecanismo para
proteger el acceso a los
datos de forma no au-
torizada.
bién minimizando el ac-
ceso a datos desautori-
zados.
Cuadro 1: Relación ente problemas, objetivos y contribuciones.
pueden solicitar datos de otros usuarios, bien estando dichos usuarios en su
misma RS o en otra diferente, incluyendo usuarios directamente (mensaje 2
de Figura 1) o indirectamente (mensaje 3 de la Figura 1) conectados. Además,
los accesos desautorizados a los datos se previenen aplicando criptografía y
gestionando el control de acceso a lo largo de todo el proceso de uso (mensaje
3 de la Figura 1). Asimismo, hay que considerar que en caso de existir datos en
copropiedad, el control de acceso se realiza en base a las políticas establecidas
por los propietarios y por los copropietarios de los datos (mensaje 4 de la
Figura 1)
Finalmente, hay que tener en cuenta que problemas de privacidad causados
por el uso de elementos externos, como pueden ser las cámaras digitales, u
otros sistemas para la grabación de las actividades que se realizan en la pan-
talla, están fuera del alcance de esta tesis. Por otro lado, se considera que los
usuarios con los que se establece una relación siempre son considerados confia-
bles. Por ello, la identificación de cambios inesperados en el comportamiento
de los usuarios se deja para trabajo futuro. En caso de que el comportamien-
to de los usuarios difiera del común, ej. utilizando un servidor de anonimato
para preservar su identidad, dichos usuarios se considerarían como no con-
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Figura 1: Visión general del las contribuciones
fiables, siendo las herramientas para la detección de estos comportamientos
un primer paso en la investigación de este problema.
Los resultados de investigación publicados en revistas y congresos científicos
durante el desarrollo de la tesis se listan a continuación:
Publicados (basados en la tesis):
1. L. González-Manzano, Ana I. González-Tablas, J. M de Fuentes, A.
Ribagorda. U+F Social Network Protocol: Achieving interoperability
and reusability between Web Based Social Networks". 2012 IEEE 11th
International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing
and Communications, 2012.
2. L. González-Manzano, Ana I. González-Tablas, J. M de Fuentes, B.
Ramos. Control de Acceso en Redes Sociales Web". XII Reunión es-
pañola sobre Criptología y Seguridad de la Información (RECSI), 2012.
3. L. González-Manzano, Ana I. González-Tablas, J. M de Fuentes, A.
Ribagorda. Security and Privacy Preserving in Social Networks. Springer.
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Capíputulo User-Managed Access Control in Web Based Social Net-
works", 2013.
4. L. González-Manzano, Ana I. González-Tablas, J. M de Fuentes, A.
Ribagorda. "Seguridad en Redes Sociales: problemas, tendencias y re-
tos futuros", VII Congreso Iberoamericano en Seguridad Informática
(CIBSI), 2013.
5. L. González-Manzano, Ana I. González-Tablas, J. M de Fuentes, A.
Ribagorda. SoNeUCONABC , an expressive usage control model for
Web-Based Social Networks", Computers & Security, 2014.
6. L. González-Manzano, B. Brost, M.Aumüller. An architecture for trust-
ed PaaS cloud computing for personal data", WorkshopWissenschaftliche
Ergebnisse der Trusted Cloud Initiative, Springer Verlag, 2014.
7. L. González-Manzano, Ana I. González-Tablas, J. M de Fuentes, A.
Ribagorda. Extended U+F Social Network Protocol: Interoperability,
reusability, data protection and indirect relationships in Web Based
Social Networks", Systems and Software.
8. L. González-Manzano, Ana I. González-Tablas, J. M de Fuentes, A.
Ribagorda. SoNeUCONADM : the administrative model for SoNeUCONABC
usage control model", XIII Reunión española sobre Criptología y Se-
guridad de la Información (RECSI), 2014.
L. González-Manzano, Ana I. González-Tablas, J. M de Fuentes, A.
Ribagorda. CooPeD: Co-owned Personal Data Management", Com-
puters & Security, 2014.
Publicados (relacionados con la tesis):
9 L. González-Manzano, B. Brost, M.Aumüller. An architecture for trust-
ed PaaS cloud computing for personal data", WorkshopWissenschaftliche
Ergebnisse der Trusted Cloud Initiative, Springer Verlag, 2014 in Press.
Enviados (relacionados con la tesis):
10 E. Palomar, L. González-Manzano, A. Alcaide, A. Galán. Implement-
ing a Privacy-enhanced ABC System for Online Social Networks with
Co-Ownership Management", Computer Networks.
11 L. González-Manzano, Ana I. González-Tablas, J. M de Fuentes, A.
Ribagorda. Towards a trade-off between privacy and rewards in Web-
Based Social Networks advertising", Information Systems.
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12 L. González-Manzano, J. M de Fuentes, Ana I. González-Tablas, A.
Ribagorda. VAADapt - Adapting VAAD for an enriched and privacy-
preserving advertisement dissemination in VANETs", Information Sci-
ences.
5. Conclusiones
Esta tesis se basa en proporcionar control de acceso con alta granularidad en-
tre distintas redes sociales, preservando la privacidad. Esto ayuda a disminuir
las amenazas causadas por tres cuestiones. Primero, los sistemas de control
de acceso impiden que los usuarios expresen todas sus preferencias y con-
trolen la copropiedad de sus datos. Segundo, la gestión del control de acceso
en distinta RSs es un proceso tedioso e incómodo. Finalmente, los provee-
dores de servicio de las RSs almacenan los datos y estos pueden utilizarse
para propósitos no deseados.
Existen muchas contribuciones relacionadas con la gestión del control de
acceso en RSs, asi como mecanismos que son candidatos para conseguir inte-
roperabilidad y reusabilidad entre distintas RSs. Sin embargo, las propuestas
existentes no están enfocadas en conseguir expresividad en la gestión del ac-
ceso, ni tampoco interoperabilidad, reusabilidad y prevención contra accesos
desautorizados a los datos. Para abordar estos problemas, esta tesis propone
un modelo de control de uso expresivo, asi como el modelo administrativo
complementario. Sobre ambos modelos se desarrollan un mecanismo para la
gestión de la copropiedad y un par de protocolos para conseguir interopera-
bilidad y reusabilidad entre distintas RSs.
La primera contribución de esta tesis consiste en la definición del modelo
de control de uso anteriormente mencionado, asi como el modelo adminis-
trativo que le acompaña, denominados SoNeUCONABC y SoNeUCONADM
respectivamente. SoNeUCONABC es un modelo de control de uso expresivo,
que permite gestionar un total de seis características (distancia, contactos
comunes, cliqués, múltiples caminos, dirección y elementos flexibles en las
políticas de control de acceso) a lo largo de todo el proceso de uso. Teórica-
mente se ha identificado que todas las características pueden ser gestionadas
por el modelo y empíricamente, se ha analizado que el modelo puede imple-
mentarse en la mayoría de los casos. Para realizar la evaluación empírica se
ha creado una prueba de concepto. Considerando que 2.000 ms. es el tiempo
máximo que un usuario va a esperar para que la información se le muestre
por pantalla, los resultados muestran que la verificanción de políticas que no
incluyen cliqués es satisfactoria si la cantidad de nodos explorados no excede
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de 200.000 y 200 relaciones por nodo. Además, la evaluación de políticas con
cliqués se considera exitosa si se exploran menos de 30.000 nodos y cada nodo
tiene menos de 200 relaciones. Por tanto, es posible considerar la adecuación
del modelo en el contexto de las RSs.
Asimismo, SoNeUCONADM , el modelo administrativo de SoNeUCONABC ,
proporciona todas las tareas administrativas identificadas basadas en la gestión
de los derechos de uso y de los derechos administrativos. La completitud del
modelo se identifica mediante una comparación teórica con los modelos ad-
ministrativos asociados a UCONABC . por ser el modelo en que se basa, y a
RBAC, por disponer de un modelo administrativo muy maduro.
Intentando gestionar la copropiedad de los datos en las RSs y tomando co-
mo base los modelos SoNeUCONABC y SoNeUCONADM , la segunda con-
tribución de esta tesis es un mecanismo llamado Co−owned Personal Data
management, CooPeD. Éste es un novedoso mecanismo basado en la gestión
de objetos que pueden descomponerse, considerando las preferencias de los
propietarios y de los copropietarios. Utilizando la misma prueba de concep-
to desarrollada para la evaluación de SoNeUCONABC , se ha estudiado la
posibilidad de implementar CooPeD sobre dicho modelo. Como resultado se
concluye que si un par de usuarios está relacionado con una estructure rt
compuesta por relaciones directas, se pueden llegar a evaluar un máximo de
34 políticas por objeto sin exceder el umbral de los 2000 ms. Por el contrario,
si un par de usuarios está relacionado con una estructura rt compuesta por
relaciones indirectas (de 2 saltos), sólo es posible evaluar 4 políticas por ob-
jeto. Además, se ha desarrollado un prototipo para verificar la posibilidad
de implementar CooPeD. Por último, y en base al prototipo anterior, se ha
realizado una encuesta para estudiar la utilidad del mecanismo, la cual ha
sido completada por 206 personas de todo el mundo, llegando a la conclusión
de que el 72.6% de los encuestados podrían llegar a ser potenciales usuarios
de CooPeD.
Además de las cuestiones anteriores, la gran cantidad de RSs y la gestión de
los datos en todas ellas puede provocar problemas de privacidad. Los usua-
rios tienen que gestionar los datos en todas las RSs en las que tengan una
cuenta. Por ello, basado en una simplificación de SoNeUCONABC , la tercera
contribución consiste en el desarrollo de un par de protocolos para conseguir
interoperabilidad y reusabilidad entre distintas RSs. Uno de los protocolos,
denominado protocolo UMA+FOAF (U+F), proporciona interoperabilidad
y reusabilidad de datos de identidad, recursos y políticas de control de ac-
ceso entre distintas RSs, consiguiendose así simplificar la gestión del control
de acceso. Extendiendo este protocolo, se propone el protocolo extendido
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UMA+FOAF (eU+F) para la protección de los datos frente a los provee-
dores de servicio y la gestión de las relaciones indirectas. Ambos protocolos
se evalúan empírica y teóricamente. La satisfacción de todos los requisitos
establecidos se ha analizado de forma teórica, así como los efectos de la
reutilización en las distintas fases del protocolo. Además, se ha creado un
prototipo, compuesto por dos RSs, FriendBook+ y MyLeisure, para analizar
la posibilidad de implementar y desplegar estos protocolos. Este estudio con-
siste en medir el tiempo de ejecución de cada una de las fases de los protoco-
los, junto con una comparación con dos RSs de alta popularidad, Facebook
y MySpace. Los resultados demuestran que, en general, acceder al perfil y
a una foto de un contacto en Facebook o en MySpace produce un menor
tiempo de ejecución que acceder al perfil y a una foto desde FriendBook+ a
MyLeisure. Sin embargo, éste tiempo es comparable con el prototipo cuando
algunos elementos son reutilizados.
6. Análisis crítico
El modelo de control de uso SoNeUCONABC , basado en proporcionar con-
trol de acceso con alta expresividad en las RSs, sienta las base de todas
las contribuciones de esta tesis. Sin embargo, la adecuación del lenguaje de
políticas propuesto, en relación con las expectativas y los intereses de los
usuarios, debe ser evaluado.
Una questión importante se plantea en cuanto al motivo por el cual construir
SoNeUCONABC a partir de UCONABC en lugar de utilizar otro modelo.
En un primer momento la necesidad de gestionar las relaciones apoya la
utilización de modelos basados en relaciones (RelBAC). Por el contrario,
aunque las relaciones son elementos fundamentales, los estudios revelan la
necesidad de gestionar, entre otros, atributos de usuarios y de objetos. Por
tanto, atendiendo a las demandas de las RSs, la gestión de los atributos es
esencial, siendo UCONABC un buen punto de partida.
En relación con el modelo administrativo, SoNeUCONADM , su implementación,
bien en un entorno real o simulado, se plantea como trabajo futuro. Especí-
ficamente, la evaluación realizada no estudia la satisfacción de los usuarios.
CooPeD, el mecanismo propuesto para la gestión de la copropiedad, trabaja
sobre objetos que pueden descomponerse pero su gestión presenta dos limi-
taciones. Por un lado, la descomposición de objetos requiere la identificación
de las partes de cada uno de los objetos, siendo necesario superar las limi-
taciones de las herramientas para descomponer los objetos. Los propietarios
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pueden descomponer manualmente los objetos pero las descomposiciones au-
tomáticas son preferibles. Por ejemplo, la descomposición de un conjunto de
usuarios que están bailando y abrazándose entre ellos es una tarea de gran
complejidad. Por otra parte, la gestión de partes de los objetos que pertenecen
a múltiples usuarios ha de ser estudiada, aunque éste es un tema que está
fuera del ámbito de esta tesis y se presenta como trabajo futuro. Por ejemplo,
asumiendo que una pareja está enfrente de su coche, la imagen se descom-
pone en tres partes, dos partes en relación con cada uno de los miembros de
la pareja y otra asociada con el coche. En este escenario se debe determinar
quién y cómo se han de establecer las políticas de control de acceso sobre el
coche.
Respecto a conseguir interoperabilidad y reusabilidad entre distintas RSs se
ha desarrollado U+F y su versión extendida eU+F. Ambos protocolos se
construyen sobre una versión simplificada del modelo SoNeUCONABC . Sin
embargo, se ha discutido cómo eU+F puede extenderse para gestionar todas
las características del modelo SoNeUCONABC . En concreto, en relación con
el control de uso, cuando se detectan modificaciones, inclusiones o borrados
en los atributos o en las políticas, es posible que se requiera la re-evaluación
de las políticas. No obstante, este hecho puede afectar al rendimiento del
protocolo, siendo indispensable un riguroso análisis en base a la gestión del
control de uso. Por otra parte, eU+F debe gestionar todas las características
que SoNeUCONABC proporciona, tanto en la gestión de la estructura rt
como en la evaluación de políticas sobre dicha estructura. Sin embargo, la
construcción de rt es compleja y se ha de estudiar el mejor modo de realizar
su construcción.
En base a los modelos de confianza propuestos en los protocolos presentados,
el propuesto en U+F es bastante restrictivo, siendo éste mejorado en eU+F.
En primer lugar, eU+F asume proveedores de identidad (IdP) confiables.
Entidades que almacenan datos personales son presumiblemente confiables
ya que, de lo contrario, la privacidad de los usuarios podría violarse. En con-
creto, los IdPs almacenan datos de identidad y las claves de descifrado de
los recursos, de modo que si estas entidades actúan maliciosamente todos
los datos de los usuarios podrían estar comprometidos. De forma similar,
otra suposición es considerar a los gestores de autorización (AMs) entidades
confiables. Esta suposición también ayuda a proteger la privacidad de los
usuarios. La información recibida por los AMs es utilizada para evaluar las
políticas de control de acceso y conseguir los tokens. Sin embargo, los to-
kens tienen que ser firmados por la RS adecuada y presentados a los Hosts
e IdPs correspondientes para, finalmente, obtener los datos solicitados. En
una situación opuesta, esto es, en caso de que AMs no confiables entren en
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juego, estos pueden entregar tokens a las RSs y éstas podrían acquirir datos
ilegítimamente.
Finalmente, hay que analizar la gestión de los datos tras su entrega. Esta
cuestión, conocida con el nombre de sticky policies en base a los requisitos
de Gates et al. [37], es abordada en esta tesis mediante la construcción de
SoNeUCONABC a partir del modelo de control de uso UCONABC . Sin em-
bargo, aunque este modelo gestiona el control de uso, todavía se considera
trabajo futuro la realización práctica de este requisito.
7. Trabajos futuros
Las propuestas presentadas en esta tesis están abiertas a nuevos desarrollos,
los cuales contribuyen en la completitud de este trabajo, así como proporcio-
nan una amplia visión del control de acceso en RSs.
Respecto a SoNeUCONABC , sería deseable la implementación de un algorit-
mo eficiente para la evaluación de cliqués, así como un análisis a gran escala.
Asimismo, la identificación de un catálogo de atributos (de objetos, de suje-
tos y de relaciones) se plantea como un trabajo deseable. Además, también
se ha de estudiar la complejidad en la construción de las políticas.
Por otro lado, el siguiente paso en relación con la mejora de SoNeUCONADM
es la gestión temporal de las delegaciones.
El estudio de la curiosidad que los usuarios pueden tener al utilizar CooPeD
es otra línea de trabajo futuro. Particularmente, aunque se utilicen técnicas
de ocultación sofisticadas para ocultar las partes de los objetos, se han de
estudiar cuestiones como ¾quién/ qué está bajo la parte escondida del objeto?
o ¾cómo puedo llegar a conocer/lo?, etc.
Otra línea de desarrollo futuro es la mejora del prototipo implementado para
CooPeD. Se deberían desarrollar técnicas sofisticadas para la detección de
las siluetas de los usuarios, consiguiendo realizar ocultaciones con alta pre-
cisión. De igual modo, el prototipo podría extenderse para detectar, no sólo
personas, sino también vehículos, animales, etc.
En relación con U+F y eU+F, dado que el segundo se basa en el primero
los retos futuros se asocian a eU+F. Este protocolo puede extenderse de
distintos modos. Primero y más importante, el prototipo desarrollado debe
desplegarse en un entorno real, incluyendo la gestión de relaciones indirectas
y el control de uso a lo largo de todo el proceso de uso. También, eU+F debe
funcionar sobre SoNeUCONADM .
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Además, la especificación de restricciones y reglas para determinar qué se
considera un IdP, una RS o un AM (Gestor de Autorización, en inglés Autho-
rization Manager) confiable, es una cuestión abierta. Otra cuestión relevante
es que, actualmente, el protocolo aborta si un AM, IdP o RS no es confia-
ble. Por tanto, como trabajo futuro se plantea la especificación dinámica de
entidades confiables.
Asociado a todas las contribuciones de esta tesis, un siguiente paso de desa-
rrollo es la protección de la privacidad de los usuarios previniendo a las RSs
la inferencia de las relaciones de los usuarios. Actualmente, las relaciones so-
ciales pueden inferirse y aunque esto no afecta directamente a la privacidad
de los usuarios se han de establecer contramedidas frente a las necesidades
demandadas. En concreto, propuestas como la desarrollada por Carminati et
al. [38], basadas en la protección de las relaciones por medio de certificados,
se pueden tomar como punto de partida.
También relacionado con todas las contribuciones, J. Park et al. propone la
distinción entre usuarios y sesiones [39], pudiendo llegar a definir políticas
en base a las sesiones de los distintos usuarios. Por ello, el trabajo futuro
consiste en el estudio de nuevas propuestas para incluir esta cuestión en los
modelos y los mecanismos propuestos.
Por último pero no menos importante, la especificación de técnicas y me-
canismos de control de datos tras su entrega, es otra línea futura. En cierto
modo esta característica se puede considerar satisfecha debido a la aplicación
de un modelo de control de uso. Sin embargo, aunque hay trabajos realizados
en esta dirección [40, 41] y esta tesis proporciona algunas guías, se requiren
más detalles.
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